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INTRODUCTION

TO

DOGMATIC THEOLOGY

BY THE

REV. FRANCIS J. HALL, D.D.

PROFESSOR OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY IN THE WESTERN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

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Dedicated

TO THE

SACRED MEMORY

OF THE

REV. JAMES DE KOVEN, D.D.

SAINT AND THEOLOGIAN

PREFACE

The writer hopes to produce a series of ten volumes, of which this is the first, as follows:

I. Introduction.
II. Authority, Ecclesiastical and Biblical.
III. The Divine Being and Attributes.
IV. The Trinity.
V. Creation and Man.
VI. The Incarnation.
VII. The Redemption and Exaltation of Christ.
VIII. The Church.
IX. The Sacraments.
X. Eschatology and Indexes.

The precise delimitation of these volumes is subject to future modification. Each volume will constitute a complete work in itself; but, if God permits their completion, they will together form a connected treatise of Dogmatic Theology. It is intended to issue these volumes, should nothing prevent, at intervals of from twelve to eighteen months.

Anglican literature contains no systematic work of this kind on a large scale, and the need of one has been keenly felt in many quarters. It is obviously a grave misfortune that our students cannot find any extended systematic treatise on divine truth without resorting to Latin literature or to the works of dissenters.

The writer has already produced a small series of *Theological Outlines;* but it is a sense of the need of what he is undertaking to produce, and a belief that a higher will than his own has prompted and sanctioned his purpose, rather than consciousness of adequate equipment, that has impelled him to so serious a venture.

The practical principles which he believes should be observed in a work of this kind are sufficiently indicated in various chapters of this volume. But two of them may well be defined at the outset. The first of these is faithfulness to the aim of exhibiting accurately, coherently, persuasively, and charitably the immutable body of truths contained in the primitive catholic faith. The other is to employ methods of treatment and forms of thought and language which are likely to be intelligible and persuasive to living men, whose minds are inevitably formed to a degree by the general knowledge and thought of their own time.

But without divine grace no method and no skill will enable one rightly to divide the word of truth. The reader's prayers are earnestly asked that God may bless this undertaking for His own glory and the welfare of souls.

Grateful thanks are here rendered to many generous ones whose kind subscriptions have made possible the publication of this volume.

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(*c*) The theistic hypothesis emerges in various ways. Its acquisition may be largely or wholly implicit.

(*d*) A more or less secure belief in the truth of this hypothesis develops, natural instinct leading to this when not hindered.

(*e*) The "venture of faith," whether deliberate and conscious or not, follows; and the individual lives as if God exists.

(*f*) This causes greater assurance, and finally the certainty of knowledge.

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Partisans in every school or party, although their respective members are not necessarily partisan.

Partisanship tends to heresy — the choice of a truth to emphasize and caricature, with denial of its counter truth. This illustrated by Arius, Apollinaris, Nestorius, and Eutyches — partisans "writ large," formally logical but using inadequate premises. So Calvin.

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Aristotle used the phrase in ethical practice, and the Church of England in ceremonial, both admitting of degree.

Anglicans have come into the line of fire between Rome and dissent, but this *via media* an evil accident, not an ideal.

Insularity induced, and desire to avoid whatever is Roman or protestant — called extremes. Thus Newman and others sought a *via media* in doctrine.

A misleading use of terms, and narrowing in effect, although some adopt it in the sense of comprehensive balance — unhistorical and not obvious.

The phrase also used to exclude additions and subtractions in doctrine: — unusual, and merely negative.

Commonly expresses moderation in doctrine, implying degrees in truth, and confusing. Moderate and extreme doctrine non-existent. Doctrine is true or false, with no middle. "Moderation" describes judicious temper, but does not warrant rejection of truth because caricatured.

All truths to be cherished. To seek a *via media* in doctrine narrows and misleads 174

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Positively it places a theologian at the centre of things. He is scientific, fearless, treasuring what he inherits and every legitimate development past or present. Loyal to

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§ 3. The catholic value of Anglican authority, faith, and order, and of an Anglican's submission thereto, is here maintained.

This obedience is both doctrinal and practical. It includes explicitly acceptance of the catholic Creeds and Ecumenical Councils. Anglican appeal to antiquity.

Also acceptance of Anglican formularies, their non-disagreement with the ecumenical faith being implied, — *i.e.*, the Prayer Book and Articles of Religion. All bound, although the clergy required to subscribe more specifically than others.

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§ 4. Ambiguous and obscure phrases have been interpreted otherwise, but wrongly.

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The Articles were imposed as an eirenicon rather than Confession of Faith. Confusing and dangerous controversy rather than formal heresy had in view by Convocation.

Although heresies abounded, it was thought inopportune to define more closely. Dependence for both peace and orthodoxy placed on eirenical generalities, and the enforcement of conformity in worship. Political influences set this way, and dominated.

The Articles not intended to innovate in doctrine, and reaffirm the dogmas of the Creeds and Ecumenical Councils, while repudiating leading errors of the day.

Forcing of issues avoided, but nothing distinctively Calvinistic accepted. The Calvinists disliked the Articles. Catholic effect of the royal declaration. Calvinistic interpretation originated later with the evangelicals, but created a new tradition. Thus Tract XC seemed disingenuous, although it revived the true method of interpretation.

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§ 7. Practical rules involved:

(*a*) To preserve the terms of the catholic Creeds and Ecumenical Councils;

(*b*) To avoid repudiation of terms generally employed by catholic writers — *e.g.*, the wider meaning and application of the term Sacrament. Judicious reserve permissible here.

(*c*) To feel free to avoid terms of mere schools of theology, or of other provincial parts of the Church, provided catholic doctrine is not prejudiced. For example, terms that mislead among Anglicans, such as "transubstantiation." Foreign terms should be borrowed with discrimination. Insularity also undesirable.

(*d*) To do justice to the language of Anglican formularies, recovering it from defective interpretation. The language of a catholic body, which binds Anglicans. No deceit involved.

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(*b*) A Church may express, and change the expression of her mind on, such views, in the interests of her dogmatic office.

(*c*) Such views should not assume a dominating influence, or determine our views of catholic doctrine.

(*d*) They should not be strenuously defended or attacked, not being demonstrably certain or provably

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(*b*) Is rationalistic.

(*c*) The truths in human systems are broken reflections of what Christianity exhibits correctly.

(*d*) The organic nature of divine truth neglected.

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(*a*) The true idea of religion — a covenant relation to God — to be discovered in its fully developed form, Christianity.

(*b*) Religion has developed on two lines: under supernatural guidance, and apart from authentic revelation.

(*c*) Non-biblical religions embody elements of nature's teaching and represent seeking after God. Their failure to find God constitutes their falsity.

(*d*) These religions convey truths that prepare men for Christianity; but do not themselves develop, as did Mosaism, into Christianity. They must give way to it.

(*e*) Modern Judaism an arrested development — neither a substitute for Christianity, nor now possessed of covenant security.

(*f*) Genuine religion seeks relations with God. Non-genuine religion, so called because due to the religious instinct, does not — *e.g.*, Buddhism.

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(*b*) Philosophy is a useful handmaid of theology, not its mistress.

(*c*) Theologians should not commit themselves to any speculative philosophy, or allow its point of view to determine their theological conclusions.

(*d*) A historical study of philosophy is especially helpful, and a needed preparation for studying particular systems.

(*e*) Apologetical theology most directly aided by philosophy, although Dogmatic Theology borrows philosophical terms to define revealed truths, crystallizing them in theological meanings.

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The technical elements secure precise and coherent knowledge. This knowledge none the less for practical ends. It is vain otherwise.

Revealed truths not imposed to burden minds, although there is a probation in faith. Doctrine is necessary as subserving practical interests. Theology should show this 220

§ 2. Many clergy know doctrine chiefly in the abstract, through inadequate study. Technical theology thus discredited.

(*a*) Truths do not appeal in merely abstract exhibition, but seem unreal. Rationalism often the result of such inadequate knowledge and desire for the practical.

(*b*) Mere technical tyros fail in doctrinal preaching, and turn to moral truisms and secular topics. The cause of dislike of dogmatic preaching lies here. True Gospel preaching unites the dogmatic and practical, and demands both technical study and practical mastery.

(*c*) The same considerations hold in apologetics. Inadequate study of dogma impoverishes the subject-matter of argument, and reduces the persuasiveness of, what is left.

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(*a*) Sufficient mastery of theological technicalities for security and soundness. Every preacher can attain this much. Technicalities furnish the skeleton, needing to be filled out, illustrated, and applied. They belong to the study — not the pulpit usually.

(*b*) Study of the history of doctrine and of the Church's

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conflict with error. Thus the practical reasons for an accurate faith are learned, as well as the precise nature of ecumenical teaching.

(*c*) Extended reading and study of Scripture, which exhibits divine truth in objective setting, as nature does the truths of physical science, and illustrates them practically.

(*d*) Moral and ascetic theology. The connecting link between Dogmatic Theology and the priest's daily experience, summarizing the experience of countless predecessors. Repetition of ancient blunders avoided by its study.

Two hints given in passing on topics for sermons:

(1) The topics should not be unfamiliar to the preacher. Young preachers should avoid betraying their immaturity in practical matters.

(2) Sermons on the spiritual life very effective in showing the connection between doctrine and life.

(*e*) Divine truth needs to be defined freshly all along in the preacher's mind by habitual reading of accurate treatises of classic rank — both general treatises and monographs 225

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In effect theology is the science of religion, although not by definition, exhibiting realities that determine true religion 230

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Such faith includes a trustful docility towards God and all divinely authorized teaching — a specialization of the trust required in all science.

This trust grounded in a filial spirit, as towards the Author of our being and of our own reason, which is deepened by considering our special relations to God in redemption, adoption, and grace.

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Mere acuteness no guarantee of real success in theology, although acuteness is valuable 235

§ 8. Thus ascetic self-discipline necessary for theologians, although specious and temporary reputations are acquired by the undisciplined.

No perfect saint or perfect theologian, save Christ, ever appeared on earth. Yet genuine holiness can be

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acquired to a degree, and it is possible to become a sound theologian. Catholic theology the fruit of joint labour of many saints 238

§ 9. Love the primary element in holiness which makes theological success possible — the love that centres in God. It alone enables the child of God to appreciate the mind of the Father. It is intuitive.

Thus penitent sinners better qualified than others, for penitence means a triumph of love; which is the germ and, in development, the esse of perfection 239

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(*a*) *Understanding* enables us to perceive the true nature of divine mysteries. It is analytical.

(*b*) *Wisdom* teaches us the bearings and spiritual value of divine truths, therefore their likelihood. It is synthetic, and facilitates scientific co-ordination.

(*c*) *Knowledge* like understanding is analytical, but pertains to the accurate perception of moral principles and laws.

(*d*) *Counsel* is analogous to wisdom, and facilitates practical judgment — especially valuable to casuistical theologians.

As doctrine and life are mutually illuminative, these last gifts are useful for dogmatic theologians.

(*e*) *Ghostly strength* affords courage for the venture of faith and fortifies the theological faculties.

(*f*) *True godliness* deepens tender affection for divine things, and ministers thus to appreciation of divine truth.

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(*g*) *Holy fear*, to be distinguished from servile, mundane, and initial fear, is actuated by love; and is anxiety to please God, accompanied by reverence for the divine majesty. It protects theologians from presumptuous handling of sacred topics and consequent superficiality 244

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INTRODUCTION TO DOGMATIC THEOLOGY

CHAPTER I

THE SCIENCE OF THEOLOGY

I. *The Point of View*

§ 1. The point of view from which this work is undertaken is both catholic and Anglican. The writer believes that the Churches in communion with the see of Canterbury are true portions of the Catholic Church. He is convinced that these Churches are co-inheritors with the Eastern and Roman Churches of an ancient faith and order which has been handed on without interruption or substantial change from our Blessed Lord, through the apostles and their successors. By the terms of this faith and order all these Churches are bound forever.

On the other hand, the writer believes that it is the right and duty of every particular Catholic Church to adjust the exercise of its authority in doctrine, as well as its discipline and worship, to the forms of thought and language, and to the practical conditions, of successive ages and of the races to which it ministers.

Therefore, in undertaking a treatise of Dogmatic Theology, the writer feels under solemn obligation to

conform his expositions, on the one hand, to that faith which was once for all delivered to the saints in primitive days and has been held by all Catholic Churches from the beginning, and by catholic theologians of every age and race.[1] On the other hand, he feels bound to show due regard for the peculiar conditions of his own portion of the Catholic Church, and to adjust his language to the needs of his own age and race. This need not involve a departure from catholic standards, or a surrender to insular and one-sided provincialism. It is simply to bear in mind the necessity of exhibiting the faith of the Gospel, and of the Catholic Church, in such wise as to reach the hearts and understandings of those for whom this treatise is undertaken.

[1] The reader will notice here an echo of the well-known rule of faith given in St. Vincent's *Commonitorium*, ch. iii. Assuming, as we do also, that "Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation: so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man, that it should be believed as an article of the faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation," he is confronted by the fact that private interpretations of Scripture result in diversity of doctrine. As a way out of such confusion, he falls back on ecclesiastical doctrine, the proper key to the meaning of Scripture, and says, "In the Catholic Church great care must be exercised to hold that which has been believed everywhere, always and by all (*quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus*). . . . But this will be achieved, if we follow after universality, antiquity, and consent."

On similar lines is the declaration of the Pan Anglican Conference of 1878, urging the maintenance of "the faith in its purity and integrity — as taught in the Holy Scriptures, held by the primitive Church, summed up in the Creeds, and affirmed by the undisputed General Councils." *Introd. to Resolutions.*

§ 2. Anglican writers since the sixteenth century have been forced by the exigencies of controversy largely to neglect the systematic treatment of Dogmatic Theology. The immediate confusion of the reformation epoch made such work a practical impossibility. At a later period the necessity of defending the Anglican position against fierce and persistent attacks from the opposite forces of Romanism and dissent imparted a polemical quality to the bulk of Anglican literature.

It was inevitable, in particular, that our writers should display a certain *odium theologicum* Romeward, in view of the persistent attempts of Romanists to undermine both the political and religious status of things in England — attempts which at times were full of danger to the English Church and realm.

The result has been that Anglicans have often betrayed more anxiety to differentiate their position from Romanism than to set forth their own catholic beliefs in adequate terms and connected order. Thus it happens that one must get beneath the surface of a vexed and ambiguous terminology to understand the positive views of many of our best divines. This accounts for the fact that, through disregard of such necessity, partisans of opposite types have been able to compile formidable catenas in support of their positions from such sources.

The reputation of these divines for consistency and catholic orthodoxy has suffered in consequence, often at the expense of justice. Careful study will justify the contention that the great divines of the seventeenth

century, for instance, were usually sound, even in those matters in which they were most powerfully dominated by controversial animus. Moreover, it may not be denied that Anglicans have enriched catholic theology in various departments.[1]

Yet the fact remains that no great work of systematic doctrine has yet been produced on Anglican lines, although some excellent manuals have appeared of late. The present writer has already published a brief series of *Theological Outlines*. It is for others to judge of their value. When this dearth of systematic treatises in Anglican literature is contrasted with the abundance of such works in Latin and in the literature of dissent, the need of works like that here undertaken seems very acute.

II. *The Importance of Theology*

§ 3. Theology treats of truths which must take the first rank in the circle of things knowable by mankind. As we shall try to show in this chapter, it is the queen of sciences. It is both intrinsically and practically of the greatest value to all, whether considered as a part of liberal education, or in relation to the various departments of human life. But its accurate mastery is

[1] The English Church has reason to honour the memory of such theologians as Hooker, Andrewes, Pearson, Thorndike, Cosin, Bull, Hammond, Beveridge, Waterland, Horsley, Palmer, Newman, Pusey, A. P. Forbes, Archdeacon Wilberforce, Mozley, Liddon, R. C. Moberly and others, whose writings can never become wholly antequated. For a longer list of writers and their more important works, see chap. x. § 21.

especially and vitally necessary for those who are ordained to minister in things pertaining to God.

§ 4. Liberal education has to do not only with the development of man's intellectual capacity, but also with the cultivation of his higher and religious nature. It includes likewise the attainment of scientific, or systematically ordered, knowledge, such as will make possible a reasonable and just consideration of all the manifold phenomena and problems of human life. Such culture, and such knowledge, require the inclusion of theology, at least its general rudiments, in a complete curriculum. Man's religious nature cannot be developed rightly and fully apart from the knowledge of God, for religion consists in practical relations with Him. And a survey of the phenomena and problems of life that fails to give adequate attention to those facts and principles which are most fundamental, and which help us to interpret all else, cannot be described as adequate or befitting a man of truly liberal education. One might as well expect to be an intelligent astronomer without mastering the Newtonian law of gravitation, as to be a successful interpreter of nature in general without studying to some extent the science of God. In a very restricted sense it is true that one need not take God into account in the study of particular departments of natural effects and their immediate or secondary causes.[1] But this ceases to be true, even restrictedly, so soon as we undertake to co-ordinate all

[1] Laplace's remark that he had no need of the theistic hypothesis in his work is well known.

our knowledge in relation to its ultimate principle of unity and interpretation. Many men are debarred from acquiring a liberal education, but those who seek such education need to acquire some mastery of theology. A university which leaves theological science out of its ordinary curriculum is misnamed.[1]

§ 5. No Christian believer in any event can consistently undervalue theology. It is an accepted truth among Christians that eternal life consists in the knowledge of God and of Jesus Christ. That is, the life which we begin on earth, and are to continue forever, has for its central peculiarity an intimacy with God, a companionship as of friends.[2] Such life involves personal acquaintance with God, and knowledge of our relations to Him, whether past, present, or future. It is only by means of such knowledge that we can learn to love God and enjoy Him forever, whatever else of divine grace, discipline, and spiritual culture may also be necessary. No doubt many souls have come to know God and to love Him without scientific theological study. But it remains true that our knowledge of God is enriched, protected, and often corrected, by such study. The point of view which leads one to disparage scientific theology in this connection involves the disparagement of every science whatsoever. Men can and do "get on" in daily life without studying the natural sciences. But no thought-

[1] This was the contention of Newman in his *Idea of a University*, a most valuable series of lectures.

[2] St. John, xvii. 3; xv. 14, 15; St. James ii. 23.

ful person denies the great value and importance of such sciences. It is only in religion that men, otherwise intelligent and reasonable, disparage adequate knowledge.

§ 6. Theology is of inestimable importance to true religion. Individuals, indeed, can be truly religious without being scientific theologians, especially when they yield to proper guidance. But the interests of religion would suffer extremely, if men ceased to study the divine truths which it implies; that is, if there were no such thing as theological science. The purpose of true religion is to bind us to God.[1] It involves, therefore, the knowledge of Him, as well as the kindling of heavenward aspirations and the inculcation of righteousness. Moreover, true religion is institutional, and its professors are called upon to participate in sacred rites of divine meaning. These rites pertain to a covenant which God has made with men. They imply a history through which men have passed, a destiny which God has purposed for them, and certain redemptive facts with which men are vitally concerned. To practise religion truly we should practise it as intelligently as we can; and this means that we should give such careful attention as we are respectively capable of giving to the study of what is involved in and signified by our religion. To do this is to study theology, in which all these things are considered in their logical connection.

§ 7. The study of theology is most helpful to the

[1] See Liddon, *Some Elements of Religion*, Lec. I.

interests of righteousness. For by such study we gain more adequate knowledge of the foundations and sanctions of morality, increasing thereby our sense of the importance of righteousness and its necessity for our attainment of the destiny ordained for us by our Creator. We learn the true nature of righteousness by the consideration of Him in whom righteousness is found in its perfection. We also master those facts, purposes, and principles in the light of which we must live, if we would grow towards perfection and share in the blessedness of life everlasting. It must be acknowledged that one may become an acute theologian without being made holier thereby. Orthodoxy and righteousness are not the same, and they may be divorced from each other in individual lives. But unworthy theologians are apt to be unsound in their conclusions, and their failures are due to individual perversity. The fact remains that the knowledge which is to be obtained through the study of theology makes mightily for righteousness.

§ 8. What has been said should show that the study of theology is useful for men in general, so that true wisdom will lead every one to study it so far as his education and opportunities permit. Theology should be taught in every properly conducted university. It is the queen of sciences, and should be kept from none who are capable of studying it.[1]

[1] No doubt many of our universities are dominated by rationalism, and would teach theology defectively and mistakenly. But a catholic theologian can ill afford to disparage the results of a general partici-

But ordinary human vocations make it impossible that men in general should be deeply grounded in theological science. This being the case, it is the more necessary that those who are set apart for the ministry of the Word should be well grounded in theology, and richly equipped in the science of what they must teach. "The priest's lips should keep knowledge." [1] The interests of souls demand this, and responsibility for the guidance of others in matters of vital concern must be added to the arguments which have been given to persuade our clergy of the need of a more extended study of theology in its various branches than is usually

pation in the study of divine things. Truth is mighty and will prevail: — and that more mightily than ever when multitudes seek it. Fears of a contrary result betray lack of confidence in the self-manifesting power of truth, and in divine providence.

We do not forget that divine grace is indispensable for successful theological scholarship. But we remember that God imparts due measures of grace to all who really seek to know Him, and that earnest study of God is a *sine qua non* of the knowledge of Him. We believe that a wide-spread and systematic study of doctrine would, in time, bring multitudes home, and would help mightily to solve the problem of Christian unity. At all events, a system of doctrine that would in the long run be injured by general study of its contents is hardly worth being anxious about.

[1] Mal. ii. 7. Cf. Jerem. iii. 15: "And I will give you pastors according to mine heart, which shall feed you with knowledge and understanding." St. Matt. xiii. 52: "Therefore every scribe which is instructed unto the kingdom of heaven is like unto a man that is an householder, which bringeth forth out of his treasure things new and old." 2 Tim. iv. 2, 3: "Preach the Word . . . exhort with longsuffering and doctrine. For the time will come when they will not endure sound doctrine." Tit. i. 9: "Holding fast the faithful word as he hath been taught, that he may be able by sound doctrine both to exhort and convince the gainsayers."

undertaken by them. Modern conditions make the temptation to substitute a serving of tables for the studies which are necessary for an intelligent ministry of the Word a powerful one. But to yield remains a blunder, a sin, in God's sight.

III. *Theology in General*

§ 9. Sacred learning, or theology in its largest sense, is the science of divine things; and treats of God and of whatever in any manner pertains to Him, in so far as it does pertain to Him.[1] It is divisible into historical theology, systematic theology, and exegetical theology.

§ 10. The term theology is derived from Θεοῦ λόγος, which means a discourse concerning God. Orpheus and Homer were called theologians amongst the Greeks, because they wrote concerning the gods. The fathers used the term variously. They applied it to the doctrine of God, the doctrine of the Trinity, and the doctrine of our Lord's divine nature. This last use of the word led them to call St. John the divine a theologian, as treating of the Word of God, Θεοῦ Λόγος.[2]

[1] Hooker, *Eccles. Polity*, III. viii. 11; Pearson, *De Deo*, p. 1; St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I. i. 7; Suicer, *Thesaurus*, θεολογία; Petavius, *Theologia Dogmatica*, Proleg., cap. I.

[2] Theodoret, in *Gen.*, Quest. 1; and Dionysius Areop., *De Mystica Theol.*, cap. iii., refer it to the doctrine of God.

Athanasius, *contra Arian.*, Orat. II.; Gregory Naz., *Orat.* I.; and Theophylact, in *Matt.* xiii., refer it to the doctrine of the Trinity.

Eusebius, *Hist. Eccles.*, III. 24; Gregory Nyssa, *Orat. cont. Eunom.*, IV.; and Chrysostom, *Homil.* CV., refer it to the doctrine of our Lord's divine nature.

In treating of our Lord's two natures, they sometimes distinguished between *θεολογία*, having reference to His divine nature, and *οἰκονομία*, having reference to His human nature whereby the Λόγος was revealed to men. *Οἰκονομία* had been used by S. Paul as referring to the dispensation of the Incarnation, and came to be employed by some as practically equivalent to the Incarnation.[1]

Abelard, 1079–1142 A.D., in his *Theologia Christiana*, applied the term to the whole range of Christian doctrine, and this use has prevailed widely since his time, although the more strict reference of the term to the divine nature still continues. The wider use of the term is justified by St. Thomas's statement that "since all things which are treated of in sacred doctrine are considered in their relation to deity, *sub ratione deitatis*, . . . God is its subject." The same thought is involved in Hooker's definition, "the science of things divine."[2] The still wider use of the term, as applied

[1] Suicer, Thesaurus, *οἰκονομία*; Lightfoot, *Apostolic Fathers*, Pt. II., Vol. II., p. 75; and *Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul*, p. 319; Newman, *Arians of the Fourth Century*, pp. 49–89; Ottley, *Incarn.*, Vol. II., p. 245. Cf. Gregory Naz., *Orat.* XXXVIII; Chrysostom, *Homil.* CVI.; Theodoret, ad cap. IV., *Heb.* v. 14; and John Damas., *Orth. Fid.* III. xv. We return to this subject in another volume, when we treat of the Trinity.

On St. Paul's use of the word, see Ephes i. 10; *οἰκονομίαν τοῦ πληρώματος τῶν καιρῶν*. So Meyer, Ellicott, and Lightfoot, *in loc.* Abbott, *in loc.*, considers that the word means stewardship here.

It is used as equivalent to the Incarnation by Tertullian, *adv. Prax.*, 3, 4; and Hippol., *cont. Noetum*, iii. See Bigg, *Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, p. 166, note.

[2] St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I. i. 7; Hooker, *Eccles. Polity*, III.

to all sacred learning, is modern and confusing, but cannot be disregarded.

Theology has frequently been defined in modern times as "the science of religion." Such a definition, however, violates due proportion; for the primary subject of theology is God, rather than the relation of mankind to Him. God is at once the Author, Subject, and End of theology.[1]

§ 11. Sacred learning may be divided under the three heads of historical theology, systematic theology, and exegetical theology. Historical theology comes first in logical order, treating of the course of divine dispensations (sacred history) and the fortunes of the kingdom of God on earth (Church history); and acquainting the student with the process of divine revelation, and the dogmatic and scholastic phrases by means of which the contents of revelation have been technically and concisely defined. Systematic theology proceeds to arrange the truths and principles which historical theology exhibits into a coherent system, for the purpose of more connected, proportionate, and practical mastery. Finally exegetical theology[2] treats

viii. 11. Cf. Pearson, *De Deo*, Lec. I.; Blunt, *Dictionary of Theology*, "Theology."

[1] Such a definition is naturally preferred by such modern writers as would confine Christian teaching to "practical discipline," and emphasize the subjective aspects of religion on agnostic or humanitarian grounds.

[2] Biblical theology would be a better name, but has been pre-empted to signify that department of biblical learning which treats of the theological conceptions possessed by the different human authors of Holy Scripture.

of the Sacred Scriptures, establishing, illustrating, and enriching men's knowledge of the truths and principles treated of in systematic theology.

Protestant writers naturally place exegetical theology first, because they regard the Scriptures as the first and sole source and rule of faith. But those who recognize the Church to be the divinely appointed teacher of the faith, and believe that catholic dogmas furnish needed clues beforehand to the divine teaching of Scripture, naturally give the history of doctrine and its scientific exposition a prior place in the scientific arrangement of sacred learning. This does not mean that they estimate biblical study at a lower value, or separate it in time from the study of ecclesiastical doctrine. On the contrary, they fall not a whit behind protestants in their implicit acceptance of Scripture as the Word of God.

IV. *Systematic Theology*

§ 12. Systematic theology treats of the contents of sacred learning, as arranged in their logical connection for the convenience of more intelligent, comprehensive, and useful mastery. It may be divided into Dogmatic Theology and practical theology.

§ 13. Systematic theology is an indispensable part of sacred learning. Divine truths are closely related to each other, and cannot be viewed in their right proportions or taught rightly except in their mutual connection. St. Paul assures the Corinthians that, while speaking "not in the words which man's wisdom

teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth," he is "comparing spiritual things with spiritual." He also writes to the Romans, "let us prophesy according to the proportion of faith"; and exhorts Timothy to shew himself "approved unto God" by "rightly dividing the word of truth."[1] Systematic theology, when rightly developed, enables the Christian teacher thus to divide the word of truth "in accordance with the proportion of faith." Exclusive study of particular truths is a fruitful cause of narrowness, and frequently produces heresy. Then, too, the reasonableness of any truth becomes more apparent when its place in the whole body of truth is correctly exhibited. No argument for the reasonableness of Christianity in general is more persuasive than a connected statement of its doctrines, so framed as to display their mutual relations and internal harmony. Again, to teach clearly one must first obtain a profound mastery of the subject to be taught, and no branch of learning is thus mastered without a systematic arrangement of its contents. A single truth which is known only in itself, and not in its relations to other truths, is not adequately mastered; and the knowledge of doctrines

[1] 1 Cor. ii. 13; Rom. xii. 6; 2 Tim. ii. 15. This holds good in spite of the fact that the systematic aim may be pressed too far. Our knowledge of divine mysteries is partial; and, while their general relations to each other can be sufficiently ascertained for scientific purposes, we need to resist the temptation to formulate these relations more completely and precisely than our knowledge warrants. Desire for formal completeness of system has reduced the value of many theological treatises.

in isolation is of little practical value to a teacher of the faith.

§ 14. Dogmatic Theology is a branch of systematic theology, and treats of the facts and mysteries of divine revelation, giving a logical exposition of them, and distinguishing truth from error concerning them. It is called dogmatic because it assumes the truth of the dogmas of the Church and employs them as its premises.[1]

Polemics and apologetics are subsidiary to Dogmatic Theology — the former dealing with erroneous systems of Christian doctrine; and the latter with alien thought, presenting the evidences of Christianity and defending its truth against every form of attack. The science of comparative religion is closely connected with apologetics.[2]

[1] In classical Greek Δόγμα means (*a*) opinion or resolution; (*b*) decree. It means decree in the New Testament. See Abbott, *in Ephesians*, ii. 15. It appears, then, that dogmatic may be taken to mean theoretic or speculative; and certainly Dogmatic Theology treats of much that is speculative and subject to modification.

It should be the aim of theology, as of every science, to arrive at truth in any case. And the only reason which justifies the theologian in accepting catholic dogmas as premises is his conviction, based on adequate grounds, that the Holy Spirit guides the Church in the exercise of her dogmatic office, and that catholic dogmas are indisputably true.

[2] Comparative religion might also be classed under historical theology, as exhibiting the phenomena which have attended the search after God amongst gentilic races, lacking the guidance of authentic supernatural revelation. The science is as yet in its infancy, and has been developed to a great extent by non-catholic and rationalistic writers. It is none the less of great importance, and ought to have the careful attention of catholic theologians. For further discussion of the subject, see chap. viii. §§ 8–10.

While this work is primarily one of positive Dogmatics, many forms of error and unbelief will have to be noticed in order to define truth more accurately and exhibit its reasonableness.

§ 15. Practical theology is another branch of systematic theology, and treats of divine things in their bearing on life, applying them to the guidance of conduct, whether individual or social, private or official. Its chief branches are moral theology, pastoral theology, canon law, ecclesiology, and liturgics.

V. *Theology a Science*

§ 16. Theology is truly called a science, for it treats of ascertained facts, considered in their logical connection and implications. Science (*scientia*, ἐπιστήμη) is defined as "rationalized knowledge of ascertained facts." [1] Theology treats of such facts, and exhibits a "rationalized knowledge" of them.

§ 17. The facts of which theology treats are of two kinds. In the first place facts of contemporary observation and experience are considered, including those that are treated of in the physical, mental, and moral sciences. Again, theology has to do with historic events, so far as they exhibit the dealings of God with mankind, and reveal His nature, dispensations, and purposes. Thus theology treats of much which

[1] Fleming, *Vocab. of Philosophy*, "Science." Baldwin, *Dic. of Philosophy*, "Science," says, "Systematic co-ordination and certainty have . . . often been specified as the notes of science." Theology possesses these notes. It is grounded in well-attested certainties, and devotes itself to co-ordinating them in systematic order.

is considered in natural and historical sciences, but not from the same point of view, nor with the same purpose; for theology considers everything with reference to God and divine things.[1]

[1] It is not the task of theology to define the facts that the natural sciences investigate — a mistake sometimes made with unfortunate results — but to interpret them in relation to divine things, when their nature has been ascertained by natural science. On the other hand, it is not the task of natural science to interpret nature theologically. This does not mean, however, that a theologian is incapacitated from passing judgment upon the propositions of natural scientists, or that natural scientists are necessarily incompetent to weigh the propositions of theologians. The conclusions of specialists are rightly subject to the criticism of intelligent men in general, provided the respective spheres of the sciences, and the methods of attaining truth proper to each, are not confused.

Says Aubrey Moore, reviewing Drummond's *Natural Law* in *Science and the Faith*, pp. 13, 14, "Now a theology that is true cannot really vitiate science, but a science that is true must fail to be an adequate expression of theological truth; for the higher explains the lower; the lower cannot explain, though it may illustrate, the higher. . . .

"Prof. Drummond says, 'The greatest among theological laws are the laws of nature in disguise.' We maintain — and the difference is by no means a verbal difference — that the greatest among the natural laws are the laws of theology in disguise. Prof. Drummond says the natural laws are 'continuous through the spiritual sphere, not changed in any way to meet new circumstances, but continuous as they stand.' We maintain that the theological laws are continuous through the natural world, though, without theology, we cannot see their full meaning, but must stop at the barren conception of 'observed uniformities.' Prof. Drummond says, the higher or moral world is for us as yet a chaos, while nature, the lower, is a cosmos. We maintain that Christian theology is a cosmos, and science is just beginning to find traces of the same unity running through the phenomena of nature. Prof. Drummond holds that 'the truth as it is in nature' interprets and illumines revelation for us; we hold that

The primary and most significant facts of theological science are the events of sacred or biblical history, especially of the Gospels; and the supernatural revelations from God which are connected with them.

§ 18. Theology treats of all these facts in their implications. That is, it co-ordinates and interprets them so as to exhibit their divine and religious significance. Such interpretations as are certain, and bear on human salvation, constitute Christian doctrine. Thus the doctrine of the Divinity of Jesus Christ is seen to be implied unmistakably in the facts of the Gospel narratives, and constitutes not only one of the primary propositions of theological science, but a central Christian doctrine, bearing directly upon man's salvation.

It needs to be added, however, as will be explained more fully hereafter, that men are not left to develop Christian doctrines without divine assistance and guidance. These doctrines are contained in a deposit of faith which was committed to the Church of God in pentecostal days. And it is the double advantage of a catholic theologian that he is taught the premises of his science by the Spirit-guided Church, and receives sacramental grace within the Church to master the truths thus conveyed to him.

'the truth as it is in Jesus' can alone interpret and give rational unity to the laws of the natural world. Prof. Drummond speaks of the unseen universe as 'that great duplicate'; we maintain, and so does Prof. Drummond in his more Platonic moods, that earth is 'but the shadow of heaven.' Finally, Prof. Drummond argues from the more known to the less known. So do we; but we begin at the other end."

§ 19. The claim of theology to be a science stands or falls with the truth or falsity of the claim that it is a department of knowledge, capable of rational arrangement and interpretation. It can readily be seen that the rejection of this claim involves moral implications of grave importance. For if the truths which are co-ordinated in theology are not really parts of human knowledge, then the moral and spiritual obligations which are involved in them lose their only possible foundation in the conscience. For example, if we do not in some valid sense know that God exists, and if we are wholly ignorant of our relations and obligations to the Supreme Judge, we cannot be held accountable for the discharge of creaturely obligations. "Let us eat and drink; for to-morrow we die." [1]

§ 20. The scientific claim of theology has been assailed from various quarters.

(*a*) It is said that theology rests on dogmatic formulas, and tends to enlarge their range and crystallize them, to the hindrance of that freedom and progress which should characterize scientific scholarship.

This objection lies against the manner in which theological science has been developed, rather than against the propriety of calling theology a science. If theologians have burdened men with formulas which are untrue, or misleading, and have resisted needed corrections of them, they are at fault and really unscientific. But every science must formulate its results, and every genuine science possesses its dogmas. More-

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 32.

over, these dogmas, so far as they are true, are helps rather than hindrances to thought. To say otherwise is to claim that the freedom of scholarship requires us forever to be wanting in exact knowledge and determinate conclusions. The objection proceeds chiefly from those who have been repelled by erroneous theological systems, *e.g.*, the Calvinistic, and who have hastily inferred that there can be no trustworthy and permanent results of theological study. They know little of catholic theology, and confuse speculative school opinions, vehemently urged, with the fixed dogmas of theology. They have drifted into the curious attitude of seeming to prefer to be "ever learning, and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth." [1] It is the very purpose of a science to concern itself with ascertained truth, and it is a great advantage to have such truth put in definite and fixed terminology, not easily capable of diverse interpretations. This is admitted to be the case with every other science. The task of the critic, therefore, is not to object to dogmatic formulas as such, but to investigate the warrant of each in order to test its truth. The progressiveness of a science does not lie invariably in an abandonment of its previous dogmas; but often in richer mastery of the bearing of ascertained premises upon the particulars of human experience. In this sense theology is a progressive science.[2]

[1] 2 Tim. iii. 7.

[2] We expect to treat of the development of doctrine in another volume. In ch. vi. §§ 14, 15, is discussed the possibility of eccle-

§ 21. (*b*) It is objected that a science must deal with what is known and accepted by intelligent men in general; whereas the leading propositions of theology are confessedly held by faith, and with the assistance of supernatural grace. They do not come within the apprehension of the natural intelligence of men at large.

The subject of faith and its trustworthiness as a faculty of knowledge will be discussed in another chapter. It is sufficient here to say that we hold faith to be a proper faculty of knowledge, although its operations commence on a lower plane, and on that plane involve elements of doubt. Its exercise requires supernatural assistance, it is true; but this assistance is available to those who make this objection, and its necessity is strictly analogous to the need of special instruments of investigation in other scientific spheres. The more extended vision gained by the use of a telescope is not mistrusted, because it transcends unaided vision. The vision thus gained is a real vision of the human eye. In like manner we hold the larger cognitions of faith to be real cognitions of human reason, the intellectual validity of which is not destroyed by the assistance made use of. Theology is not a species of occultism. Any one can become a theologian

siastical dogmas being set forth which are capable of retaining permanent authority and validity without fundamental change of interpretation. The point here noted is that the scientific claim of theology does not depend for its truth upon such possibility. No physical science whatsoever could claim the name if such were the case.

if he will submit to the necessary conditions of investigation; and this is required in every science.[1]

§ 22. (*c*) A third objection is that the primary facts maintained by theologians, and used as the premises of their science, are miraculous, whereas the reality of miracles must be denied as inconsistent with human experience, which teaches that the phenomena of the universe are governed by laws that cannot be violated.

The subject of miracles is to be considered in its place; but we may say here that natural science teaches us of a law of progress which involves innovations from time to time upon the existing uniformities of phenomena. If this be true within the sphere open to natural investigation, it is not incredible that the progress of the divine plan in general, which includes within its sphere much that transcends natural investigation, should also include new steps and innovations upon the past, and that these innovations should at critical epochs manifest themselves within the sphere of human observation. The implication that miracles are lawless and capricious may not rightly be granted. They are, on the contrary, "signs," σημεῖα, of the higher laws of progress, revealing themselves as exceptions to the usual course of physical phenomena, but fitting into the wider march of events by which nature and all things are governed.

[1] Jevons, *Evolution*, ch. viii, points out that natural sciences start with certain *credenda*, such as the uniformity of nature, that have to be accepted on trust or by faith; and that natural scientists are therefore inconsistent in assailing the scientific claim of theology because it rests on faith.

§ 23. (*d*) It is objected that theology deals with particular events and truths, incapable of generalization or reference to the prior principles or laws by which they are governed; whereas the term science is applicable only to generalized knowledge, by which facts are co-ordinated and brought into rational unity.

The answer is that theology does deal with facts capable of generalization, and that the leading doctrines which it expounds are not merely revealed propositions but also have the value of scientific hypotheses by which a multitude of spiritual phenomena are brought into unity of conception and reduced to law and order. Thus the doctrine of the Trinity, taken as a scientific hypothesis, accounts for the whole course of sacred history, and uncovers much of the mystery attendant upon our relations to God. It enriches Theism as well; and the theistic hypothesis, as thus enlarged, is relieved of certain metaphysical difficulties connected with the notion of an infinite personal being, and becomes in consequence a satisfying hypothesis of all being and life. The only point of view from which the scientific nature of theology can be denied plausibly by a Christian is the false one which treats the phenomena of revelation as mutually unrelated. This mistake is no doubt encouraged by the common habit of isolating Christian doctrines from each other, and emphasizing certain of them one-sidedly.

§ 24. (*e*) Akin to the above objection is the contention that science is inductive in its methods, whereas theology is deductive, starting with certain premises

alleged to have been revealed, and deducing what ought to be true in particular from these *a priori* conceptions, instead of investigating observable facts and making one's generalizations agree with them.

We reply that science is both inductive and deductive. Natural scientists begin with induction from particulars, but they proceed to deduction from their hypotheses, and verify their hypotheses by the correspondence of these deductions with further particulars. It is by means of such deductions that some of the most notable discoveries of modern astronomy and chemistry have been made possible.[1] Theology differs from natural science in having some of its leading hypotheses revealed by God, but these hypotheses may be, and are, treated scientifically. The deductions which are made from them are verified daily by the spiritual experiences of a multitude of saints, who adopt the faith as a working hypothesis of life. By living the life deducible from Christian doctrines, they come to know that they are true, since they solve the particular problems of life more adequately than any other known hypotheses.

§ 25. (*f*) Finally, there is the agnostic objection in its various forms. The Ritschlian separates the religious

[1] The planet Neptune was thus discovered in 1846, on the basis of the theory of gravitation. The movements of Uranus could not be accounted for on this basis except on the supposition of another planet. Astronomers computed its probable whereabouts on this hypothesis, and then pointed their telescopes upon it successfully. Recent discoveries of new elements in the atmosphere were due to experiments based on chemical hypotheses.

consciousness of man from his scientific consciousness, and denies that their contents are mutually related. He says that the truths of religion are to be regarded as having worth-value, but must not be translated into the forms of scientific certainty.[1] Others treat the infinite as signifying a self-contradictory notion, thus nullifying the possibility of a science or rational knowledge of God.[2] They also emphasize the relativity of human knowledge, and deny the scientific validity of any idea of God which we may possess. As Herbert Spencer puts it, "The Power which the Universe manifests to us is inscrutable."[3] But, it is urged, the theologian makes God the one subject to which all the contents of his so-called science are referred.

We shall treat of Agnosticism in its proper connection. We join issue with it in all its forms. The human mind is a unit, and human consciousness cannot be divided into separate spheres to the exclusion of one of them from the intellectual domain. All truth, and all consciousness thereof, is related, and must be in ultimate agreement, whether we can explain the harmony or not. A doctrine which may be denied rightly

[1] See Orr, *The Ritschlian Theology and the Evangelical Faith*, for a discriminating account of this peculiar point of view.

[2] Sir Wm. Hamilton, Dean Mansel, and Herbert Spencer have taken this line. See Mansel, *Limits of Religious Thought*, Lec. II., where a notable array of alleged contradictions is made, based upon an abstract definition of the infinite quite different from its meaning in theology. Spencer adopts Mansel's language in his *First Principles*, Pt. I. ch. ii. § 13.

[3] *First Principles*, Pt. I. ch. ii. p. 39. He treats of the relativity of knowledge in chapter iv.

in the sphere of the scientific consciousness may not be accepted rightly in the religious consciousness. Those who treat the infinite as a self-contradictory notion mistake the notion, regarding it as quantitative instead of qualitative, or as purely negative instead of as a positive notion discriminated negatively from another positive. The infinite does not signify the unlimited or indeterminate, but a Being whose limitations and determinations are wholly within Himself. The relativity of knowledge, if inconsistent with the knowability of God, is fatal to knowledge in every direction, and makes for scepticism, destroying the foundations of every science whatsoever. It is true that we know things only as they are related to us, but this is consistent with the contention that to that extent we know them really.

We ought to avoid the sophistry of argument by definition. Those who deny the knowability of God start with a philosophical definition of knowledge which disagrees with the definition involved in everyday life. To know means to have a practical certainty, the criterion of which is that it fits in as a working hypothesis with all our experience, whether subjective or objective. We need not, and cannot, analyze exhaustively or demonstrate the validity of the mental process by which we know. We recognize that we know, and philosophy can neither carry us much further nor use its failure as a sufficient objection against the validity of knowledge. To deny the trustworthiness of certain of our mental faculties, because

we cannot go back of them and directly demonstrate their value, is to subvert all philosophy and introduce mental chaos. Demonstration of primary truths necessarily starts with elements of the very knowledge which men seek to demonstrate.

§ 26. We need not answer in this place those who reject the truths of theological science on the ground of a lack of sufficient evidence for them.[1] Such an answer would involve a treatise in apologetics, and would carry us too far afield from the task before us. An abundance of such treatises exist, and we assume in this work that the general truth of Christianity is capable of sufficient evidence and defence.[2] The point we make is that the truth of Christianity is a matter of evidence, and ought not to be rejected on *a priori* grounds simply. And we urge that, if Christianity in general is true, a body of mutually related facts exists in connection with it which is subject to scientific treatment.

In brief, theology is a science, and this fact has the most vital bearing. It signifies that the divine truths by which our lives ought to be guided can be brought

[1] The late Prof. Huxley claimed, in controversy with Dr. Wace, to have invented the term "Agnostic" as describing such an attitude. The term, however, has come to stand chiefly for an *a priori* denial of the knowability of God. *Nineteenth Century*, Feb. 1889; reprinted in *Christianity and Agnosticism*, N. Y., D. Appleton & Co., 1889 (see especially pp. 34–38).

[2] Among the best apologetical manuals are Harris' *Pro Fide;* Fisher's *Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief;* Turton's *The Truth of Christianity;* and Christlieb's *Modern Doubt and Christian Belief.*

together and applied rationally as a coherent body of heavenly principles to the guidance of conduct, making it to be at one with itself, and in correspondence with the divine law that governs all things forever, and directs them to their perfect end.

VI. *Theology and Other Sciences*

§ 27. Theology occupies a central place within the circle of sciences. It is related directly or indirectly to them all, and gives unity to scientific conceptions. It is rightly called the queen of sciences.

§ 28. The universe is God's universe, and He not only transcends all, but is also immanent in all. In Him all creation has its being. Nothing exists apart from God; and the phenomena of the universe are treated in accordance with fact, and their true meaning, when viewed as having God for their ultimate principle of causation and government. The theistic hypothesis of scientific theology, cleared of unnecessary contradictions by the theological doctrine of the Trinity, is the ultimate hypothesis of the totality of being and life, and can stand the scientific test of comparison with all the facts of experience better than any rival hypothesis. Thus the science of God, which theology is, exhibits the underlying principle needed to give unity, rationality, and validity to the natural and historical sciences. Each of these sciences is concerned with the phenomena and laws of some department of divine causation, whether physical, mental, or moral. If the knowledge of God cannot be admitted, the universe becomes a

baffling enigma, and all the sciences thereof lose their ultimate rational basis. This basis is trust in the ultimate rationality of what is treated scientifically.[1]

§ 29. The physical sciences are so many departments of induction, by means of which the causes of sensible phenomena are sought. It should be clear to scientific thinkers that this demand for causes of things is not wholly satisfied by resting in what is open to physical observation. The idea of causation, in its final analysis, requires uncaused causation. If, therefore, the secondary causes with which physical investigators are directly concerned are not viewed as having some ultimate cause not needing itself to be accounted for, the whole process of induction loses its rational basis — the existence of a true cause.

Again, contemporary scientists agree generally in accepting some form of the evolutionary hypothesis — that there is an upward development of things in the universe, in obedience to a sovereign law of cosmical progress. We are not here concerned with the particular forms in which this hypothesis is held, but it seems sufficiently evident that this hypothesis implies some transcendent cause and mind to originate and control the march of events. It also clearly implies the existence of some goal — some

> "... far off divine event,
> To which the whole creation moves."

[1] A thought which appears prominently in Fraser, *Philos. of Theism*.

Thus the natural sciences in their present state involve a background of supra-mundane laws; and, if there is a science which exhibits some of these laws, such a science is obviously in a central position in relation to the physical sciences. Theology is such a science, for it treats of the cause and sovereign mind which orders the process of cosmical development, and also brings within our scientific view the purpose and goal of creation, so as to satisfy the scientific demand for a final, as well as an efficient, cause of the universe.

§ 30. The historical sciences are proper sciences only so far as they give a rationalized account of the march of human events. But no complete rationale of them can be given apart from the sovereign mind and overruling providence of God. Man is made for God, and human history is concerned with the events that attend the working out of the laws of moral causation which "make for righteousness," and for the realization of the kingdom of God among men. Knowledge of what this kingdom is, and what these laws of progress are, is of practical importance, and requires a science of God and things pertaining to Him. Theology is such a science.

§ 31. The mental sciences, such as psychology and logic, bring to light certain *a priori* laws, the immediate operation of which come within their sphere of investigation, but the ultimate rationale of which cannot be treated scientifically except in a science which treats of the ultimate mind whose handiwork is seen in human reason.

The same is true of moral science. There is no ultimate basis and sanction of moral distinctions except in the nature and will of the universal Sovereign and Judge of mankind. If, therefore, moral science is to establish the validity of the distinctions and laws with which it is concerned, it must appeal to the contents of the science of theology, wherein the ultimate foundations of moral sanctions are defined.[1]

§ 32. It is said that philosophy, rather than theology, is concerned with the ultimate foundations of the sciences above referred to. This is a misleading statement. The philosophy referred to consists of certain speculative attempts to solve the problems of being and life without reference to any other facts than those natural phenomena which are treated of by the inferior sciences. The history of such philosophy is instructive, but is a history of failure. No ultimate philosophy is possible on such lines. A true philosophy takes into account the contents of true theological science, and displays their relation to other domains of fact. Theology treats of the facts which articulate the trend of universal evolution, and thus brings to light the implicit foundations of all science, so far as they can be known by men. To put it in another way, the only true philosophy of all things is one which begins by taking note of the mind of the sovereign Cause and

[1] Modern ethical treatises often disregard this necessity, and lack completeness and coherence as a result. The teaching of nature is fragmentary and inadequate, until it is interpreted in the light of the more articulate teaching of supernatural revelation.

Governor of the universe in relation to the various departments of the sciences. Theology affords a scientific account of what can be known of that supreme mind.

§ 33. There is but one way of overthrowing the position claimed by theology among the sciences. If it can be shown that the data of theology do not come within the sphere of a supernaturally enlightened human cognizance, and that what is said to be known through divine revelation is not really known at all, then theology is not a department of scientific knowledge, and is not the queen of sciences. But the circumstances that the central data of theological science are unknown to the majority of mankind, and are denied by men of profound scientific attainment, cannot militate against theology, so long as this wide-spread ignorance and unbelief can be accounted for by failure, culpable or otherwise, to employ the instruments necessary for spiritual knowledge, and by failure to put the truths of theology to the practical test required for their verification or intelligent rejection. Truths to live by cannot be tested except by one who strives to live by them. The real issue then is, not the need of conformity of theological instruments of discovery to those of physical science, but the truth of the data which the theologian employs in building his science. The arguments by which an acceptance of their truth is justified belong, as we have already indicated, to apologetics rather than to Dogmatic Theology.

CHAPTER II

THE NATURAL AND THE SUPERNATURAL

I. *Definitions and Rationale*

§ 1. The data which are considered in theology are partly natural and partly supernatural and miraculous. It is desirable to understand clearly what is meant by such terms in theology; and what is implied in the distinctions for which they stand.[1]

Defining briefly, the natural is whatever pertains to that visible order of things of which man is the micro-

[1] The patristic view of this subject is found in St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, XXI., and *De Trinitate*, III. 4–11, etc. The best scholastic treatment is that of St. Thomas, in *Summa Theologica*, I. ciii.–cv., cx., and *Summa Contra Gentiles*, III. xcvii–ciii. The vast enlargement of knowledge of nature in modern days, coupled with a more subtle formulation of difficulties, makes it necessary to depend chiefly on modern treatises.

The classic objections are to be found in Hume's Essay *Of Miracles* (repeated on more up-to-date lines in Mill's *Essays on Religion*, pp. 212 *et seq.*); and in Spinoza's *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, ch. vi.

The best defensive treatments are contained in Butler, *Analogy*, Pt. II. ch. ii.; Mozley, *Lecs. on Miracles;* Trench, *Notes on the Miracles of our Lord*, Prelim. Essay; Fisher, *Supernatural Origin of Christianity*, Ess. XI.; Fraser, *Philos. of Theism*, Pt. III. Lec. IV.; Gore, *Incarnation*, Lec. II.; Harris, *Pro Fide*, ch. xvi.; Boedder, *Natural Theol.*, Bk. III. ch. iii.; Newman, *Essays on Miracles;* Perrone, *Prælec. de Vera Religione*, cap. iii.; Schouppe, *Elem. Theol. Dogmatica*, Tract II. cap. ii.; A. Moore, *Science and the Faith;* and Illingworth, *Divine Immanence*, pp. 100–145.

cosm and highest member, being either one of its constituent elements or proceeding from forces resident in them. It is characterized by uniformities in the conjunction and sequence of its phenomena, and these phenomena are interpreted scientifically on the assumption that the same unhindered causes or combinations of causes produce the same effects.[1]

The supernatural is that which pertains to higher beings and forces than are contained or resident in the order of things above described, transcending them in nature and effect. The supernatural may indeed operate and manifest itself within the sphere of the natural, enlisting natural forces and making use of natural means; but the resulting effects cannot be accounted for by the natural means and forces employed.[2]

A miracle is a supernatural event which visibly inno-

[1] The word natural has various uses: (*a*) pertaining to the nature of the thing or order of things referred to, as here; (*b*) what is rational, all the circumstances being considered, in which sense even divine miracles are natural; (*c*) what belongs to men by birth, *e.g.*, "natural rights," as contrasted with acquired or "positive rights"; (*d*) the carnal state in which men are born, really unnatural, and opposed to spiritual by St. Paul. It is in this sense that the natural man cannot know God; (*e*) opposed to abnormal and distorted.

Natural law may signify either the observed order of natural phenomena (as when it is said that miracles are contrary to natural law); or the principles and methods of causation involved in natural phenomena, which are not violated by miracles.

[2] Not a few writers exclude all creatures and their operations from the supernatural. But as Scripture speaks of miracles wrought by demoniacal agency, although it calls them "lying wonders," — calculated to deceive, — the dividing line between the natural and the supernatural which is here adopted seems most convenient for Dogmatic Theology.

vates upon the normal order of natural phenomena, challenging attention on that account, signifying something beyond what purely natural phenomena teach, and pointing to super-physical and super-human causation.[1]

[1] St. Thomas, in line with the exclusion of angelic operations from the supernatural referred to in the previous note, confines miracles to events of exclusively divine agency. He says "It does not suffice for the notion of a miracle if anything happens beyond the nature of any particular thing. For, if any one throws a stone upward, it will be a miracle, because this is beyond the order of nature of a stone. Therefore a thing is called a miracle because it is beyond the order of the whole created nature." *Summa Theol.*, I. cx. 4. For the reason already given, we include innovations wrought by angelic agency among miracles, and divide miracles into divine and demoniacal.

In the New Testament miracles are called (a) *τέρατα*, wonders — always used with some other name, as if to guard against their being considered mere wonders. They are so called as calculated to rouse attention in a way that the uninterrupted course of nature does not. See Matt. xxiv. 24; Acts xiv. 3; Rom. xv. 19; Heb. ii. 4.

(*b*) *σημεῖον*, sign, a token of spiritual working and purpose. Unfortunately the distinction is lost in the A. V., where the word is often rendered "miracle." They signify the power of the worker, Mark xvi. 20; Acts xiv. 3; Heb. ii. 4; and his authority as a teacher from God, Matt. xii. 38; xvi. 1; John ii. 8.

(*c*) *δυνάμεις*, powers, showing divine causation, Matt. vii. 22; xi. 20; Mark vi. 14; Luke x. 13; Acts ii. 22; xix. 11; 1 Cor. xii. 10, 28; Gal. iii. 5.

In Acts ii. 22; 2 Cor. xii. 12; and 2 Thess. ii. 9, all three words are used together, although in different orders.

(*d*) *ἔργα*, works, that is, such as might be expected of the God-man who wrought them. Used frequently in St. John — *e.g.*, v. 36; vii. 21; x. 25, 32, 38; xiv. 11, 12; xv. 24.

Unhappily, by the choice of the term miracle, theology accentuates the tendency to dwell on the most subordinate and scepticism-provoking aspect of supernatural phenomena. See Trench, *Notes on Miracles*, Prelim. Essay, ch. i.; Christlieb, *Modern Doubt*, p. 293.

§ 2. It can be seen that the terms natural and supernatural are mutually relative, and may vary in meaning according to what nature or order of natures is made the standard of reference.

The point to be insisted on here is that the distinction is objective and of permanent validity, so that the terms natural and supernatural have in their particular reference a fixed meaning, which is not changed because of men's progress in the knowledge of the universe. It is true that wider knowledge often proves that what was once considered supernatural is really natural; but this does not signify that the meaning of terms has changed. It simply indicates that we may make mistakes in applying the terms.

Schleiermacher, in his anxiety to make the supernatural more credible to the rationalists of his age and race, defined that term as signifying what lies beyond our present knowledge, and cannot be explained by the existing generalizations of science. Thus what is at any time correctly regarded as supernatural may come to be reckoned with equal correctness as natural when we have mastered the laws by which it is governed. Some treat our Lord's miracles as anticipatory of what may be done by men in general, when they come to understand the laws of mind and matter more adequately.[1]

[1] St. Augustine has been claimed for this view because he says that miracles "happen not contrary to nature, but to what we know as nature." *De Civ. Dei.*, XXI. 7. But in the same chapter he accounts for miracles by divine omnipotence, and treats them elsewhere as special signs from God. What he means here is that, while the visible sequences in nature which we ordinarily experience

Such a use of terms is highly objectionable, since it fails to allow for the difference of natures for which the terms stand in their historical connotation. They signify in theology the immediate objective sources of the forces which are brought into operation, not the relation of these forces to our subjective knowledge, although it is true that what is called natural is the proper sphere of physical investigation, and what is called supernatural is explained only by the aid of grace and divine revelation.

§ 3. It remains, however, that the terms in question are *mutually* relative, indicating the transcendence of

are violated, the underlying laws of nature are not violated, since they represent the divine will which cannot contradict itself.

Romanes, *Thoughts on Religion*, pp. 126–133, thought that an objective distinction between natural and supernatural banished God from the natural, and contradicted physical science. Both notions are wrong. The objective view does not exclude God from nature, but distinguishes between those forces employed by Him which are subject to the generalization of physical science and higher ones. Moreover, the existence of such higher forces in nowise militates against the reality of natural forces or against scientific generalizations exclusively concerned with them. The doctrine involved — that higher divine forces exist which can and do manifest their effects within the visible sphere — does not come within the sphere of natural science either to affirm or deny. See Mozley, *Lecs. on Miracles*, VI.; Trench, Prelim. Essay, ch. v.; Fisher, *Supernatural Origin*, p. 475.

Ritschlians regard miracles as notable demonstrations of divine working, which are miraculous only to those who spiritually discern them, and need involve no questions as to their reality among scientists. So Schultz, *Apologetics*, pp. 55–77. This is a subjective view and reduces miracles to a purely natural level. Any natural phenomenon might on such a view assume a miraculous aspect to devout contemplation.

certain natures, and their resident forces, over other natures and forces.

It is a truism to say that what is natural to a thing pertains to its proper nature, while that which is supernatural to *it* pertains to higher natures and transcends it. By the proper nature of a thing is meant its native constitution and capacity, including its resident forces. Thus a higher nature is, in some respects at least, supernatural to a lower one. Men, for instance, possess powers which are supernatural to inferior beings. In physical detail, no doubt, certain members of the lower orders can do what men cannot do. For example, a monkey can perform acrobatic feats which are impossible for men. Yet for two reasons we cannot rightly regard such performances as supernatural to men. In the first place, the use of the term supernatural is determined by the relative superiority of the nature from which it has its source, considered as a whole. And secondly, although men cannot do all the things which monkeys can do, that is, without artificial means, they can utilize their performances, and can devise and control means by which the achievements of the inferior species can be equalled and even excelled. Thus, while men cannot run with the speed of greyhounds, they can invent motors by which to travel much more swiftly.

With such considerations in mind, we see that the meanings of the terms under consideration depend upon the level of being and life, the nature of which is made our standard of reference.

Certain apologists start with that nature which reaches up to, without including, the self-conscious and rationally free. Thus they reckon as supernatural all events which require self-conscious and rational freedom to account for them — that is, what is commonly called the super-physical. From this point of view man has supernatural power, for he can to a considerable extent innovate upon and control the direction of natural phenomena, making them subserve purposes which transcend what the physical instruments employed are capable of achieving, apart from human device and control. For a falling cricket ball to stop in mid space is supernatural to the merely physical order of things. Yet the human cricket player produces this phenomenon, when he catches the ball and thus arrests its flight.

The stricter theological use of terms, however, makes the supernatural equivalent to the superhuman. It includes, in other words, any thing or event which transcends in nature, capacity, causation, and significance that order of natures which has human nature for its crown. To the angels some of the operations which theology calls supernatural are natural; and to God nothing can be supernatural, for all that is or can be done depends ultimately upon divine causation.[1]

[1] The supernatural is not the unnatural — *i.e.*, contrary to that natural from which it is distinguished — but a higher natural, and included in the totality of naturals contained in the universal order of divine operations. It is, in brief, not above all naturals, but above that series of naturals of which man is the highest example.

The distinction we are considering rests for validity upon the

According to this, the proper theological use of terms, the operations of grace are supernatural, since they spring from special divine assistance, and cannot

existence of natures possessing distinct resident forces, divinely imparted and preserved, and unequal rank and capacity. Such a belief is contained in the theory of secondary causes — that God operates in and by means of inferior things, forces and agents of His own creation, preservation, and ordering. This theory is consistent with the evolutionary hypothesis, that creatures undergo modification, and are elevated to higher levels of being and capacity. It requires, however, that at each given point in development, if there be development, each creature shall possess determinate and resident capacity which it cannot transcend, either in operation or development, except by the coming in of forces which pertain to higher natures than its own.

The objection occurs that science cannot establish the theory of secondary causation, and that what are called secondary causes are really nothing more than members of series of effects due immediately to divine causation. Some writers urge this in the interests of the doctrine of divine immanence. See A. Moore, *Science and the Faith*, p. 146.

It is true that what are called secondary causes, that is, things as distinguished from rational wills, are not true causes in themselves, but are links in sequences of effects. It is also true that the nature of matter and force is too mysterious for us to define. The distinction between thing and force may be viewed in ways which reduce the theory of secondary causes to nonsense. It remains, however, that to regard things as substantial entities, which possess resident forces employed by God in producing natural effects, gives rationality to experience and to the generalizations of natural science. In short, this belief works successfully as a hypothesis, and describes the course of nature *as it appears to us*. We cannot believe that this appearance is false, whatever we may acknowledge as to the *inadequacy* of our terminology.

Secondary causes mean simply the apparent *media* through which divine causation operates. Strictly speaking, a cause must contain rational will, for to cause anything involves a determination that a

be accounted for by the native capacity of men.[1] But they are not ordinarily miraculous. A miracle is distinguished from other supernatural operations in that it appeals to our external senses, and innovates visibly upon the course of natural phenomena. Thus it is calculated to cause wondering attention on the part of observers. A miracle, in short, is a sensible wonder which suggests and requires supernatural causation to account for it. Men may mistake for a miracle what is simply an abnormal phenomenon, due to purely natural causation. But the term is not rightly applied to such events.

§ 4. It needs to be said with emphasis that there can be no real conflict between nature and the supernatural.[2] The distinction is based on the assumption

certain effect, as distinguished from other effects, shall be produced. In strict parlance, then, we should distinguish between means and agents employed by God, and restrict the phrase "secondary causes" to creaturely agents possessing the power of choosing what effect shall be produced. See Illingworth, *Divine Immanence*, pp. 127–129.

To conclude, no objection can be made against the theory of secondary causation which does not militate against physical science, as well as against the theological method of viewing what are called miracles.

[1] The Scriptures treat grace as supernatural because super*human*, not merely super-*physical;* and this justifies our inclusion of merely human activity within the natural.

[2] Hume is responsible for the modern definition of miracle as "a violation of the laws of nature."

Baldwin defines it as "an event which, on account of its unusual character, is assumed to be beyond the recognized powers of nature and man, and therefore the product or manifestation of supernatural agency, of which it also serves as a sign and witness." He says "The early and mediæval theologians agree in conceiving the mirac-

that higher natures exist than those which are referred to by the term natural; and that these natures can and do, on suitable occasions, manifest their existence and power by operating within the sphere of natural observation. But this does not violate the uniformity of nature, rightly defined. The principle still holds good that the same unhindered causes or combinations of causes produce the same effects. The supernatural effect is not a violation of natural causation; but is due to a well recognized principle of science, that when several causes co-operate the effect of such co-operation differs from what would result from the operation of either of the causes considered when acting by itself.[1]

ulous as being above but not contrary to nature." *Dic. of Philos.*, "Miracle."

St. Augustine says, "How is that contrary to nature which happens by the will of God, since the will of so mighty a Creator is certainly the nature of each created thing?" *De Civ. Dei*, XXI. 8.

Illingworth, *Divine Immanence*, pp. 121–122, points out that the older conception of uniformity in nature has given way to that of unity. In terms of time this means continuity. In Stewart and Tait's *Unseen Universe*, 62–82, the continuity of nature is shown to be consistent with strange and abrupt events by the history of astronomical phenomena. So, it is urged, the miracles of Christ must not be viewed as putting us to confusion in the continuity of the physical order.

[1] Says St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I. cv. 6, So far as an order of things depends on the first cause, God cannot do anything contrary; but so far as it depends on secondary causes He can do what is beyond its order. To act contrary to the first is to violate His own prescience, will, and goodness which they express. But He can operate beyond the order of secondary causes, because He is not subject to it, but such order is subject to Him, as proceeding from Him, not by necessity of nature, but by choice of His will, for He

The innovations which supernatural causation produces are analogous to those which men are capable of causing. The steam locomotive represents a startling innovation upon the course of phenomena previous to its invention, and the innovation is due to a cause transcending the native capacity of the physical means employed. But the laws of nature — *i.e.*, in the sense of the ascertained working of natural causes — are used rather than violated, and a new cause, the human will and device, accounts for the novel result.[1]

Of course, if we define natural law as consisting simply of the normally observed conjunction and sequence of phenomena, it is violated — *i.e.*, interrupted and changed. But in the deeper sense of the phrase natural laws agree with the principle that the intervention of exceptional causes will produce exceptional phenomena.

§ 5. The belief that miracles happen is rational, and in accord with a large view of history. The very idea of a miracle involves the assumption that there is an established and normal order of phenomena of which

could institute another order of things. So He can operate beyond the order instituted, by producing effects otherwise or by producing effects to which it does not extend. See Mozley, *Lecs. on Miracles*, III. note 1; Trench, Prelim. Essay, ch. ii.; Fisher, *Supernatural Origin*, pp. 480, 481.

[1] The iron and other materials employed could not assemble themselves to produce a locomotive. The locomotive is *artificial*, and the artificial corresponds in human agency to the miraculous in superhuman agency. In both the means employed operate according to their nature. It is the effect which is modified, and that by the coming in of other forces.

it constitutes an interruption. And this normal uniformity of the phenomenal universe is a manifestation of the principle that God is orderly in His operations. "Order is heaven's first law." [1] But if this uniformity of phenomena were never interrupted, the universe would remain forever the same. There could have been no beginning of the present cosmos, and no progress towards a goal, — no "far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves." There could be nothing but an unending series of cycles, without moral significance or rational purpose.[2]

[1] The most perfect manner of doing things under similar conditions is a similar manner. Divine perfection, therefore, justifies our expectation of regularity in His operations.

Hooker says, *Eccles. Polity*, I. ii. 1, "All things that are, have some operation not violent or casual. Neither doth anything ever begin to exercise the same without some fore-conceived end for which it worketh. And the end which it worketh for is not obtained, unless the work be also fit to obtain it by. For unto every end every operation will not serve. That which doth assign unto each thing the kind, that which doth moderate the force and power, that which doth appoint the form and measure, of working, the same we term a Law. So that no certain end could ever be obtained, unless the actions whereby it is attained were regular; that is to say, suitable, fit, and correspondent unto their end, by some canon, rule, or law. Which thing doth first take place in the works even of God Himself."

[2] This is the burden of "the Preacher." Eccles. i. 9, 14: "The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun." "I have seen all the works that are done under the sun; and behold all is vanity and vexation of spirit."

Huxley is cited by the *Expository Times*, Oct. 1892, as saying, "May I be permitted to repeat . . . that the statements denoted by the terms 'natural order' and 'law of nature' have no greater value or cogency than such as may attach to generalizations from

Divine revelation teaches that God is working out a vast design through a progressive succession of stages or *æons*. Each stage of advance involves innovation upon the previous order of events — one, however, which, so far from stultifying the significance of what has gone before, really advances the purpose involved therein towards its more complete fulfilment.[1]

experience of the past, and to expectations for the future based upon that experience? Nobody can presume to say what the order of nature must be; all that the widest experience . . . that events had happened in a certain way could justify would be a proportionally strong expectation that events will go on so happening, and the demand for a proportional strength of evidence in favour of any assertion that they had happened otherwise. It is this weighty consideration which knocks the bottom out of all *a priori* objections either to ordinary 'miracles' or to the efficacy of prayer, in so far as the latter implies the miraculous intervention of a higher power. No one is entitled to say *a priori* that any given so-called miraculous event is impossible," etc. See also Mozley, *Lecs. on Miracles*, II., III.; Temple, *Bamp. Lecs.*, pp. 6–33.

[1] In the New Testament the world is regarded from the temporal point of view, as *αἰών*, as well as from the spatial, as *κόσμος*. This appears in at least thirty-one instances. That is, the world is a drama, acted out through a series of ages or dispensations, with an occasional shifting of scenery. Temple, in *Bamp. Lecs.*, Lec. VII., shows that miracles stand for freedom in the ordering of events by God. See also Maccoll, *on the Creed*, pp. 103–115. St. Augustine says, *De Trin.*, III., "Nothing but the will of God is the prime cause of health and sickness," etc. St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, III. xcvii., shows that God orders all by a plan, in which several forms have their respective properties as proximate causes. Illingworth, *Divine Immanence*, pp. 121 *et seq.*, points out, as we have said, that the objection to miracles based on uniformity has given way to the idea of unity or continuity. The whole and its parts is conserved by spirit, which may modify natural processes for adequate spiritual ends. As St. Augustine says, *Confess.* I. 4, "God changes

It would be an error to limit the occurrence of miracles to brief moments in history. Even the more phenomenal changes of divine methods of operation are not usually sudden in the manner of their introduction, so as to appear full-grown at once, but are prepared in the womb of preceding history, and are heralded as well as followed by "signs and wonders." Each general movement onward involves a miraculous epoch, one which, without nullifying the previous order, exhibits significant indications of a new and more developed order which is being evolved from the old by supernatural causation.[1]

His operations, but not His counsel." St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I. cv. 6, ad 3, "God so established a certain order that yet He reserved to Himself that Himself should act otherwise at any time for a cause. Therefore, when He acts beyond this order, it is not changed."

[1] The truth of Christian doctrine is not dependent on the genuineness of post-apostolic miracles, and a few general considerations only need be given concerning them. (*a*) Miracles are possible in any age, provided adequate reasons exist for their occurrence; and, when such reasons can be given, we ought not to reject evidence of their occurrence on *a priori* grounds; (*b*) The conversion of new nations, and grave crises in the fortunes of the Church, may afford such reasons; (*c*) Yet it must be admitted that the occasions for miracles of post-apostolic date do not as a rule appear so obvious and convincing as in the case of New Testament miracles; (*d*) With some notable exceptions, the alleged miracles of later date are not of a nature to prejudice thoughtful believers in favour of belief in their reality. The ancient fathers and later writers of repute testify to many miracles of their own times, but acknowledge their inferior importance. On the whole subject see Trench, *Notes on Miracles*, Prelim. Essay, ch. iv., who throws doubt upon the generality of them; Newman, *Essay on Miracles*, Pt. II., who seeks to vindicate their reality; and Maccoll, *Lecs. on the Creed*, pp. 193–196, who shows the fallacy of excluding ecclesiastical miracles by an arbitrary

Miracles, therefore, have a reasonable place in the *æon*, or the world considered in its historical aspect, and are to be looked for whenever a proper and transitional epoch arrives. Such a philosophy of the universe seems to be implied in divine revelation, and is larger than any which natural investigation alone can enable us to formulate. But, when the admitted limitations of natural sciences are taken into account, there is no reason for alleging a conflict to exist between them and this higher philosophy. The revealed plan of God in the *æons* or ages of the world is confessedly beyond the sphere of natural sciences to investigate. but, so far from contradicting their genuine results, the manifestation of the divine plan serves to uncover their ultimate bearing and value.

The theory of evolution, if true, agrees plainly with the idea that the development of the universe which it hypothecates is divinely ordered.[1] It also agrees with the contention that no form of being or life can be advanced to a higher form and capacity without the intervention of a cause supernatural to its previously existing nature. The truth of this contention remains whether we suppose the modification to have occurred suddenly or gradually. It is as impossible for a being to take to itself a higher nature gradually, without the

dividing line in time. It is difficult to disprove all ecclesiastical miracles, but it is not necessary to accept particular ones.

[1] That is apart from materialistic views, not necessarily involved. The theory is concerned with the method of development, not with its cause or with initial creation. Mozley, *Lecs. on Miracles*, Lec. III., note 4.

operation of a cause higher than itself, as it is for such a being to do so suddenly. Accidental variations and survivals of the fittest cannot of themselves explain the ascent of the species.[1]

Miracles have a reasonable place in the general march of events; and we take for granted that a useless, meaningless, and capricious divine miracle will appear impossible to one who considers adequately the purposeful and orderly method of divine operations and

[1] It is as impossible to lift oneself by one's bootstraps gradually as to do so suddenly. The Darwinian hypothesis served to habilitate the general theory of evolution, of which it is one of several forms. Certain facts have led eminent scientists of late to doubt the adequacy of natural selection to account for the ascent of the species. Thus the ascent from the inanimate to the living, and from the irrational to man, seems to involve abrupt changes, too large to be accounted for thus. And it is not merely between man and the next lower species that connecting links are missing. Geology points to the sudden appearance of species in many lands without progenitors near enough in the scale of development to have become such by the variations permitted by Darwin's theory. Dinnert (a rather polemical writer, it must be admitted) gives an important list in his *At the Death-Bed of Darwinism* of eminent scientists who have abandoned Darwinism of late.

In any case, as Harris says, *Pro Fide*, pp. 253–256, "since reason refuses to entertain the supposition that effects can transcend their true efficient causes, it is clear that this process of evolution, in which effects have continuously transcended their antecedent conditions, cannot be regarded as one of purely natural causation." Such also is the view of Aubrey Moore in his various essays on the subject, a believer in the Darwinian theory.

Concise and up-to-date treatments of evolution and related topics can be found in Baldwin, *Dic. of Philos.*, in "Natural Selection," "Selection (in Biology)," "Evolution," "Survival of the Fittest," "Variation," and "Lamarckism."

the rationality of cosmical history as a whole. It is not to be expected, indeed, that the relation of particular miracles to the general course of things will always be easily understood by the observer or recipient of his testimony. The course of history is full of complexity, and many baffling phenomena occur, even in the natural sphere. Weighty testimony may not be rejected because of the strangeness of its contents without careful consideration. It remains, however, that if the miracles in general which are alleged to have attended divine revelation can be shown to have no reasonable place and function in history, they will cease to be credible. Happily, the fact is quite otherwise, and the miracles of the New Testament commend themselves on other grounds than that of mere testimony.[1] Rightly viewed, and in connection with the

[1] Butler says, *Analogy*, Pt. II. ch. ii., "Take in the consideration of religion, or the moral system of the world, and then we see distinct, particular reasons for miracles. . . . And this gives a real credibility to the supposition that it might be part of the original plan of things that there should be miraculous interpositions . . . our being able to discern reasons for them gives a positive credibility to the history of them, in cases where these reasons hold." Illingworth urges that, if the Incarnation is presupposed, Christ's miracles are natural to Him. "They flow naturally from a Person who, despite His obvious humanity, impresses us throughout as being at home in two worlds." *Divine Immanence*, pp. 100–108.

The Fathers believed in magic, and were thus driven, in their effort to vindicate the source of Gospel miracles, to notice their rationality. They also connected them with prophecy. Justyn M., *Apol.* i. 30; Iren., *adv. Heres.*, ii. 32; Origen, *Contra Cels.*, ii. 5, 48; Tertul., *adv. Marcion*, iii. 3; Lact., *Div. Inst.*, v. 3; St. Aug. *De Civ. Dei*, xxii. 6.

Incarnation and the Resurrection, they fulfil the promise of all previous history, and both account for and justify the developments of subsequent ages.

§ 6. Miracles are not only factors in the general progress of things, but are also full of moral significance to those who observe them with open and thoughtful minds, and have evidential value in establishing the genuineness of alleged divine revelations, with which they are often connected.

In saying this we do not mean to imply that natural phenomena are to be dissociated from divine causation, or to be regarded as without divine and moral meaning. On the contrary, we maintain that God is the cause of what theology calls natural operations as truly, and perhaps as directly, as of the operations here distin-

Rationality is apparent especially in divine miracles. It may be believed that evil spirits, so far as they are permitted, and within their limited power, will display capricious wilfulness in their action upon nature. But this is strictly analogous to the manipulations of nature by evil men. We know, however, that neither demoniacal nor human wills are able to disturb the general course of nature, or do more than manipulate within narrow limits the conditions under which natural forces operate. Bœdder, *Natural Theology*, Bk. II. ch. iii, gives three criteria by which to distinguish divine from demoniacal miracles: (*a*) Those which could not be produced by mere manipulation of nature are divine; (*b*) such as discredit divine truth are demoniacal; (*c*) such as produce irrational or unworthy effects are demoniacal.

It may be alleged that some of the Gospel miracles — *e.g.*, the sending of devils into the Gadarene swine, and the cursing of the fig tree — are irrational. Our reply is that we cannot expect to understand every miracle of Christ, and must regard the difficult ones in the light of the works of Christ in general, as part of a drama which as a whole is rational and credible.

guished as supernatural.[1] Furthermore, we hold that "the heavens declare the glory of God," and that "there is no speech nor language where their voice is not heard," as "day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night sheweth knowledge": — the knowledge of the invisible things of God, which are "understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead." The truth is that, unless we learn somewhat of God and of the moral significance of things through natural experience, we are incapable of understanding aright the teaching of miracles and of supernatural revelation. That which is natural comes first in the order of our moral and spiritual education.[2]

[1] Perrone, *De Vera Religione*, cap. iii. 121, maintains that God acts in and through individuals immediately. Law, genera, and species are our abstracts. Every operation is simply of the divine will. Such a view must be taken with caution, lest a pantheistic tendency creep in. The idealism of Berkeley lies open to the same danger. The conception of nature which makes physical science rational must be regarded as at least symbolically true — the best manner of formulating the method of God in the physical order that is practicable, and one which cannot be stultified by the event, however much it may be enriched and clarified. St. Thomas expresses what best agrees with our observation of nature when he says, *Summa Theol.*, I. cv. 5, "God does not so operate in all agents that they do not operate themselves. But He operates in everything finally, effectively, and formally, yet so that themselves operate as well."

[2] Psa. xix.; Rom. i. 19–20; 1 Cor. xv. 46. The last text refers to the body before and after its resurrection; but the principle is of general application. Newman says, *Essays on Miracles*, p. 10, "It (a Miracle) professes to be a signature of God to a message delivered by human instruments; and therefore supposes that signature in some degree already known, from His ordinary works."

The moral teaching of nature is sufficient to put men to a real probation. All can discern its moral significance to some extent; and, when they govern their lives by what they discern, they grow in the knowledge of God and of righteousness.[1] Yet we can learn nothing

The ancient Fathers were quite alive to the divine teaching of nature, as can be seen in passages cited by Illingworth, *Divine Imman.*, pp. 41–44. Thus St. Cyril of Jerusalem says, "The wider our contemplation of creation, the grander is our conception of God." *Cat.*, ix. 2. St. Hilary says, "Who can look on nature and not see God?" *In Ps.* lii. St. Augustine, "Every aspect and process of nature proclaims its Creator; with diverse moods and changes like a variety of tongues." *Lib. Arb.*, iii. 70. He also cites Basil, *Hex.*, iii. 10; vi. 1; *In Ps.* xxxiii.; Greg. Nyss., *De Mort. Inf.;* Dion. Areop., *Cel. Hier.* c. ii.; Greg. Mag., *Moral.*, XXVI. ch. xii. To these citations should be added Tertul., *adv. Marcion*, I. 18, who says that God must first be known through nature, and its teaching must then be authenticated through revelation; and St. Aug., *De Trinitate*, XV. 6, on what nature teaches of God.

The eighteenth century gave birth to many treatises on natural theology. They were apt to err on the side of a mechanical view of nature, and over-emphasized the divine transcendence. Later treatises in theism are better. As Martensen says, *Dogmatics*, § 38, theistic arguments constitute an analysis of the natural search after God and the study of His nature. Martineau, *Religion*, Bk. II. ch. i. § 8, says that the divine attributes are implicit in causation. Lindsay, *Recent Advances*, p. 5, describes natural theology as ultimate human thought exercised upon what man himself and his surroundings may teach or imply as to the Primal Reality known as God. See Calderwood, *Philos. of Inf.*, pp. 148–153, as to the teaching of nature on the nature of God.

[1] Much of nature's teaching is indeed only probable. But, as Butler says, "Probability is a very guide of life." *Analogy*, Introd. p. 72; Pt. II. ch. vi. pp. 261, 262. Cf. Hooker, *Eccles. Polity*, II. vii. 5; Romanes, *Thoughts on Religion*, p. 154. The relation of natural uniformities to probation is treated of by Temple, *Bamp. Lecs.*, III. pp. 90–96.

positive from a uniform sequence of natural phenomena beyond what is wrapped up in the immediate and present dispensation of things. It is true that even the uniformity of things is full of moral implications which constitute divine intimations. Nature teaches the existence of a Creator and moral Sovereign, and points to a future which will solve its enigmas and satisfy human instincts and aspirations. But this teaching is implicit and without authentication. It requires for our correct understanding of its lessons not only the assistance of divine grace, but also more articulate revelations, such as will authenticate and define nature's teaching, and will afford further information such as nature alone cannot furnish.

To this end, that which is beyond the sphere of natural uniformities must somehow be made manifest to us. And this cannot be accomplished, so far as we can see, except by the occurrence of exceptional phenomena, brought about by supernatural causes, and calculated to authenticate and draw our attention to special and articulate messages from God.[1]

[1] St. Augustine, in *St. John* ii. 1; vi. 1, asserting that miracles are no more wonderful than God's works in nature, says that the latter deaden our attention by their constant recurrence. Miracles by their exceptional nature rouse attention. St. Thomas says, *Contra Gentiles*, III. xcix., "There is no better way of manifesting the subjection of all nature to the divine will than by something being done at times beyond the course of nature. . . . Nor should it be accounted a frivolous reason to allege that God works some effects in nature in order to manifest Himself to human minds, since . . . all material creation is subordinated to serve the end of intellectual nature, while the end of intellectual nature itself is

This is what is meant by saying that miracles teach the moral relations and purposes of the world. Nature teaches that there are such relations and purposes, and its teaching is certainly divine; but miracles, and the oral revelations which they authenticate, define these relations and purposes, and enable us to find the personal God whom nature teaches that we should seek. To adopt a phrase of the late Professor Fraser, "The Revelation we call miraculous more distinctly unfolds the implicates of theistic faith and hope, and is therefore more richly divine and reasonable, than the more attenuated revelation of Omnipotent Goodness that is tacitly presupposed in all experience." [1]

This view of the matter shows that we may not disparage the evidential value of miracles. It also shows that in regarding them as needed evidences of supernatural revelation, we are not pledged to the absurdity of shutting out the exercise of our critical judgment. Without miracles we should lack a necessary basis of certainty that God has indeed spoken to us in articulate language. But miracles must be rational in their ultimate philosophy, and we may rightly assume an attitude of incredulity when asked to believe in divine miracles

the knowledge of God." Newman says, *Miracles*, p. 11, "The mind habituated to the regularity of nature is blunted to the overwhelming evidence it conveys; whereas by a miracle it may be roused to reflection, till mere conviction of a superhuman being becomes the first step towards the acknowledgment of a Supreme Power . . . In miraculous displays of power the field is narrowed; a detached portion of the divine operations is taken as an instance, and the final cause is distinctly pointed out."

[1] *Philos. of Theism*, p. 303.

which are meaningless, or the meaning of which is subversive of what nature teaches us to be divine and rational. As is the case with all evidence touching matters beyond our personal experience, when offered in support of the absurd we reject the evidence as having no value; but when offered in support of that which, although beyond our previous knowledge, is in accord with the deepest and most spiritual trend of God's universe, we accept its evidential value and are enriched thereby.[1]

II. *Supernatural Revelation*

§ 7. We have yet to consider specifically the objections which have been advanced against the supernatural and miraculous. But we can do this more intelligently if we first deal more directly with the subject of supernatural revelation.

[1] An article on "Liberal Theology," in the *Church Quarterly Review* for January, 1906, shows that the primary canon of just criticism is not "Miracles cannot happen," but, "The irrational cannot be true." "The primary note of the irrational is unrelatedness." That miracles are thus irrational is a question for consideration, not for assertion at the outset. Says A. H. Strong, *Systematic Theology*, Pt. III. ch. I. iii., "A miracle is not an irrational or capricious act of God; but an act of wisdom, performed in accordance with the immutable laws of His being, so that in the same circumstances the same course would be pursued." Newman says, "To consider them [miracles] as mere exceptions to the physical order, is to . . . degrade them from the station which they hold in the plans and provisions of the Divine Mind, and to strip them of their real use and dignity; for as naked and isolated facts they do but deform an harmonious system." *On Miracles*, p. 5. Cf. Gore, *Incarnation*, pp. 48–55.

The word revelation may be applied to all manifestations of the divine nature and purposes to men, so as to include the theistic and moral teaching of natural phenomena. Such a use of the term is found in many modern writings. But in technical use the word has a more restricted meaning, referring exclusively to supernatural signs and communications from God, designed to impart a knowledge which men cannot acquire through natural channels. The word is also applied to the contents of supernaturally imparted knowledge.[1]

Revelation, as thus defined, assumes two forms: (*a*) objective signs, or miraculous events which constitute factors in the march of history and have pregnant meaning; (*b*) oral communications, given either through inspired prophets or by the Incarnate Word. These two are sometimes combined — miracles attesting the source of oral communications, and these communications interpreting the miracles and signs.

§ 8. What has been said touching the rationale of the supernatural and miraculous ought to suggest satisfactory reasons for the occurrence of supernatural revelations.

(*a*) In the first place, such revelations constitute a continuance of the gracious purpose of God that is exhibited in nature itself, and seem necessary for its complete

[1] On the subject of Revelation see Lee, *Inspiration*, ch. i.; Christlieb, *Modern Doubt*, Lec. II.; Schouppe, *Elem. Theol. Dog.*, Tract II. cap. ii.; Illingworth, *Reason and Revel.*, pp. 143–151, 252–256, and ch. ix.; Wilhelm and Scannell, *Manual of Cath. Theol.*, Vol. I. pp. 3–15; Butler, *Analogy*, Pt. II. ch. i.; Turton, *Truth of Christianity*, Bk. II.; Harris, *Pro Fide*, pp. 274–281.

fulfilment. Nature teaches of God sufficiently to put us to a probation of faith and obedience. But it raises vital questions bearing on present duty and future destiny, which, in the absence of further intimations, leave men morally helpless. Without supernatural revelation we seem to be confronted with arrested purpose: — as if, having begun to bring us into intelligent relation to Himself (the chief end of our deepest aspirations) and to our future, God had given up His design and had left us in a state of fragmentary knowledge, more baffling to our reason and conscience than in accord with justice and mercy.

A worthy conception of divine goodness seems to demand that the inadequate and therefore somewhat enigmatical intimations of nature should be supplemented by further revelations, such as will articulate nature's teaching and enable men to advance intelligently towards the goal to which nature darkly points. The moral teaching of nature is most reasonably to be regarded as preliminary, and designed to prepare us for fuller and more explicit revelations. The natural comes first as most rudimentary, the supernatural following in logical sequence; and divine grace is imparted to our sin-darkened minds that we may discern spiritually the meaning of both.[1]

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 46. St. Paul says, "Unto me . . . is this grace given, that I should preach . . . the unsearchable riches of Christ; and to make all men see what is the fellowship of the mystery, which from the beginning of the world hath been hid in God." Ephes. iii. 8–9. Cf. Acts xvii. 23. St. Thos., *Sum. Theol.*, I. i. 1; Hooker, *Eccles. Polity*, I. xi.

§ 9. (*b*) Again, while it must be acknowledged that men seek after God and learn somewhat of His nature and will apart from supernatural revelation, it may not truly be said that they really find Him or come into authentic relations with Him. The greatest philosophers and religious leaders of the heathen world have failed hopelessly in this respect; and this failure has been shared in by all who have not enjoyed the benefit of supernatural revelation. Socrates, Plato, Cicero, Seneca, Confucius, and Gautama were seekers after God, but one and all failed to find Him. Yet man was made for God, and the very essence of true religion consists in real communion with Him. No doubt the Judge of all the earth allows for the inability of the heathen to find Him, but their failure in this regard cannot be considered as other than a proof of the need of revelation for men. "This is life eternal that they might know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent." [1]

[1] St. John xvii. 3. What is said does not involve a denial that pagan seekers after God have divine guidance, but only that it is articulate and productive of authentic personal relations with God. Clement of Alexandria and other ancient writers believed in what Newman calls a "dispensation of paganism." See his *Arians*, ch. I. § iii. 5; Clement, *Strom.* VI.; VII. 2. Cf. note 1 of p. 100; and chap. viii. § 11.

A. H. Strong, *Systematic Theology*, pp. 58–59, gives quotations from pagan philosophers which show their sense of the need of revelation. Pythagoras, "It is not easy to know [duties], except men were taught them by God Himself, or by some person who had received them from God, or obtained the knowledge of them through some divine means." Socrates, "Wait with patience till we know with certainty how we ought to behave ourselves towards

§ 10. (*c*) Furthermore, belief in divine revelation of some kind has prevailed so widely and under such diverse conditions as to seem instinctive.[1] The beginnings of this belief are prehistoric, and may in particular races be due to vague traditions of primitive revelations. If this be the case, the fact of such revelations makes for the probability of subsequent ones. If it is not so, then the belief would seem to be natural to man, unless stamped out by savage degradation or by the vagaries of *a priori* and sceptical philosophy. And if man looks instinctively for divine revelations, he is led to such anticipations by the nature which God Himself has given him. It is difficult to believe that God would implant in His creatures an instinctive tendency to look for the unreal and impossible.

§ 11. (*d*) This phenomenon, of wide-spread and instinctive looking for divine revelations, suggests another line of thought. If we assume the general truth of the evolutionary hypothesis, we observe that the course of

God and man." Plato, "We will wait for one, be he a God or an inspired man, to instruct us in our duties and to take away the darkness from our eyes." Citations and references are given on the failure of pagans and their sense of need of revelation in Schouppe, *Elem. Theol. Dog.* Tr. II. cap. ii. §§ 115–116.

[1] Note the pagan oracles, the inspection of entrails, omens, and the wide-spread beliefs in incarnations. For this last see Illingworth, *Divine Immanence*, pp. 91-96. See also his *Personality*, note 23, pp. 267-268, on Ethnic Inspiration. Dods, *The Bible*, pp. 69–70, cites and supports Fairbairn (*Christ in Modern Theology*, p. 494), who contends that "Of every religion the idea of revelation is an integral part; the man who does not believe that God can speak to him will not speak to God."

cosmical development consists in an ever deepening correspondence with an environment of reality. As Herbert Spencer says, the end toward which the changes involved in evolution tend "must be adaptation to the requirements of existence." [1] This philosopher is arguing for the existence of some underlying reality in religion, which he recognizes to be a genuine element in man's progress. But in religion man seeks to come into correspondence with the divine, and a self-revelation of God seems to be necessary for the success of this aspiration. On no other basis is the direct and conscious communion with God which religion seeks to secure possible. Here, then, is a genuine element in human evolution. Is it to be defeated? The previous course of evolution, as held by modern scientists, would suggest a negative reply. It is not to be defeated, and a revelation from God to man is to be expected.

§ 12. It must be acknowledged that there have been many alleged revelations which are plainly spurious. Some of them contradict others, suggesting the impossibility that all can be true. Again, many of them are not only puerile in their contents, but are accompanied by circumstances suggestive of fraud.

Clearly, we need to discriminate between alleged divine communications — trying the spirits whether

[1] *First Principles*, Pt. I. ch. i. § 4. The late John Fiske works this out very fully and convincingly in *Through Nature to God*, ch. ix., x., and we shall make use of his argument when we come to treat of theism, in another volume.

they be of God.[1] What then are the evidences which establish the fact of a genuine divine revelation? As this is not an apologetical treatise we can only summarize them briefly.

(*a*) The testimony, and the traditions by means of which a revelation is made known to us, should be adequate and trustworthy. That is, the original witnesses should give evidences of sufficient knowledge, competency, sincerity, and sobriety. And the documents and other means of tradition whereby we receive this testimony should be sufficiently authentic, and in sufficient mutual agreement, to warrant a belief in their credibility, after allowing for inevitable divergences in insignificant details.

(*b*) The contents of an alleged revelation must exhibit marks of its divine source. They must not contradict our previous sure knowledge, for truth cannot contradict itself. The manner of the revelation must not be puerile or out of harmony with the methods which may be looked for in divine operations. Its contents should have sufficient and spiritual importance, and should have some relation to man's previous knowledge, exhibiting a progressive unfolding of the divine mind. They should not be unintelligible and simply stulti-

[1] In doing this we should not forget to allow for the necessary limitations of progress in revelation, adapted to the slowness with which men are capable of receiving its contents. If a *course* of revelation unfolds a faith which can stand legitimate criticism, the crudeness and defects of its earlier stages may not be urged against their divine origin. Mozley, *Ruling Ideas of Early Ages*, discusses this subject very fully.

fying. They must make for righteousness and be consistent with the divine character. It should be evident that such marks of divine origin cannot rightly be discerned except by spiritually minded men. "Spiritual things are spiritually discerned."

(*c*) We cannot, however, anticipate the contents of divine revelation. If we could, such revelation would be superfluous. The mere consideration of its contents does not therefore establish its divine authority. It is needful for our assurance of this that it should be attested by evidence which can be recognized to be supernatural. This is true whether God reveals Himself directly, as in the Word Incarnate, or indirectly through prophets. Such evidence is in general of two kinds: (1) the fulfilment of predictive prophecy; (2) miracles plainly requiring divine power or assistance for their performance.[1]

(*d*) Our assurance as to the genuineness of divine revelation is increased, and finally established, when we examine the effects of such revelation on human history and individual lives, including our own. To put it in another way, if the contents of an alleged divine revelation constitute a successful working hypothesis, solving many problems, lighting up the pathway of

[1] Newman, *Essays on Miracles*, pp. 6–10. Harris, *Pro Fide*, pp. 278–281; Trench, *Notes on Miracles*, Prelim. Essay, ch. iii.; Illingworth, *Reason and Revel.*, ch. vii.–viii., who brings conveniently together citations from Origen, *Contra Celsum*, VIII. xlvii.; Athan., *De Incarn.*, § 18; Greg. Nys., *Log. Cat.*, xii. He also shows that the Fathers relied much on prophecy, and on the self-evidence of the Incarnation from its sublimity and power; Mozley, *Miracles*, Lec. I.

human life, and enlarging wondrously our understanding of all things, we possess scientific evidence of a high order as to the truth and source of the revelation. The evidence of spiritual experience is, perhaps, the most convincing of Christian evidences, but in the nature of things it is available only to those who are willing to make the venture of faith and guide their lives by Christian truth.

III. *Objections Against Miracles*

§ 13. We shall now return to the subject of miracles, and consider briefly the chief objections raised against them.

(*a*) In the first place, it is urged that the conviction that there is an established order and uniformity of nature is an instinctive one, and is confirmed by the wonderful progress of the sciences which assume its truth. The predictions of natural science, for instance, which are constantly verified by the event, could not be depended on unless we were justified in expecting that events will continue to happen in the future in obedience to the laws which owe their discovery to investigations based on the hypothesis of the uniformity of nature.[1]

We have already acknowledged that there is an

[1] Mozley discusses this difficulty very thoroughly in his *Lectures on Miracles*, Lecs. II, III. Note Illingworth's remark, already referred to, that the idea of mere uniformity has given way to that of unity, or continuity of progress in a plan. The natural course of events may well be modified for adequate spiritual ends. *Divine Immanence*, pp. 121 *et seq.*

established order of nature, and that the law of uniformity is valid within the sphere of its causation. In other words, the presumption that these uniformities will continue unbroken is a rational one. But it may not be given the rank of an intuitive truth; nor is it possible to prove that no higher causes will intervene, with exceptional and miraculous results. Natural science is concerned with what will happen, if no other causes operate than those which come within the sphere of its investigation. The presumption that other causes will not ordinarily operate may not be interpreted as meaning that they cannot do so.

Nature is not its own end, but is part of a larger plan, which requires innovating forces and events for its advancement. All that can be established, therefore, by the objection we are considering is that the presumption is under ordinary circumstances against the likelihood of miraculous events.[1] The evidence that they have occurred must be weighty, and their place in the general plan of divine operations must be capable of justification to enlightened reason in order that they should be accepted.

§ 14. (*b*) David Hume advanced the sceptical objection that, whereas the conviction that miracles are

[1] "Under ordinary circumstances," is an important qualification of what is said. The presumption is against the likelihood of miracles under ordinary circumstances, because ordinarily no sufficient reason exists for their occurrence. If, however, an alleged miracle pertains to what we have reason to think is a critical moment in history, in which the divine plan is being advanced to a new stage of fulfilment, the presumption against its likelihood disappears.

contrary to human experience is as well established as any scientific generalization can be, it is notorious that human testimony is liable to err. His conclusion is that testimony to miracles cannot hold its own against human experience, or be regarded as credible.[1]

This objection is more specious than weighty. Hume rejects the theistic view of the universe, and of course is unable to grant the possibility of a sufficient reason, growing out of the larger plan of God, for an interruption of physical sequences in the phenomenal world. He assumes, therefore, that all alleged miracles must possess the same degree of likelihood or unlikelihood. Their credibility in every case rests exclusively on a limited amount of testimony, which cannot shift the weight of probability from the side on which scientifically generalized experience has placed it. From such a point of view but one legitimate conclusion can follow — "Miracles do not happen."

That miracles are contrary to the experience which science can generalize — experience of purely natural causation — may be granted, provided the word "contrary" is interpreted as meaning "outside of." It is Hume who is responsible for the misleading definition of miracles as violations of the laws of nature. They

[1] Essay on *Miracles*. Among the best discussions of his argument are those of Fisher, *Supernatural Origin of Christianity*, pp. 480–496; Trench, *The Miracles of our Lord*, Prelim. Essay, ch. v. See also Harris, *Pro Fide*, pp. 264–270. Illingworth, *Divine Immanence*, pp. 110–119, shows that sin alone violates law; and that the Gospel miracles, *e.g.*, the Virgin-birth, pertain to a dispensation whereby this violation is designed to be remedied.

do not violate these laws, but are signs that other than natural causes are operating. They lie outside of generalized experience because natural science can only generalize touching the working of natural causes. If "contrary to experience" means contrary to all human observation in detail, to say that miracles are contrary to experience is to beg the question, which must be settled in view of the evidence available — including not only the testimony offered, but also the rationality of the alleged miracle, considered in relation to its nature, historical connection, and apparent significance.[1]

§ 15. (*c*) The deistic objection was based upon a view of the universe which is no longer generally accepted. According to that view, the world is like a machine, which God has made and set in operation, and which He cannot tamper with without producing disorder. It is now widely recognized that the world is neither a fixed mechanism, nor external to God. God is seen to be immanent in His universe as well as transcendent, and the order of nature exhibits operations which are charged with moral purpose, and point towards a goal that requires for its attainment more than natural forces alone can achieve.[2]

[1] Fairbairn shows that Hume's argument is inconsistent with his own philosophy. If, as Hume urges, our so-called knowledge is confined to individual impressions, mutually disconnected, we cannot acquire a knowledge of experience in general which warrants assertions as to what is contrary to it. *Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, pp. 24–27. See also Temple, *Bamp. Lecs.*, pp. 10–12.

[2] On the Deistic objection see Harris, *Pro Fide*, pp. 260–262; Christlieb, *Modern Doubt*, Lec. V. pp. 311–312.

§ 16. (*d*) An objection more congenial to present-day forms of thought is due to one-sided emphasis upon the truth of divine immanence. We are warned against distinguishing between what is divine and what is natural. All phenomena are the direct pulsations of divine life and activity. The causation of what is called natural and of what is called supernatural is the same. Both are supernatural so far as their causation is concerned, and both are natural in their method, although we do not recognize this with the same facility in every case. This difference in the obviousness of divine purpose constitutes the whole truth of the distinction between natural and supernatural events. God alone is objectively supernatural, and His operations are found equally in all that happens.[1]

Such reasoning errs through inadequate premises. It is true that divine causation is present equally in the natural and in the supernatural, and that both are charged with moral purpose having the same source. It is also true that all things are natural to God, and the distinction between the natural and the supernatural is relative. But it is not merely subjective. The

[1] This objection is put with rare plausibility in Bowne's *Immanence of God*. He labours under the supposition that to distinguish objectively between the natural and the supernatural is to banish God from the natural. The same is the case with Ladd, *Philos. of Religion*, Vol. II. pp. 272–274. St. Thomas says, "God governs all things immediately through His plan, but through others in execution." Again, "God does not so operate in all agents that they do not operate themselves. But He operates in everything finally, effectively, and formally, yet so that each thing itself operates as well." *Summa Theol.*, I. ciii. 6; cv. 5.

difference of natures under divine government is objectively real, and the scientific view that each nature possesses by divine ordering its own limited, distinct, and enduring capacities and resident forces, so as to become a secondary cause and determinate instrument of divine operations, is confirmed by all human experience. It is this view that warrants and makes possible the generalizations and predictions of the physical sciences. The conviction, therefore, that events which have particular natures as their secondary causes, means, or agency are supernatural to natures of lower rank and capacity, is in accordance with experience, and does not exclude the divine causation and significance of any event whatever. All events have divine causation. But we rightly distinguish between those that are the result of the forces and capacities which God has imparted to the natures that constitute the existing order of every-day human experience, and those which transcend such forces and capacities. Furthermore, we rightly distinguish the divine meanings of each, and discern manifestations of onward progress and articulate revelations of the divine plan in the supernatural which cannot be discovered in the natural.

§ 17. (*e*) Finally, there is the pantheistic objection. God and nature are but different aspects of one totality of being and event which obeys universal law. To suppose that law can be broken or transcended is to suppose something capricious and unreasonable. Moreover, as there is no personal and infinite cause distin-

guishable from the universe, there can, of course, be no special manifestation of that cause and no supernatural event.

This objection depends for its value wholly upon the truth of pantheism. If God is merely the underlying reality of all things, there can be no place for the distinction between the natural and the supernatural. This is not the place to consider the claims of pantheism to our acceptance. It is sufficient to say that, while neither the falsity of pantheism nor the truth of theism lie within the province of absolute demonstration, the superiority of theism is confirmed by too many lines of argument to permit of our regarding it as doubtful. Pantheism fails to satisfy human instincts and is subversive of our surest intuitions — the moral.[1]

§ 18. The conclusion of the matter is that the reality of the supernatural and miraculous, and of the objective distinction of natures and operations involved, cannot be denied consistently by a theist.[2] Nor may such an one deny that the natural and the supernatural are harmonious factors in one plan of divine operations, each having a rational place therein, and both necessary

[1] The pantheistic objection is stated by Spinoza, *Tractatus Theologico-politicus*, ch. vi. He assumes that a miracle must be regarded as an inexplicable caprice. We have shown that this is just what a divine miracle is not. On the whole objection see Harris, *Pro Fide*, pp. 262–263; Trench, Prelim. Essay, ch. v. 3.

[2] See Mozley *Lecs. on Miracles*, *Lec.* V., pp. 95–109. Mill admits in his Essay on *Theism* that the belief in miracles is rational for a theist, and that evidence rather than *a priori* considerations should be considered.

to be taken note of in a satisfactory philosophy of history.

In such a philosophy it will be acknowledged that the natural exhibits a particular stage of history, and the visible sphere of divine operations now going on. It is characterized by general uniformity in the conjunction and sequence of phenomena, due to the law that the same unhindered causes or combinations of causes produce the same effects. The laws of nature signify how things happen, so far as we have observed them, when natural forces alone operate. Innovations upon natural sequences require the coming in of supernatural forces to account for them. This natural order has divine meaning, and affords conditions under which men are put to a probation and can, with divine aid, acquire virtues which are pleasing to God and suitable as far as they go to their future destiny.

The supernatural, on the other hand, pertains to higher natures than are included within this visible order, although natural to God and forming part of an universal and harmonious system. It is the operation of supernatural forces within the sphere of the natural that makes progress or evolution a possibility, and which causes the whole creation to move onward toward its "far-off divine event."

Miracles are events occurring within the natural sphere which are due to supernatural causes, and are also visible to our senses. They have a significance over and above the teaching of nature because of their exceptional quality and the obviously higher source of

their immediate causation. As wonders they challenge attention to their peculiar immediate source and to the lessons which they convey or authenticate. In brief, miracles (*a*) draw attention to the supernatural and attest its teaching;[1] (*b*) signify new steps in the fulfilment of God's plan;[2] (*c*) vindicate the divine order, especially as against moral disturbance.[3] As is the case with the supernatural in general, miracles fit in with the general constitution of things and forces, and have a rational place in history.

[1] St. John iii. 2. "Rabbi, we know that thou art a Teacher come from God: for no man can do these signs that Thou doest, except God be with him."

[2] The miracles of the conception of Christ and His resurrection from the dead have this bearing.

[3] The miracles which were wrought in behalf of the chosen people had this purpose, as did also the miraculous dispensation in general of the redemption of Christ.

CHAPTER III

DATA AND SOURCES

I. *Natural Data*

§ 1. We are now ready to consider in detail the statement made at the beginning of Chapter II, that "the data which are considered in theology are partly natural and partly supernatural and miraculous"; and to survey the sources from which these data are immediately derived.

The natural order contains many theological data, including the existing order of phenomena in the cosmos as scientifically observed, the evidences of progress in cosmical development, mental and moral facts, and the general history of mankind.

§ 2. The existing general order of cosmical phenomena is full of theistic meaning, although that meaning is largely implicit, and is most truly and adequately interpreted in the light of supernatural revelation. We can, however, discover in the physical order apart from revelation evidences of the existence of God, and many significant indications of the method of His external operations. These operations also make evident some of the divine attributes, for example, His power, wisdom, and righteousness. Enlightened reason is able to infer from the contents of sensible experience certain

theistic truths which transcend experience, and are seen to have *a priori* validity. Such processes of thought enable us to perceive that God must be uncaused or self-existent, personal and infinite — *i.e.*, limited by nothing which is external to His own being and nature — the necessary ground of all other being and life whatsoever. Finally, nature teaches us much of the divine will touching our own conduct, exhibiting conditions to which we must conform and judgments of the conscience upon our individual actions, judgments which imply that God is our moral Sovereign as well as our Creator and Sustainer.

But nature leaves us with many difficult problems, especially moral ones. While our natural aspirations teach the need of religion and communion with God, nature does not tell us how to find Him or how to worship Him. We are conscious of an instinctive demand for justice, but this life fails to satisfy the demand. The problem of evil is ever with us, and suggests to an enlightened mind the need of a future life in which these difficulties can be met. But nature tells us nothing as to the character and conditions of such a life. In short, the data afforded by the present state of the cosmical order are valuable, but are quite inadequate to the needs of men and of theology.

§ 3. Additional light is afforded by a study of cosmical and organic development, and the abundant traces of such a development constitute valuable theological data, although their interpretation is in many respects uncertain. That the universe has not been

what it is from the beginning, either in general appearance or biological contents, must be admitted, whether we accept the theory of a growth of the higher species of life out of the lower or not. Geology, morphology, astronomy, and other lines of research reveal clearly that there has been progress from primitive chaos to the present cosmos, from the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher — whether by independent creations or by gradual and evolutionary process.[1] The data thus brought to light enlarge our knowledge of divine operations, and indicate that a vast plan is being worked out, the fulness of which remains hidden among the secrets of the future. They indicate also the unique position occupied by man, whatever may have been the method of his creation,[2] and point on to a destiny to be realized hereafter under higher and holier conditions. Finally they indicate the transi-

[1] We do not commit ourselves to any theory of evolution. Such theories are old, and seem implied in some patristic writings. St. Thomas Aquinas anticipates modern views in some particulars. But Charles Darwin gave the belief in natural evolution its present recognized place among scientists, without securing a final acceptance of his particular theory of natural selection. The articles in the *Encyc. Britannica* on "Evolution," "Biology," and "Embryology," may be consulted with advantage; also the writings of the late John Fiske and Aubrey Moore.

[2] Man is, of course, what he is, superior to all other forms of life on earth, whatever may have been the manner of his origin or his descent; and this superiority is not merely one of degree. If he descended from lower orders of life, he also ascended by having imparted to him from God powers and attributes which would be distinctly supernatural to any other animal species. The nature of man differs in *kind* from that of his alleged progenitors.

tional and alterable nature of the present constitution of things, and enable us to discern the possibility and probability of events and revelations transcending nature as now constituted. The development of the higher from the lower cannot proceed from powers native to the lower, however smooth and gradual the process may be, but requires an overruling and creative Power, whose modes of self-revelation cannot be restricted by any science which is confined to the present and previous course of natural events.

§ 4. The mental and moral nature and life of man also supply theological data, and of a high order. Taught by his own mental and moral actions, man is able to discern indications of design and moral purpose in the universe about him, and these facts, thus enlarged in their significance, enrich his conceptions of God. Although we cannot argue from analogy and say that God must be like man — a man writ large — we do find ourselves unable to account for the existence of a person without attributing personality, however much it may transcend our own, to his Creator. We feel compelled to look also for somewhat in our God which shall afford an adequate ground and sanction for the moral nature and instincts with which He has endowed us.

§ 5. Finally, the course of human history affords data which are charged to a pre-eminent degree with the teachings of nature as we have thus far considered them. History exhibits men as mastering and coming to general agreement touching the laws of nature and

their meaning; as working out on a super-physical level the plan which seems implied in cosmical development; as reaching towards social organization and the subjection of nature to its needs; as aspiring to things above and beyond this world; as maintaining religious systems which grow more and more towards a consciousness of divine unity, holiness, sovereignty, and providence, and an assurance of a future world wherein dwelleth righteousness. All this is written upon the face of human history, in its natural as well as its supernatural aspects, and cannot be disregarded by an adequate theology.

II. *Supernatural Data*

§ 6. As has been shown already, the data afforded by the study of natural phenomena are inadequate. They signify much, but not enough; and what they signify requires the clearer light of the supernatural for its articulation and for the theologian's final assurance. Supernatural data are sufficiently abundant. Among the more notable and significant are the miracles described in Holy Scripture, the Person, life and words of Jesus Christ, the establishment and subsequent fortunes of the Church of Christ, and the authoritative revelations, expositions, and definitions of divine truth which are associated with these phenomena, and which give them their peculiarly distinct meaning.

§ 7. Miracles, we have shown, are to be looked for especially in connection with transitional epochs in the advancement of the divine plan. The history of divine

dispensations contained in Holy Scripture bears this out. Thus, the time of the establishment of the Old or Mosaic dispensation was peculiarly an age of signs and wonders, the meanings of which were often self-evident, and were made certain by oral revelations which they attested. Certain crises in the history of the old dispensation were also accompanied by miraculous indications of divine sovereignty and purpose — notably in the time of Elijah and Elisha. But the age of miracles *par eminence* coincided with the appearance and work of the Word-Incarnate and the establishment of His visible kingdom on earth — the Church of the living God. These miracles are not to be treated as isolated happenings, but as significant parts of the dispensations with which they are connected. Only in such connection can theologians truly discern their meaning and employ them as scientific data.

§ 8. The central data of theology are those which appear in connection with the manifestation of Jesus Christ — His miraculous birth, unique Person, life and teaching, His works, death, resurrection, and bodily ascension, as well as the training of His Apostles and their commission to baptize and make disciples of all nations. These data constitute the Gospel, and afford positive information concerning the divine nature, the relations subsisting between God and man, and the purposes of God — information necessary for the attainment by man of the blessed end for which he was created. A correct interpretation of the facts of the Gospel supplies us with the primary doctrines of the

Christian religion, doctrines which draw with them all that a Christian needs to know and believe for his soul's health, and which constitute the fundamental premises of theological science.[1]

§ 9. The manner of origin, and continued existence of the Church of God, as well as its divinely appointed and sacramental institutions, also afford theological data of a high and distinctly supernatural order. They are significant of the method of divine government, of the covenant relations with God now made available for all men, and of many divine truths not rightly understood apart from them. Protestant theology has disregarded these data to a large extent, and this fact accounts for the diversity and consequent uncertainty which attend its conclusions.

§ 10. Finally, the theologian has at his service a large body of authoritative explications of divine truth — explications which have the attestation of God in Christ, or of divinely inspired writers, and of the Spirit-guided Church Catholic. The truths which are here taken for granted — that Christ is God, that certain writings are divinely inspired, and that the Catholic Church is guided by the divine Spirit, will be con-

[1] The Faith is grounded in historical events, capable of being apprehended correctly by ordinary men. And he who accepts these facts without reservation, and is guided by them, also holds the entire faith by implication, whether capable of mastering it theologically or not. Thus appears the catholicity of the faith, in the possibility of its being laid hold of by all men. And in laying hold of it the mind proceeds according to its natural and normal method, accepting concrete realities before advancing to the abstract ideas involved in them.

sidered in other volumes. These explications not only enrich our knowledge of the subjects treated of in theology to a very great degree, but are theological safeguards of the utmost necessity and value. Conclusions which are in conflict with them are shown by that fact to be in need of correction.

III. *Theological Sources*

§ 11. By theological sources are meant the literatures and other channels through which the data of theology are conveniently received and become immediately available for theologians. These are of two kinds — authoritative and unauthoritative. The authoritative sources are the doctrines of the Catholic Church, and the Sacred Scriptures; while theological literature in general, the natural sciences, and personal experience, are unauthoritative sources.

§ 12. The Church teaches and the Scriptures prove the contents of supernatural revelation.[1] The faith of the Church is thus the first source of theological data. This does not mean that the teaching of the Church has higher authority than belongs to the Scriptures, but that it is definitive, and affords a necessary key to the general meaning of Scripture. In the Scriptures we have a divinely inspired record and memorial of various stages of a progressive and manifold revelation and

[1] This is so because, although the faith was once for all delivered to the saints — prior to the writing of Scripture — the Bible records the primitive teaching of the Church, and thus enables us to verify the agreement of later teaching with what the Church received and taught in pentecostal days.

application of divine truth. In the Church's faith we have an explicit summary of the completed contents of this revelation, formulated with the guidance of the Holy Ghost. It would be unscientific, and would involve much loss of time and liability to error, to neglect such a summary. We need not repeat in our day the toilsome and age-long steps by which our spiritual forefathers were led to the knowledge of truth; but, starting with the final results of revelation as taught by the Church, we can study the literary monuments of its successive stages with security and edification. We shall not undertake here a full discussion of the Church's dogmatic office, but content ourselves with the broad statement that the dogmas of the Church afford the chief premises of theological thought, and propositions by which every theological conclusion should be tested.

§ 13. The Sacred Scriptures are indispensable sources of theological data. They give a divinely inspired record of the revelation of divine truth, and of the divine dispensations which have attended the march of events towards the fulfilment of divine purposes. They are crowded with symbols, parabolic narratives, types, prophecies, miraculous signs, divine precepts and admonitions, expositions and examples, which confirm the faith of the Church, illustrate divine truths and principles, and throw a flood of needed light upon all the subjects with which theology is concerned.

Two remarks only need to be added at this point, as we intend to treat of the general subject of dogma

and Scripture in another volume. In the first place, the value of the different portions of Scripture to the theologian is uneven. This does not mean that some portions of Scripture are less inspired than others, for, as we shall see, the inspiration of the Bible does not admit, properly speaking, of degrees. It means this, that the immediate purposes for which the different parts of Scripture have received divine authority are diverse. Not all portions are inspired for the purpose of revelation, nor are the earlier revelations contained in Scripture as full and explicit as are the later ones.

Again, it is usually a mistake to employ separate passages of Scripture as proof texts, sufficient of themselves to establish divine truths. These truths emerge rather from a consideration of the general course and tenour of revelation. Individual texts are best understood when considered in their context and historical background, and in their place in the general course of revelation.

§ 14. The previous literature of theology is a valuable source of theological data. Theology is a progressive science. New bearings of ancient truths are continually appearing, as well as new theological data — not new articles of the faith, but newly ascertained facts in nature and experience, which help the theologian to fill out his science and explicate the faith. Each new generation builds on the work of previous ones. Nothing is lost, and the contribution of each age retains some value forever, even when modified by later enrichments. No theologian can afford to

ignore what his predecessors have done. He cannot hope to repeat by his own efforts the theological achievements of all who have laboured before him in the same field. He must consult the theological literature of the past, and will find there much material which he cannot safely neglect. But no individual theologian may be regarded as infallible. Such authority as he may have is purely human, and depends chiefly upon his success in exhibiting the mind of the teaching Church. Ancient writings have this advantage, that they have undergone the test of ages, and have consequently taken the rank to which their respective merits entitle them. Many of them have thus acquired great authority in certain of the subjects of which they treat, so that we need to consult them and defer to them. It remains, however, that the mind of the Church must rule within the area of the faith; and this mind is to be sought for in what commands the consent of theologians rather than in the views of any one or more among them.[1]

§ 15. The natural data of theology are to be obtained most conveniently and securely in the latest literature of the physical, mental, moral, and historical sciences. This does not mean that theological opinions and inferences which are to be found in such literature are necessarily valuable or to be adopted; nor does it signify that the latest scientific views are necessarily final and not liable to modification or abandonment.

[1] Lists of theological classics will be given in the concluding chapter of this volume.

All natural sciences, with the exception, perhaps, of the mathematical, undergo correction with the progress of investigation, But, in spite of such limitations, these sciences bring before us many indisputable facts and generalizations which lend themselves to theological use and interpretation. Such interpretation pertains, of course, to theology, and to those trained in theological method; not to natural science, or to those whose training is confined to the methods of such science.[1]

§ 16. To individual souls the ultimate and convincing test of all truths is personal experience and personal verification. Truths which are not arrived at through our own experience, or at least confirmed by it, are apt to remain in our minds on the level of unverified hypotheses, however plausible, until we find that they fit in practically with our experience. It is so with divine truths. They do not receive their final and satisfying verification *for ourselves* until we have put them to the test of our own lives. Our daily experiences continually supply data by which to verify the agreement of revealed truths with the facts of man's spiritual nature and life. When this agreement is realized, our faith in divine truth becomes scientific certainty, and the meaning of all things is wonderfully enriched in our minds.

[1] Says Aubrey Moore, "Theology relates together all acts of God, integrating them as parts in a great moral purpose; science also relates together all the acts of God, as seen in nature, finding in them a rational and intelligible unity. In theology the moral purpose is more prominent; in science the rational cohesion; and partisans generally fail to see that these are the convex and concave of truth." *Science and the Faith*, p. 226.

CHAPTER IV

FAITH AND REASON

I. *Their Relations*

§ 1. Having considered the data of Theology, and the objective sources from which they are immediately derived, we now treat of the subjective faculties which have to be employed in understanding, interpreting, and co-ordinating these data scientifically — the faculties of faith and reason.

The subject before us is naturally complicated and has been made more so by the treatment it has received at the hands of rationalists and agnostics. The terms which must be employed are peculiarly liable to misinterpretation. It seems best, therefore, to give a brief summary at the outset of the position which is either elaborated or presupposed in what follows.

(*a*) Four factors are involved in the knowledge of divine things, and all are indispensable to theologians. These are experience, authority, reason, and supernatural grace. The first two are objective sources of theological data, and the last two are concerned with the subjective appropriation and scientific treatment of these data. Rationalism disparages or rejects authority and grace; while agnosticism, both Christian

and non-Christian, disparages the theological value of experience and reason.

(*b*) Authority must be depended on to some extent, if we are to obtain the benefit of other experience than our own. And the previous experience of mankind is made available partly through unwritten traditions and partly through documentary evidence.

(*c*) This experience includes certain miraculous events of theological significance, and a series of supernatural revelations from God. These constitute the central data of theology, and we depend for our knowledge of them upon the authority of the Catholic Church and Holy Scripture. Human accidents and limitations are bound up with both ecclesiastical and biblical authority; but the guidance of the Holy Spirit guarantees the trustworthiness of the invariable official and consentient teaching of the Church; and the Holy Scriptures, rightly interpreted, confirm the Church's teaching on divine authority. Reason cannot err through the acceptance of this concurrent testimony, and it cannot attain to a correct knowledge of divine things without such acceptance.

(*d*) Reason, in the sense here used, includes every faculty of the soul, whether intellectual, emotional, or volitional, so far as they are exercised as means or determining conditions of the subjective discernment, appropriation, and interpretation of truth. The intellect is never exercised apart from a conditioning activity, and more or less determinative influence, of the other psychical faculties.

(*e*) Faith is a term of various meanings,[1] but in this connection signifies the faculty by which, when assisted by supernatural grace, we rationally discern and

[1] Lightfoot says, *Epis. to the Galatians*, p. 154, that the uses of πίστις "hover between two meanings: *trustfulness*, the frame of mind which relies on another; and *trustworthiness*, the frame of mind which can be relied on. Not only are the two connected together grammatically, as active and passive senses of the same word, or logically as subject and object of the same act [of believing]; but there is a close moral affinity between them." On p. 157 he treats of New Testament usage. See also Liddon and Sanday in *Rom.* i. 17.

Bishop Forbes, *Nicene Creed*, p. 15, gives six senses of the word: (1) Fidelity in promising, Rom. iii. 3; (2) The promises themselves, 1 Tim. v. 12; (3) Conscience, Rom. xiv. 23; (4) Confidence, Jas. i. 6; (5) The Christian Religion, 1 Tim. vi. 12; (6) "The assent of the intellect, or the habit that inclines us to assent on the authority of another: if the authority be human, it is human faith; if it be divine, it is divine or theological faith: and this last, as regards the truths taught by the Church, is termed catholic faith."

The following are the chief theological uses of the word: (*a*) The faculty of cognizing divine things — so used in this chapter;

(*b*) The act of believing the spiritually credible, as credible. Pearson, *Apostles' Creed*, Art. I;

(*c*) The body of truths which are taught by the Church as necessary to be believed for salvation, "*the faith*";

(*d*) Faith which works miracles, a sure confidence, divinely imparted, and conditioned by a certain discernment of the divine will, which involves supernatural power over the physical order;

(*e*) The virtue of faith, or justifying faith, which includes a belief, trust, and assurance which is informed by love, and which issues in good works and holiness.

In addition to these uses are

(*f*) Trust in the ultimate rationality of the universe and its government, which is the condition of all scientific knowledge whatsoever;

(*g*) Docility, or readiness to be guided by sufficient authority, also required in every department of knowledge.

appropriate divine things that lie beyond our present vision and unassisted natural reason.

(*f*) We maintain that men can attain to rational knowledge of God and divine things, but in asserting this we presuppose the availability of supernatural grace and a proper employment of its aid.

(*g*) Although the assistance of grace imparts to the reason a supernatural range and power, the nature and laws of operation of reason are in no wise subverted. The reason which thus appropriates divine truth is truly human, and is not other than that which appropriates truths in general. Faith and spiritual knowledge are not less human and rational because supernatural.

(*h*) God cannot be known fully, nor does our knowledge of Him escape the relativity which inheres in all human knowledge whatsoever. But so far as we know God we know Him really and truly, and it is God Himself whom we thus know — not any abstractions or illusions which may not be predicated of Him as He is in Himself. The more or less symbolical nature of our predications must, of course, be allowed for, but the symbols employed in theology are not misleading to an enlightened understanding.

§ 2. Faith is not an independent faculty, separate or separable from reason, but is reason itself in so far as reason is exercised on divine things and is assisted by supernatural grace. The act of faith is an act of reason, conforming strictly to the laws of human reason in general. Faith, no doubt, has its distinctive charac-

teristics, but these are due to the fact that in faith the reason is directed upon spiritual realities, and is exercised under conditions which impart to the understanding a certain supernatural capacity. To believe or cognize without exercising the reason, however imperfectly, is simply unthinkable; and there is but one reason in man by which to appropriate or consider truth, whatever may be the source and nature of the truth referred to, or the peculiar method required in reason's exercise. There is but one true science of human logic, and its laws may not be violated in any thinking. They hold good in faith, although faith is exercised under conditions which enlarge human vision and understanding. These conditions neither subvert the laws, nor destroy the validity, of the reasoning faculties which are employed. One who maintains that they do might as truly urge that the use of a telescope subverts the laws by which the human eye is governed, and robs its vision of scientific value. Divine grace constitutes the telescope of human reason, by means of which it can discern, and in a measure understand, the heavenly verities which transcend its unassisted power to grasp. Faith may indeed be contrasted with sight;[1] but to oppose faith and reason

[1] Heb. xi. 1: "Now faith is . . . the evidence of things not seen." See also 2 Cor. v. 7; iv. 18; Rom. viii. 24, 25; St. John i. 18. This has reference, of course, to faith in this life. The faculty of discerning and understanding divine things is not nullified by the beatific vision, but will there find its happiest exercise. To say that faith is then "lost in sight," can only be true in a restricted meaning of the word faith. 1 Cor. xiii. 8–12 is quite consistent with this. It is

to each other is a serious mistake, and imperils our acceptance of the intellectual validity of faith.

§ 3. The error of rationalism does not lie in its insistence upon the application of reason to divine truth, for truth cannot be appropriated if reason is suppressed or violated. Its mistake lies rather in one or more of the following errors: (*a*) a Pelagian rejection of the assistance of grace; (*b*) a dependence upon mere intellectuality, divorced from rightly ordered affections and the will; (*c*) a rejection or minimizing of supernatural revelation; (*d*) a repudiation more or less complete of authority, biblical, or ecclesiastical, or both. In short, rationalism endeavours to employ reason in perverse ways, that reduce or destroy its value for the appropriation of divine truth.

It has many forms. In relation to supernatural revelation, for example, rationalism either denies *in toto* its reality and possibility; [1] or restricts its range and purpose to defining and publishing to the masses what can be discerned by intellectual men in the teaching of nature alone; [2] or, acknowledging that revelation is necessary for our first discovery of its contents, claims

the *partial* and *imperfect* knowledge of our present condition that is to be done away. Theophilus treats beautifully of the subject in *Ad Autol.*, i. 2–8.

[1] Thus Tindal, in *Christianity as Old as Creation*, 1730 A.D., denied that there could be a revelation of things not taught by nature.

[2] Toland, in *Christianity Not Mysterious*, 1696 A.D., maintained that the Scriptures neither are nor claim to be above reason. Their contents are intelligible, although often needing to be explained to ordinary men.

that these contents, once made known, can be fully explored, if true, and demonstrated on purely rational grounds by the unassisted reason. This last error is called dogmatism.[1]

Catholic theologians acknowledge and maintain that the reasonableness of our acceptance of revealed truth can be shown to men whose minds are enlightened by divine grace, but they contend that revealed mysteries transcend human demonstration and full understanding, even after their revelation. To show the reasonableness of these mysteries means (*a*) to show that they do not demonstrably contradict human reason; (*b*) to exhibit the mutual coherence and harmony of revealed truths; (*c*) to point out the richer and more reasonable meaning which is imparted to human life and experience when the truths of revelation are accepted; (*d*) to afford reasons for accepting the divine source of revelation, and therefore the truth of its contents. But to demonstrate revealed mysteries on other grounds than

[1] The ancient Gnostics were dogmatists. Wolff (1679–1754 A.D.), Prof. of Philosophy at Halle, following in the wake of Leibnitz, formulated and made popular the modern German tendency to ground dogmas in metaphysics, making Dogmatic Theology a department of metaphysical philosophy. Kant's efforts were directed to the overthrow of his method of deducing all philosophy from *a priori* data.

Baldwin, *Dic. of Philos.*, "Rationalism" and "Rationalism in Theology," classifies rationalism in wider relations than the theological. A. S. Farrar's *History of Free Thought* is the most valuable account of rationalism prior to Darwin and recent critical movements. Consult also Lecky, *Hist. of Rationalism in Europe;* Cairns, *Unbelief in the Eighteenth Century;* Adeney, *A Century's Progress In Religious Life and Thought* (the nineteenth century).

that of revelation, or to discern their truth and spiritual bearing without the assistance of grace, is rightly regarded by catholic theologians as impossible.[1]

[1] The appeal to reason, duly enlightened by the Spirit, is characteristic of Christianity. It is the fool that "hath said in his heart there is no God": Ps. xiv. 1; liii. 1; xcii. 6. St. Paul ceases not to pray and desire that his readers "might be filled with the knowledge of His will in all *wisdom* and spiritual *understanding*": Col. i. 9–10. The men who have not faith are described by him as "unreasonable": 2 Thess. iii. 2. Cf. 1 Cor. x. 15; 1 Pet. iii. 15.

The ancient fathers both vindicated and exercised reason in matters of faith. Tertullian's paradox, *Flesh of Christ*, ch. v., "It is by all means to be believed because it is absurd. . . . The fact is certain because it is impossible," is a rhetorical protest against supposing that our faith is limited to what alien and unenlightened minds consider rational. The thought perhaps is that, since the fact seems irrational to the unenlightened mind, it pertains to those things that are seen to be true only by faith — *i.e.*, by supernaturally enlightened reason. At all events no one was more ready to employ reason for the establishment of divine truth than was Tertullian.

Athenagoras, *Plea for Christians*, ch. xxii., speaks of God as one "who can only be beheld by reason." Clement of Alex., Origen, and Augustine alike regard it necessary to go on from the beginnings of belief to understanding and knowledge. Clem., *Strom.*, vi. 12; vi. 10; i. 2; Origen, *Contra Cels.*, i. 13; Aug., *Serm. in Joh.*, Tract. xxix. 6. St. Augustine cites Isa. vii. 9, "Except ye believe, ye shall not understand"; and says, "Therefore do not seek to understand in order to believe, but believe that thou mayest understand." In this he is followed by St. Anselm's famous phrase, *Proslog.*, ch. i., "I do not seek to understand that I may believe, but I believe in order to understand" — *credo ut intelligam*. The end in view is then to understand or appropriate rationally. He adds, in ch. ii., a prayer that God will give him, "so far as Thou knowest it to be profitable, to understand that Thou art as we believe." St. Ambrose had said, in Ps. cxviii., Serm. 14, "To do everything by the Word, and nothing without the Word, thou must do everything by reason and nothing without reason, for thou art a rational being, O man."

It is maintained that men can attain to true knowledge of divine things; but this is not the knowledge of mere intellectuality of the unassisted natural man. It is made possible only by supernatural grace, and depends upon the harmonious exercise of all the psychical faculties.[1] In this connection it should be noted that

It remained for St. Thomas Aquinas to sum up the respective claims of reason and authority. Revealed truth has to be accepted on authority for it is above human demonstration. *Summa Theol.*, I. i. 1; but reason can be employed successfully to show the credibility and possibility of revealed truth, II. II. i. 5, and to refute opponents. *Summa contra Gent.* I. ix. Although he uses the term faith as meaning assent to what is not seen, *Summa Theol.*, II. II. i. 5, knowledge is its goal. "To know God by understanding is the final end of every subsistent intelligence." *Contra Gent.*, III. xxv.; l. 6. This goal is attained partially in this life. Faith is incipient cognition. He accepts the view of St. Augustine and St. Anselm that we must first believe before we can understand.

Du Pin, *Method of Studying Divinity* (trans. from the French, London, 1720), pp. 32, 33, says, "Although natural reason ought not to be employed alone in judging of the truth of the mysteries proposed to our belief, we ought, notwithstanding, to use it . . . in judging of the sufficiency of that authority that proposes them, and whether it be certain that God has revealed such and such a truth or not," etc.

See also Hooker, *Eccles. Polity*, III. viii.; Butler, *Analogy*, Pt. II. ch. iii.; Newman, *University Serms.*, x., xi.; Illingworth, *Reason and Revel.*, ch. i.; Moberly, *Reason and Relig.*, pp. 106–139; Mozley, *Lectures*, pp. 96–99; Ladd, *Philos. of Relig.*, ch. xii. The Roman Church, with all its exaltation of authority, attaches importance to the use of reason in matters of faith. See *Constitutiones Concil. Vaticani*, Sess. III. cap. iv.

[1] If the unaided natural capacity is referred to, man cannot by searching find out God (Job. xi. 7–9), and this is the undeniable teaching of Scripture generally. Job. xxxvi. 26; Ps. cxlv. 3; Isa. xlv. 15; Mic. iv. 12; John i. 18; Rom. xi. 33, 34; 1 Cor. i. 18–28;

the purely natural man never existed except in the abstract. Every actual man is either in a state of grace or of loss of grace and perverted nature. The only manner in which men can rightly exercise even their natural reason upon divine truth is to employ the aid of grace in order to remedy the inborn disorder of their faculties.

In our own day rationalism shows itself most prominently in relation to biblical criticism and ecclesiastical authority. Many biblical critics disregard the supernatural factor in the Scriptures. They insist upon treating them in all respects like any other and purely human literature, and regard the history of Israel as exhibiting a purely natural development of a race whose peculiar genius was religious. Such critics refuse to admit that other than purely human causes are needed to account for any of the literary peculiarities of Scripture, and assume that accurate predictive prophecies are impossible.

By rejecting the authority of the Catholic Church, which alone is competent to distinguish and authenticate the Holy Scriptures and impose them upon the faithful as the Word of God, protestants have opened the road to a denial of all authority, properly so termed. They are forced to depend upon subjective estimates for their acceptance of the Scriptures; which means that they

1 Tim. vi. 16; 1 John iv. 12. See Hooker, *Eccles*, *Polity*, I. ii. 2; S. Thos., *Summa Theol.*, I. xii.

But Agnosticism goes further, and denies that the human mind can know God under any conditions. If so, eternal life, which consists in such knowledge, is a vain delusion. John xvii. 3.

accept them on their merits, rather than because they are the authentic Word of God. Private judgment thus displaces authority.[1]

II. *Some Difficulties*

§ 4. Much confusion of thought touching faith and reason arises from a failure to allow for the indivisible unity of a human person. This person is equipped with distinct faculties of feeling, willing, and knowing, but these faculties are not separate organs, nor is a divorce between them possible. The soul acts always in accordance with its nature, as an indivisible unit. Its fundamental faculties must act together, the opera-

[1] Among the more notable and representative works of recent time against the acceptance of authority are Martineau's *Place of Authority in Religion* and Sabatier's *Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit.*

The theory of degrees of inspiration, estimated by the edifying value of the several parts of Scripture as weighed by ourselves, means when pressed logically that we do not accept the Scriptures because they have authority, but because, and just so far as, we judge them to be true and edifying.

The same result follows the view that inspiration — *i.e.*, divine authority — is confined to the writers. Unless the Scriptures themselves, which have been transmitted to us as the Word of God, have divine sanction and authority as Scriptures, and in the form of their transmission and authentication by the Church, we cannot know what is the Word of God, and must accept the Scriptures, if at all, solely on their merits. The most successful criticism cannot authenticate for us, with the certainty demanded, the originals of the sacred writers. Catholics do not accept the Scriptures on the authority of their original writers; but because, by whomsoever or however written and compiled, they are divinely sanctioned and authenticated by the Spirit-guided Church, in the form and sequence which they have in the Sacred Canon.

tion of each implying and involving the operation of the rest. Differences appear, no doubt, in the manner and relative prominence of their operations, but it is as impossible to suppress one of them as it is to cause an ordinary flame to give light without yielding heat, or furnish heat without shedding light. The psychical faculties come into exercise together, although in such mutual proportions as each occasion requires and permits.[1]

Such considerations help us to meet the difficulty often felt in view of the peculiar prominence of emotion and will in faith. This prominence is supposed to militate against the rational nature and validity of faith, and to show that a peculiar faculty is being employed, different from that which is exercised in other departments of truth-seeking. This is bad psychology. The exercise of emotion and will is involved in the employment of reason in every direction, although this fact often escapes notice. The human

[1] Dr. Moberly, *Reason and Religion*, pp. 91–93, shows that a person cannot cease to feel while he knows, for he remains a person and must exercise his faculties in the manner of a person. He goes on to apply this to the evidences of Christianity, which take on their character and significance because they are weighed by persons. The whole book is exceedingly valuable in connection with the subject of this chapter. Cf. Illingworth, *Divine Immanence*, pp. 59–73; *Reason and Revel.*, pp. 44–54. He shows that it was the error of Kant, Hegel, and Schleiermacher to isolate respectively the will, the intellect, and the feelings from the rest of our personal faculties. See also McLaren, *Cath. Dogma the Antidote of Doubt*, ch. ii.; Romanes, *Thoughts on Religion*, pp. 140–147; Ladd, *Philos. of Relig.*, ch. x.; Flint, *Theism.*, pp. 68–71. Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, p. 19, speaks of reason as "the logic of the whole personality."

thinker remains a moral and spiritual agent when he thinks, and is obliged always to reason in the manner of such an agent. There is no such thing in human experience as an act of pure reason — *i.e.*, unconditioned by the operation of the emotional and volitional faculties. The human soul, as we have said, is an indivisible unit and acts as such. Every act of the reason involves attention, desire, and interest. Attention requires an exercise of will power, while desire and interest spring from the emotional faculty. What kind of university would that be in which its members exercised no attention, had no anxiety to learn, and no interest in study! Plainly, the exercise of reason would also be wanting. Honesty is likewise generally reckoned as one of the primary qualifications of rational scholarship. And there is involved in every course of reason a free selection of what to take note of and what to ignore. The development of our rational faculties is strictly a moral process. And moral conditions are obviously present in the higher lines of rational and scientific investigation. In proportion to the demand for precision and exact reasoning, a necessity arises for conscientiousness, scrupulous attention, and anxious desire to discriminate and do proportionate justice to each fact and argument under consideration. The personal and moral equation determines the success of any attempt at truth-seeking, and truth-seeking is the primary end of all human reason. Even in mathematical deduction, in which but one rational conclusion is possible, the attainment of that conclusion

depends upon effort of the will in attention and upon earnestness of application.[1]

§ 5. Now the moral elements required in faith are essentially the same as those present in other departments of rational truth-seeking. Desire for truth, readiness to make efforts in seeking it, choice of what to take particular note of, docility in the presence of competent learning and authority, honesty in doing justice to every pertinent fact and argument, and whole-hearted acceptance of the conditions necessary to be observed in verifying conclusions, are demanded in faith as they are in other exercises of the reason, but no more so.[2] There is indeed a difference — not in

[1] Ladd says, *Philos. of Knowledge*, ch. vi., pp. 165, 166, "No cognition at all is possible without the presence of effective and emotional factors in the very act of cognition, or without the influence of such factors over the nature of the cognitive process itself." In chap. iv., p. 122, "If we are to speak of the cognitive faculty . . . then this faculty calls forth and summarizes, by absorption into itself, as it were, all other faculties." Again, "That the will of the knower is ever present and taking a part, so to speak, in every act of knowledge, is a psychological truism." See also Porter, *Human Intellect*, §§ 26, 27; Illingworth, *Divine Imman.*, pp. 59–73; Ferguson, *Affirmative Intellect*, pp. 37–39.

[2] Many biblical passages imply that more than mere intellect is involved in faith. For example: "Taste and see that the Lord is Good — Ps. xxxiv. 8; "And I will give them an heart to know Me" — Jerem. xxiv. 7; "Slow of heart to believe" — Luke xxiv. 25; "If any man will do His will, he shall know of the doctrine" — John vii. 17; "Having the eyes of your heart enlightened that ye may know" — Ephes. i. 18; "He that loveth not knoweth not God, for God is love" — 1 John iv. 8.

Moberly says, *Reason and Relig.*, p. 131, "True theological apprehension postulates not the ingenious exercise of a single faculty,

the necessity of the moral conditions above referred to, but — in a certain conflict of will and desire apt to be present in seeking divine truth, which makes these elements obtrude themselves upon our attention. The truths of religion bring with them an unwelcome conviction of sin, and also certain serious duties and responsibilities. The natural man, therefore, shrinks more or less from the exercise of faith, and a moral struggle occurs which tends to obscure the strict rationality of the process required for the mastery of divine truth. In a peculiarly obvious sense, therefore, our belief depends upon our desire and will to believe.[1] The fact that the personal equation determines our faith is, accordingly, more generally observed than the fact, equally certain, that it also determines our success

but the allegiance of the whole man. Nay, there is often more theological insight in moral dutifulness, though it seem unintellectual, than in the most ingenious hypotheses of an intelligence which seems to be independent, because it is deficient in moral dutifulness." See Christlieb, *Modern Doubt*, pp. 124, 125; Fisher, *Faith and Rationalism*, App. I. Neander says somewhere, "Pectus est quod theologum facit." Pascal remarks, in his *Thoughts*, "The heart has reasons of which the intellect knows nothing." This is slightly rhetorical, for reasons, strictly speaking, pertain to the intellect. But the heart does suggest reasons to which the mind defers without explicit process of thought.

[1] Professor James, in his *Will to Believe*, adopts the one-sided view that the will to believe is in ultimate analysis the only reason for belief — as though the will could act as pure will, without rational motive for its choice. The will may indeed be *controlled* more by emotional impulse than by reason; but it must act for reasons, although these reasons may be bad ones. Professor James confuses reasons for belief with conditions *sine qua non*. See Flint, Agnosticism, pp. 452–455.

in other departments of truth-seeking. Moreover, men are apt to confuse the moral bearing and value of divine truth, and the duty of seeking it, with the process by which it is attained; and this increases the tendency to regard the process of faith as non-rational.

But no thinker worthy of the name denies the rational nature and validity of the conclusions of natural scientists on account of the moral conditions which are involved in their attainment, when they are brought to his attention. It is equally unreasonable to deny the rational nature and intellectual validity of the conclusions of faith on such grounds. Individual faith is, of course, as fallible and liable to err as any other form of individual reason, and personal conclusions require continual testing. But we must not confound the moral conditions of faith with the rational action of which it consists. This is to be insisted upon. The exercise of faith is not a substitution of desire and choice for the rational pursuit of truth. Rather it is an observance in such pursuit of the moral conditions which truth-seeking everywhere requires, accompanied by a reliance upon that assistance of grace and divine revelation which the discernment of spiritual things demands.

§ 6. The objection is often raised against the position here taken, that faith is possessed only by a small portion of mankind, and that, if it were a true faculty of human nature, it would be possessed by all.

The difficulty is not stated correctly. All men do possess the faculty of faith, so far as it is a rational

faculty, and some measure of the grace necessary for its exercise is available for all. There is a "Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world." There are, indeed, "diversities of gifts," and consequently wide differences in the spiritual power of discernment of individual men. But no conditions of race or environment nullify altogether the God-given faculty with which men discern spiritual realities.[1] If there are savages who seem to exhibit no religious capacity whatever — a disputable proposition[2] — such exceptions prove the rule, for these savages are also wanting

[1] John i. 9; 1 Cor. xii. 4–11; Rom. i. 18–20; ii. 14, 15. Justin Martyr, *2nd Apol.*, ch. 8, 10, 13, speaks of the Logos as implanted in every race as a "seed of reason." In note 1 of p. 58 references are given on the belief of the Alexandrian school in a "Dispensation of Paganism."

Knight, *Aspects of Theism*, pp. 109–114, notes that the higher an endowment is the fewer there are who rise to its exercise. The finer faculties are most easily disordered, and may readily become atrophied by disuse. The higher intuitions are not to be discredited because few exercise them.

[2] Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, Vol. I. pp. 424–425, defining religion at its minimum as "the belief in Spiritual Beings," says, "So far as I can judge from the immense mass of accessible evidence, we have to admit that the belief in spiritual beings appears among all low races with whom we have attained to thoroughly intimate acquaintance; whereas the assertion of absence of such belief must apply either to ancient tribes, or to more or less imperfectly described modern ones." Jevons, *Introduction to the History of Religion*, p. 7, says, "Writers approaching the subject from such different points of view as Professor Tylor, Max Muller, Ratzel, de Quatrefages, Tiele, Waitz, Gerland, Peschel, all agree that there are no races, however rude, which are destitute of all idea of religion." The opposite contention he describes as "now gone to the limbo of dead controversies."

in the higher faculties of reason which are admittedly natural to men. We are not to look for indications of what is human in those who have sunk beneath the human level.

If men who possess human reason in its normal degree appear to be wanting in the faculty of faith, the reason is clear. They refuse to exercise this faculty in the way in which alone it can be exercised. They neglect to submit to those conditions under which grace becomes effective, and are in a condition analogous to one who should profess an inability to discern the phenomena treated of in astronomy, while refusing to make use of a telescope.

The lack of faith is often due to unfortunate training and environment, and is then the outcome of invincible ignorance. But blindness can never hold its own in argument against those who see, whatever may be said by way of excuse for those who fail to see. It remains that the Judge of all the earth will do right, and Christian truth permits us to believe that a lack of faith which is really blameless will not be punished hereafter, although the present loss involved in such failure is indisputable.[1]

[1] Gen. xviii. 25. Our Lord's condemnation of those who believe not (St. Mark xvi. 16) refers to those who wilfully reject the Gospel when it is made known to them. The Athanasian Creed is not concerned with those who have not heard the Gospel, but with those to whom the opportunity has come of holding or surrendering the catholic faith, with sufficient knowledge to be held accountable for their attitude. Cf. Jonah iv. 11: "And should not I spare Nineveh, that great city, wherein are more than six score thousand persons

§ 7. Another objection to conceding such an important place to reason in faith is the fact that faith is often exercised in exalted degree by uneducated people, who are quite unequal to the processes of high thinking.

This objection would be fatal, if reason were confined exclusively to articulate progress from one particular to another, or discursive thought. But true psychology shows that the reason is intuitive as well as discursive, and that the mind is sometimes able quickly and without seeming effort to reach conclusions which are usually attained only after laborious thought. Nor does it always happen that a mind which "jumps" to its conclusion is acting unreasonably or insecurely. Genius is not tied to logic, and yet the conclusions of genius are securely rational.

So it is with faith. The untrained mind is often more completely possessed by grace, and by the moral qualities which make for spiritual discernment, than the mind which is habituated to waiting on the results of discursive thought. Thus it acquires an ability to perceive without the labour of trained thinking what others learn slowly and after much difficult thought.[1] The perception of worth-values is of great assistance

that cannot discern between their right hand and their left hand . . .?" It is because the gentiles had violated what they knew of righteousness that St. Paul places them under condemnation. Rom. i. 18–21.

[1] Our Lord thanked His Father for having hidden the mysteries of His kingdom from the wise and prudent, and having revealed them to babes. St. Matt. xi. 25; St. Luke x. 21. Cf. 1 Cor. i. 17–27; ii. 13, 14. The last text shows that St. Paul did not disparage wisdom, but only the failure to employ a wisdom that is spiritual. See ch. v. § 4.

in the attainment of spiritual knowledge,[1] and divine grace is a more important factor in such perception than formal logic.[2] It remains that, however truth may be attained, one's acceptance thereof is rational. It can and must stand the test of experience, reflection, and wider knowledge.[3]

This ordering of faculties exhibits the justice of God, who so constitutes the human mind that the obligation to know Him can be fulfilled by all sorts of men, while the special work of formulating scientifically, vindicating, and propagating divine truth among thoughtful

[1] The Ritschlian emphasis on "worth-values" has this truth, that what seems to a spiritual mind to have the "worth-value" of truth is not likely to prove wholly false. In short, if such a mind perceives that anything *ought* to be true, this creates a certain presumption in favour of its truth. But it is the mind's spiritual equipment that gives this capacity to discern correctly what ought to be true; and convictions thus produced should be capable of being supported by appropriate evidence. They cannot hold their own against sure evidence to the contrary. "Value-judgments" and "existential-judgments" which are in real conflict cannot be held together rationally or truly.

[2] St. John i. 9; x. 3; 1 Cor. ii. 5–14.

[3] The "wider knowledge" referred to is a learning which emancipates the mind from the one-sidedness so often attendant upon the highly specialized study of "experts." Lord Bacon somewhere shows that a little learning (which surely includes one-sided learning) is apt to unsettle faith, whereas more learning (such as enables us to contemplate truth in its largest bearings) establishes faith more securely. Says Pope, *Essays on Criticism*, line 215:

> "A little learning is a dangerous thing;
> Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring;
> Their shallow draughts intoxicate the brain,
> And drinking largely sobers us again."

men is left to those who are suitably trained for such work.

Conclusions which are intuitively reached are among the most certain which a human mind can attain. It would be a strange dispensation of things which would require us to deny the term rational to them, and to restrict it to conclusions that are reached by more laborious and intricate processes, ones which are apt to be less absolutely convincing.

§ 8. Finally, it is objected that faith is to a large extent a blind trust in authority, unaccompanied by any exercise of reason which can be detected or estimated as rational. Millions of believers, it is said, accept what they are told to believe, whether by parents, or clergy, or others, without devoting any thought of their own to the reasons for belief or to the rationality of what they believe.

It is undoubtedly true that the majority of believers think little, or not at all, about the rationality of their faith; and, if asked why they believe, can give no other explicit reason that this, that they have been taught what to believe. Nor are they equal to giving a rational defence of their acceptance of such teaching. But, without discussing fully the subject of authority, which we are to deal with in another treatise, we deny that it is either irrational or non-rational to be guided in belief by what seems to be sufficient authority. And we also deny that an authority is necessarily insufficient because many of those who accept it lack the knowledge and training necessary to defend its sufficiency on rational grounds.

Unless the young accept the teaching authority of their elders, they can make no satisfactory progress in knowledge. Education in every department is thus conditioned; and the inability of a little child to explain the reason for its acceptance of the authority of its parents and other teachers, or to establish the reasonableness of what is taught, is not regarded by thoughtful people as an indication that the child acts without good reason in accepting such teaching. It is surely rational that, without being able to think the matter out, children should take it for granted that what is taught by their elders is based upon wider knowledge than they themselves possess, and upon more adequate reason than they can fathom. The fact that they assume this without thought does not nullify the rational nature of their mental attitude.

The reasonableness of this attitude does not depend upon the correctness or finality of the teaching which is accepted, but upon the fact that, at that stage in their education, the teaching which they receive is the best, or seems to be the best, available. So it is all along. Reason demands that in matters concerning which others seem to be better informed than ourselves, especially when such matters have an immediate and practical bearing on our lives, we should submit to be taught, and accept what we are taught until we are able to correct such teaching by better authority or by our own investigation and reason.

If this is true in the matters of ordinary life, it is not less true in religious matters. However ignorant

and untrained in logic one may be, he shows himself to be rational when he accepts what seems to him, however erroneously, to be the best available authority in matters of divine truth that lie beyond his own ability to discover. To reject what seems to him to be the best available teaching is unreasonable — as unreasonable as to continue to receive it after discovering that it is untrustworthy.

We do not admit that one who accepts the authority of the Catholic Church and of Holy Scriptures will ever have just reason to doubt the trustworthiness of such authority, or to reject the teaching thus received. But if we are mistaken, it is none the less a rational act on our part to accept such authority, as the best available, until we discover our mistake.[1]

With a few fundamental propositions we shall drop the subject: (*a*) A believer accepts authority on rational grounds, that is, because he thinks it is to be trusted

[1] St. Augustine says briefly, *De Trin.*, iv. 10, "No sober person will decide against reason, no Christian against the Scriptures, no peaceable person against the Church." Illingworth, *Reason and Revelation*, pp. 6, 7, shows that authority does not bar out reason but enriches it with materials. Dogma is condensed truth for philosophers to realize and justify. Orr points out in his *Essays on Ritschlianism*, Essay on Faith and Reason, that when we claim rational grounds for faith we do not have to mean reasoned grounds.

Sabatier says, *Religions of Authority*, p. xxi., "Like every good teacher, authority should labour to render itself useless." This is part of the truth only. In fact, teachers will be needed to the end of time, for never can their work bring all human beings once for all to the point of no longer needing to be taught. Moreover, the function of authority in religious truth is not only to make it known, but to protect it from perversion in a sinful world.

in teaching divine truth. Should sufficient reasons appear for supposing such authority to be untrustworthy, he ought to abandon his dependence upon it; (*b*) Authoritative teaching does not displace reason, but furnishes it with material for consideration, assimilation and co-ordination with other knowledge; (*c*) knowledge gained through authority is subject, like other knowledge, to such testing and verification as the nature of the matters known admits of. If authoritative teaching should appear to be demonstrably in conflict with certain truth, absurd and contrary to reason, rather than above it, then such teaching ought to be rejected. It remains, however, that a dependence on authority, reasonably accepted, does not destroy the rational nature of faith thus conditioned. The precise opposite is true.

CHAPTER V

FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE

I. *Human Knowledge*

§ 1. In the last chapter it was shown that, "Faith is not an independent faculty, separate or separable from reason, but is reason itself in so far as reason is exercised on divine things and is assisted by supernatural grace." The position now to be justified is, that faith is a faculty of knowledge, as well as of reason. But before we can do this satisfactorily, we need to consider the nature and possibilities of knowledge in general.

Knowledge is a unique and primary datum of consciousness, and no definition of it can be given which will conform strictly to the requirements of logic, or will be intelligible apart from personal experience of knowledge. Yet it may be described sufficiently for practical purposes as the rational appropriation of truth. To know is to form a judgment in our minds which is both objectively true and subjectively certain.[1]

[1] Fleming's *Vocabulary of Philosophy* says, "*Knowledge* supposes a *being* who knows, an *object* known, and a *relation* determined between the knowing being and the known object. This relation, occasioned by the mind's activity, is the act of knowledge; the content of consciousness, consequent on this relation, is the knowledge. Truth may be defined to be the conformity of our thoughts with the

Such judgments are arrived at variously, according to the nature of the truths appropriated and the particular exercises and processes of the reason which have to be employed. In any case the result of coming to know is a state of certainty, based upon sufficient and normally ordered reason, whether assisted or not, and whether implicit or articulate. It is unqualified by doubt, and capable of standing the test of experience.

Thus there are two available *criteria* of knowledge: Objectively, when the contents of real knowledge are adopted as working hypotheses, they work successfully, since they fit in with wider experience and enrich its significance; subjectively, when the process of reason, or the intuitive exercise of it, through which we come to know is scrutinized, it is found to agree with what we have learned to be the laws by which human minds in general are governed in acquiring knowledge.[1] We

nature of its object. Certitude is thus either immediately known existence, or truth brought methodically to the human intelligence; that is, conducted from facts to generalizations, or from principle to principle, or given in that which is evident in itself."

Porter says, *Human Intellect*, § 46, "No definition or description can convey, to him who has never *known*, the conception of what an act of knowledge is. All definitions and descriptions presuppose that the person to whom they are addressed can understand their import and verify their truth by referring to his own conscious acts." In § 48 he says, "To know is to be certain that something is . . . Subjectively viewed, to know, involves certainty; objectively, it requires reality."

[1] Newman says, *Grammar of Assent*, ch. ix., p. 331, "Earnestly maintaining, as I would, . . . the certainty of knowledge, I think it enough to appeal to the common voice of mankind in proof of it. That is to be accounted a normal faculty of our nature, which men

cannot go back of these processes successfully to criticise them on *a priori* or abstract grounds.

Such a description answers to what has been treated

in general do actually exercise. That is a law of our minds, which is exemplified in action on a large scale, whether *a priori* it ought to be a law or no . . . Our possession of certitude is a proof that it is not a weakness or absurdity to be certain. How it comes about that we can be certain is not my business to determine; for me it is sufficient that certitude is felt." In ch. viii., *fin.*, he says, "Judgment . . . in all concrete matter is the architectonic faculty; and what may be called the illative sense, or judgment in ratiocination, is one branch of it." In ch. ix., p. 332, "The sole and final judgment on the validity of an inference in concrete matter is committed to a mental faculty, which I have called the illative sense."

Schurman, *Belief in God*, pp. 27, 28, says that we cannot demonstrate either the power or limit of human knowledge except by trying to know. "Philosophers may analyze the elements that enter into cognition and describe their respective functions, but this gives them no *a priori* criterion for setting up, as Kant did, one sort of knowledge as valid and another as illusory." The point is, that if our minds act normally their judgments must be accepted, so far as subjective criteria are concerned. He proceeds to say that experience alone can be brought in to test our beliefs.

It is in line with this view that Ladd says, *Philos. of Religion*, Vol. I., p. 600, "The most nearly final test which man can have, or which he can ever conceive, is essentially the same as the corresponding test in any other [than religious] realm of truth. It is the completeness and self-consistency of the answer which the conception of Reality gives to the total experience of the subject."

Touching *a priori* criteria, even Hamilton says, *Metaph.*, Vol. II, p. 122, "We know, and can know, nothing *a priori* of what is possible or impossible to mind, and it is only by observation and generalization *a posteriori* that we can ever hope to attain insight into the question." This means simply that if we would test knowledge subjectively at all, it must be by the laws seen to govern human knowledge in general and in fact.

Spencer also says that "being one in origin and function, the sim-

as knowledge by mankind in general, and agrees with the implicit assumption of all scientists — that, when a hypothesis or judgment has been reached in a manner that agrees with the observed methods of human reason, and is found to work in every sphere of experience to which it is applicable, it may be reckoned as being within our knowledge.

§ 2. But certain philosophers have undertaken the vain task of getting back of knowledge to discover its ulitmate subjective and rational foundations, forgetting that knowledge begins with our first conscious experience, and is the necessary condition of our earliest exercise of reason. A mind possessing no knowledge whatever is without food for thought, and lacks the conditions which make the exercise of reason possible.

It is indeed true that implicit assumptions are involved even in our first acts of knowing: that is, that our knowing faculties may be trusted, and that things in general are somehow rationally coherent and intelligible. In this sense St. Anselm's contention, that we believe in order to know, may be accepted as in accord

plest forms of cognition and the most complex must be dealt with alike. We are bound in consistency to receive the widest knowledge our faculties can reach, or reject along with it that narrow knowledge possessed by all." *First Principles*, ch. i. § 5, p. 15. He did not notice that this habilitates our knowledge that we know, and invalidates *a priori* criticism which would stultify it. He goes on in § 6 to show that the truths of religion and natural science must harmonize, thus accepting impliedly the objective criterion of knowledge which we have given.

with sound psychology.[1] But we cannot demonstrate logically either the truth or the falsity of these primitive assumptions, nor can we either justify or discredit on *a priori* grounds the necessity we are under in making them. All we can do is to take note of the mental operations and methods which normally attend and condition human knowledge, and test its contents by this means and by their value when employed as working hypotheses and practical guides of life. It is because knowledge in general is not stultified by experience, but gives experience rationality and meaning, that we continue to be convinced that we do indeed know reality.[2]

§ 3. Neglect of these undeniable contents of our experience in knowing has led to much error. Thus philosophers have undertaken to discredit the validity of certain forms of knowledge on the basis of an *a priori* criticism of the rational processes by which they

[1] *Proslogium*, ch. i. *fin.* Elsewhere he says, "He who has not believed has not experienced, and he who has not experienced will not understand." We have already cited, in note 1 of p. 91, Clement of Alexandria and St. Augustine for the same position. Cf. Christlieb, *Modern Doubt*, Lec. II. iii. pp. 124–127.

[2] The underlying thought of Fraser's *Philosophy of Theism* is that man's trust in the rationality and intelligibility of the universe is the ground of scientific progress, and is not in fact stultified by experience. The justification of this faith, he says, "lies in this — that the universe of experience dissolves in pessimist doubt when its sustaining influence is withdrawn. . . . Final Faith is tacit or implied trust that nothing can happen in the temporal evolution which will finally put to confusion the moral reason latent in Man — incomprehensible as the world's history of mingled good and evil may appear" (p. 243).

are conditioned. Whereas we leave our only sure ground when we fail to accept the testimony of our consciousness. This testimony is the only subjective evidence by which to distinguish our acts of knowledge from other operations of the reason. We should, therefore, accept this testimony, as the best available, and confine ourselves to an *a posteriori* consideration of the rational methods of knowledge thus exhibited. To repudiate one normal method of knowledge certified by our consciousness, while we accept another, is to stultify consciousness; for we cannot get back of consciousness to test and discriminate between its operations on *a priori* grounds, but must accept its fundamental testimony wholly or not at all. And only when the methods of an individual mind disagree with the methods discoverable in other human minds can mere psychological and logical analysis and criticism justify us in impugning the subjective validity of its acts of knowledge.[1]

[1] Logic deals with the laws — *i.e.*, observed normal methods — of discursive thought. To criticise these methods lies beyond its province. But logic treats of fallacies, or the ways in which the individual reasoner may violate the normal processes of human reason. The presence of such violations throws suspicion upon the cognitive value of the reasoner's conclusions; but, when such violations cannot be discovered, no *subjective* basis exists for doubting the validity of the cognitions which follow.

Schurman, *Belief in God*, p. 27, says, "And to the simple inquiry, whether we can demonstrate the capacity of the human mind to apprehend God, the sufficient answer is, that we cannot prove the capacity of the mind to know anything whatever, and that it is only by actual trials, most of them failures, that mankind has found out what knowledge it is capable of compassing."

It is a frequent mistake of modern philosophers to challenge the normal consciousness of mankind in this direction. And the *a priori* principle is adopted that every genuine act of knowledge must be attended by a rational process which is capable of analysis, and of being shown in the abstract to be a sufficient basis of knowledge.[1] In fact, no psychological process attendant upon knowing can be shown of itself to warrant the claim of knowledge as its result. Knowledge is a richer phenomenon than its attendant reasoning. The most that can be said is that this attendant reasoning constitutes the condition which makes knowledge possible in certain directions and under certain circumstances. The ultimate subjective grounds of the validity of knowledge, as knowledge, are beneath the threshold of consciousness and lie beyond our scrutiny. We know by experience that the mind is able to know, and we observe that it knows under certain conditions, conditions which are diverse in different lines of

[1] The *Church Quarterly Review*, July, 1897, gives an admirable history of modern attempts to discredit various forms of knowledge. The succession of writers considered includes Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Hamilton, Mansel, and Herbert Spencer. Porter covers the same ground in relation to "Theories of Intuitive Knowledge" in his *Human Intellect*, §§ 531 *et seq.* See also Ladd, *Philosophy of Knowledge*, chaps. iii., iv., who says, p. 134, "The creation of a fixed gulf between kinds of knowledge, and the relegation, for its sources and its validity, of one kind to an unanalyzable mystery, and the other to a system of merely formal rules, with the accompanying separation of the faculties involved in all cognitive activity, and a total disregard of the necessary implicates of every cognition, have been the πρῶτον ψεῦδος and the chief mischief-maker in epistemological theories since Kant."

knowledge, and under different circumstances, but which in each case obey observable laws. This is as far as we can go in critical analysis.

§ 4. We have need to distinguish between knowledge and the processes of thought by which it is conditioned. These processes are not equivalent to knowledge, nor are they always followed by knowledge. It is possible to regard them in the light of mere preparations of the mind and arrangements of material for the act of knowledge; that act being treated as in itself distinct. It is not an incredible supposition that logical processes have the restricted function of assisting to provide conditions which release the cognitive faculty and put it into action, without being themselves a part of that action.[1]

We can see that acts of knowledge which are unattended by logical processes resemble in a measure those which are conditioned by them. They are all too rapid to be analyzed.

Intuitive knowledge is immediate and instantaneous

[1] Newman treats of this subject very fully in *Grammar of Assent*, ch. viii.–ix. He defines his main position as, "that inference, considered in the shape of verbal argumentation, determines neither our principles, nor our ultimate judgments, — that it is neither the test of truth, nor the adequate basis of assent." Ch. viii. § 1 *fin.* "It is plain that formal logical sequence is not in fact the method by which we are enabled to become certain of what is concrete." § 2. In ch. ix., § 2, he says, "the mind itself is more versatile than any of its works, . . . and it is only under its penetrating action that the margin disappears . . . intervening between verbal argumentation and concrete conclusions. . . . This power of judging about truth and error in concrete matters, I call the illative sense."

knowledge, in which we are conscious of no process of thought, although we have reason at times to think that an implicit process of reasoning has taken place, too rapid to rise above the threshold of consciousness.[1] Sense perceptions are intuitive, but acquired sense perceptions seem to involve implicit or subconscious processes of reasoning. It is possible, although not demonstrable, that intuitions are normally attended by reasoning of this rapid nature.

That our reason and knowledge should involve process at all is due to the limitation of finite intelligences, which are unable to attend at once to all the sequent particulars which suggest the conclusions sought. An infinite mind is not thus limited, and its reasoning, if the term is applicable in such a connection, is both immediate and timeless. The point of such a remark is that we are not always to make the validity of reason depend upon our ability to trace its particulars. For such ability may in reality be the result, not of a difference in the nature of the reasoning, but of the fact that the toilsome slowness with which the mind labours in some directions is what brings the successive stages of the process above the threshold of consciousness. Implicit processes of reasoning may be involved even in the higher forms of intuition, escaping analysis by their facility and swiftness.[2]

[1] One of the most adequate treatments of intuitions is to be found in McCosh's *Intuitions of the Mind Inductively Investigated*. See also Porter's *Human Intellect*, Part IV, esp. chaps. i, ii.

[2] T. J. Hudson, in his *Law of Psychic Phenomena*, endeavours to show that we possess two minds, the objective and the subjective.

Whether all this is so or not, our consciousness bears testimony to an act of true knowledge in intuition, as well as in reasoned knowledge. Consciousness tells us when we know; and when our minds act normally the knowledge which seems to follow must be tested, if at all, by the objective *criteria* of wider experience. Such is the implicit and necessary assumption of all science and practice. No contrary philosophy is or can be practically applied to daily life. If knowledge be limited to that the validity of which can be demonstrated subjectively on *a priori* grounds, or by psychological analysis, all knowledge must be rejected, and blank scepticism be accepted, with the result of mental and moral chaos.

§ 5. The certainty of reasoned knowledge is sometimes demonstrative and sometimes moral; and hasty thinkers deny the name knowledge to the latter. This denial is surely a mistake, for the difference in certainty does not lie in its own nature and degree. Genuine certainty does not admit of degrees. The difference lies rather in the process of reasoning by which it is conditioned. Moral proof may be carried to a point which enables the mind to pass on instantly and securely to its conclusion, and attain to knowledge by

The operations of the subjective mind do not ordinarily rise above the threshold of consciousness. He employs this theory to account for the phenomena of telepathy. But without adopting his theory of two minds, it is clear that our minds operate in ways of which we are unconscious, and that these unconscious operations condition and determine our conscious reasoning and knowledge. See Baldwin, *Dic. of Philos.*, "Subconscious" and "Herbartianism."

implicit logic defying articulate analysis.[1] The contents of such knowledge share the common necessity of every kind of knowledge, of being subject to the test of wider experience. If it stands this test, it is as securely established as it can be. The knowledge which physical scientists possess of natural laws has this nature.

As we have said already, the validity of knowledge does not depend ultimately upon the nature of the

[1] Moberly, *Reason and Relig.*, p. 24, shows that the more instant the process of mental judgment the more perfect it is. Newman, as we saw in note 1 of p. 115, vindicates what he calls the "illative sense" at some length, *Grammar of Assent*, ch. viii., ix. "The mind itself is more versatile than any of its works, . . . and it is only under its penetrating action that the margin disappears . . . intervening between verbal argumentation and concrete conclusions."

In his *University Sermons*, xi., Newman applies this principle to the justification of faith, wherein the gap between articulate reasons and the mind's judgment is peculiarly noticeable. The world brings against faith the imputation "that it is the reasoning of a weak mind, whereas it is in truth the reasoning of a divinely enlightened one" (p. 208). In § 25, p. 218, occurs a famous description of faith: "Faith is a process of the Reason, in which so much of the grounds of inference cannot be exhibited, so much lies in the character of the mind itself, in its general view of things, its estimate of the probable and the improbable, its impressions concerning God's will, and its anticipations derived from its own inbred wishes, that it will ever seem to the world irrational and despicable; — till, that is, the event confirms it. The act of mind, for instance, by which an unlearned person savingly believes the Gospel, on the word of his teacher, may be analogous to the exercise of sagacity in a great statesman or general, supernatural grace doing for the uncultivated reason what genius does for them." He goes on to confirm this last by the baffling and seemingly inadequate reasonings of inspired men in Holy Scripture.

rational process, if normal, by which it is conditioned, but upon the trustworthiness of our cognitive faculties, a trustworthiness which we have to assume in practice; and it is confirmed by the harmony of what we are conscious of knowing with experience in general. There are only two legitimate ways of impugning the testimony of consciousness in this matter: (*a*) by showing that our minds have acted contrary to the observed laws of human knowledge, so as to fall into some logical fallacy; (*b*) by contrary evidence derived from experience, or the failure of what is thought to be known to fulfil the function of a working hypothesis.[1]

II. *Sceptical Objections*

§ 6. The vital importance to theology of genuine knowledge of reality justifies a brief review of some difficulties which have been raised by modern philosophers. We shall notice four.

It has been said that much of our alleged higher knowledge is the result of reasoning, which is based upon mental symbols that correspond to no imaginable reality. Thus it was noticed by Locke that we can form no true images of general notions, or concepts, as modern psychology calls them.[2] These concepts are

[1] See § 1 of this chapter and note 1, p. 109, on criteria of knowledge.

[2] In his *Essay on the Human Understanding*, Bk. IV, ch. vii., § 9, Locke called attention to the difficulty of forming a general idea so simple relatively as that of a triangle. Such triangle "must be neither oblique, nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon; but all and none of these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect that cannot exist," etc. In Bk. III., ch. iii., § 11, he says, "It

but abstractions, incapable of being pictured in a manner agreeing with reality. They do not answer to any member or to the totality of the classes of things to which they refer, but only to what has been mentally abstracted from them. Nor do they correspond with any single thing, either in reality or imagination; for if we attempt to picture them we are compelled to individualize and add distinctive attributes which general notions are supposed to exclude. Thus in every course of argument which depends upon the use of such notions, *e.g.*, in syllogistic reasoning, we are basing our argument upon what is unreal; and this fact excludes our conclusions from the domain of knowledge of reality.

The same difficulty was felt by Herbert Spencer, although advanced in a slightly different form, and extended to such notions as the infinite, self-existent, etc. Because we can form no true or complete image of such things, he declares that they are inconceivable and inscrutable.[1]

is plain . . . that *General*, and *Universal*, belong not to the real existence of things; but *are the inventions and creatures of the understanding*, made by it for its own use, and *concern only* signs, whether words or ideas."

Locke did not go so far as to deny the possibility of forming concepts, but only their correspondence with any concrete reality. Berkeley, while acknowledging that "A man may consider a figure merely as triangular, without attending to the particular qualities of the angles or relations of the sides," adds, "But this will never prove that he can frame an abstract, general, inconsistent idea of a triangle." *Principles of Human Knowledge*, Introd.

[1] *First Principles*, ch. ii.

No difficulty should be felt here. A concept does not agree with any imaginable reality in the sense in which Locke speaks, it is true. But he mistakes the place of general notions in reasoning. They are not conceived of as real things in themselves, but as means whereby many real things or individuals are brought into unity of thought. Thus, when we use the concept man in reasoning, we are not reasoning with a purely abstract bundle of attributes, which indeed are only real as found in singulars, but with all things, collectively or severally considered, which possess the attributes comprehended within the concept, eliminating from consideration their individual and non-relevant peculiarities. That is, we are reasoning about real men, so far as they possess the attributes which are common to men, neglecting all else for the purpose of argument. This is not to reason about unreality. The concept is not treated as a thing at all, but as a law, which signifies to us what are the attributes which are possessed in common by the things about which our argument is really concerned.[1]

[1] Says the *Church Quarterly Review*, July, 1897, pp. 269, 270, A general notion "is not an image, but a *rule* or *law*. It is something which is perceived solely by the intellect as existing in things; and as a rule or law it is wholly unfigured and unfigurable. . . . Our general notion of a triangle, for instance, is nothing else but the rule or law of construction, which, as inhering in that figure, constitutes or makes it to be a triangle . . . so far from being difficult of apprehension [as Locke says], it is so clear to the intellect that a boy can be taught it in five minutes, and he will never forget it." See also Mansel, *Prolegom. Logica*, pp. 77, 78, and Porter, *Human Intellect*, p. 392, who distinguish between images and concepts.

Moreover, and this covers Herbert Spencer's extension of the difficulty to theistic notions, we should not confuse what we can conceive with what we can imagine. To conceive of a thing is to have in mind such of its attributes as will enable us to distinguish it from other things. To imagine a thing is to form a mental picture of it, capable of answering to reality. We can conceive, partially only perhaps, but really, of much that we cannot picture or imagine. This failure to imagine is sometimes due to the fact that the mind cannot lay hold all at once of sufficient materials to form the image sought to be made; in which case attempts at imagining are likely to result in deceptive appearances of contradiction. Thus, to advert to an illustration employed by Spencer, the human mind cannot marshal at once in picturable assemblage the materials needed to imagine the complex totality of this cosmos.[1] Again, the difficulty may be due to the fact that the thing conceived is of non-figurable nature, so that while we can have in mind some of its attributes and thus conceive of it, partially at least, we cannot form a true image of it, since images are necessarily figures.

Thus we can partly conceive of the infinite in that we can have a proper, though partial, notion of some of its attributes. But the infinite is wholly unimaginable, since we can neither grasp together in our minds sufficient data to form its image; nor will any image that we form in our minds fail to contradict the nature of the infinite, since images are figures and the infinite

[1] *First Principles*, ch. ii. § 9.

is without figure. Similar applications of this distinction between conceiving and imagining will serve to explain difficulties connected with other theistic notions, such as self-existence, etc.[1]

§ 7. The second difficulty is that of Berkeley and others, who say that our empirical knowledge consists wholly of subjective impressions and appearances.[2] The distinction is made by Kant between *phenomena*, or appearances, and *noumena*, or what we infer rather than observe, in order to account for the phenomena.[3]

There seems, with some writers, to be a subtle, though unconscious, misuse of words here. What do the appearances of a thing mean, if they do not signify that the thing appears? What right have we to use the term appearance, if nothing appears? And what

[1] See Calderwood, *Philos. of the Infin.*, pp. 25–27; Porter, *Human Intellect*, §§ 369, 370.

[2] Berkeley set forth his view first in 1709, *New Theory of Vision*. This work was epoch-making as a contribution to psychological analysis, and established the fact that our perceptions of things are not wholly direct, but are partly based on inference and represent long practice in such inference. We develop a faculty of "acquired sense perception." Our immediate sense percepts are enlarged and even altered by judgment and imagination. Berkeley declared that the reality of matter is illusory. What we experience consists of subjective phenomena only. *Principles of Human Knowledge*, 1710, and later works. As Schurman shows, *Belief in God*, pp. 49–55, the subjectivity of our knowledge, *qua* knowledge, "does not disprove the objective significance of the content of knowledge." Jevons gives a very clear and neat refutation of Berkeley's idealism, in *Evolution*, ch. iv.–v.; and App., p. 289. Cf. Bowen's *Modern Philos.*, pp. 141–153.

[3] *Critique of Pure Reason*, Divis. I. Book II. ch. iii.; esp. pp. 218 *et seq.* of Max Muller's translation.

is the appearance of a thing, but the external or objective correlative of perceiving the thing?

But let it be granted that the term appearance is merely a survival in philosophy of popular language; and that the writers whose difficulty we are considering really mean that appearances, so called, are not appearances at all, but purely subjective, so far as our knowledge goes.[1] The true answer is clear. Consciousness bears testimony that something is perceived, and that phenomena are real appearances to our minds of objective things. As was said elsewhere, this testimony should settle the matter, for we cannot go back of our consciousness, nor can we impugn its testimony without discrediting the human mind altogether.[2]

It only needs to be added that no intelligent thinker

[1] Such is Hamilton's contention in *Lecs. on Metaphysics*, Vol. I. pp. 148–152. Cf. pp. 136 *et seq.* See also Spencer's *First Principles*, Pt. II., ch. iii. § 46, for a discussion from the agnostic standpoint of what he regards as the misleading popular connotation of the word "phenomenon" and its equivalent, "appearance."

[2] Says Schurman, "The *Critique of Pure Reason*, as an analysis of the elements of knowledge, is of great and permanent value to philosophy. But as an inquiry into the extent and validity of knowledge — and this was its primary object — it was foredoomed to failure. For this problem is unanswerable of cognition as a whole; and even in the case of particular cognitions, the solution . . . turns on the greater or less adaptability of the proposition under consideration to the rest of our knowledge." *Belief in God*, p. 29.

Flint discusses Kant's position at length in *Agnosticism*, pp. 168–238. In discussing Hamilton's position, pp. 606–621, he admits, p. 610, that phenomena constitute the conditions of objective perception, but shows that they enable and compel the mind to transcend themselves, for the qualities which they exhibit cannot be conceived of except as residing in objectives.

urges that phenomena are the appearances of all that is comprehended within the things we see. The contention is that, so far as things appear — *i.e.*, so far as we experience their phenomena, — we truly perceive and know them. This knowledge is partial, and we may make erroneous inferences from it, but it is knowledge of part at least of the reality[1] — knowledge which daily experience verifies and proves to be practically sufficient. We neither do nor can live as wholly in a dream land of symbolic and illusory shapes.

§ 8. Such considerations should meet a third difficulty, that which grows out of what is called "the relativity of knowledge." It is urged by Mansel, whose language is accepted by Spencer,[2] that to be conscious of an object is merely to be conscious of its relation to our consciousness. To prove that this relative object of consciousness corresponds with objective reality, we must be able to compare the relative object in our consciousness with the object as it exists independently of our consciousness. This is impossible, for it involves a consideration of what is admittedly unrelated to our consciousness.

[1] Seeing things in the night illustrates the possibility of partial knowledge. What we see is real, and is not nullified by daylight vision. Our inferences from partial vision may, indeed need to, be corrected. But we truly perceive in the dark the same *thing* which we perceive in daylight, although imperfectly.

[2] Hamilton had led the way in *Metaph.*, Vol. I. pp. 136 *et seq.* See Mansel, *Limits of Relig. Thought*, Lec. III.; Spencer, *First Prins.*, ch. iv.

Although expressed profoundly, the difficulty is exceedingly specious and superficial. The object which is related to our consciousness, consciousness itself being witness, is one with the object considered as existing independently of our consciousness. The difference lies in the aspects under which it is considered. In one case we consider what we discern of the object, or the object so far as it appears to our cognizing mind. In the other case we consider that object in its totality, as comprehending much that we do not perceive at all.[1] We know things only as they come into relation to our consciousness. This means that we do know them in part, so far as they appear to us. Their relation to our consciousness is their appearing to us. Such is the testimony of human consciousness, from which there is no rational appeal.

§ 9. A fourth difficulty was formulated by Kant, who held that reason acts always in obedience to certain laws or forms of thought, grounded in the mind's innate constitution; such, for example, as space and time. This being the case, he maintained that the reason imposes these forms of thought upon the contents of experience, so that our notions of them do not derive their forms from objective reality, but from our

[1] The positions of all three of these philosophers are discussed by Flint in his *Agnosticism*, pp. 606–639. See also Mill, *Exam. of Sir W. Hamilton's Philos.*; Caldecott, *Philos. of Relig.*, pp. 405–410; Porter, *Human Intell.*, p. 523; Martineau, *Study of Relig.*, Vol. I. pp. 79, 120, 121, 135, 136. Calderwood's *Philos. of the Infin.* is directed against Hamilton's agnosticism.

own minds.[1] We cannot, of course, be said to observe or know things which reach our consciousness only in forms of our own mental manufacture. What we apprehend is to be described as consisting of our own mental forms, at least so far as they take apprehensible shape in our consciousness.

The difficulty is subtle, but is really the same as has been referred to before. The process which enables us to perceive is considered, and that mistakenly, instead of the fact attested by our consciousness that we do perceive. The innate structure of our minds does indeed enable us to perceive things under such forms as space and time. If it were not so, spatial and temporal things could not be apprehended at all. In view of the judgment of our final court of appeal, the consciousness, that we take real cognizance of such things, we are driven to hold that these mental forms are simply elements of our subjective equipment which enable us to discern external realities. It cannot be shown that they are moulds which alter what is pressed into them so as to make the objects discerned by us to be purely subjective in form and out of semblance with reality.[2]

[1] *Critique of Pure Reason*, Pt. I., esp. pp. 18 *et seq.* (Muller's translation).

[2] The question as to whether the subjective forms of our intelligence resemble the external objects which we are conscious of perceiving is misleading, since it presupposes a comparison of two objects. Only one object is considered in perception, and that external. The subjective forms do not constitute or manufacture another object, but are the conditions of our perception of external

Many have been the attempts to treat the mind as a fettered thing, bound down by the very characteristics which make it to be an instrument of objective knowledge. But all these difficulties are based on the speculative results of *a priori* thought, and must disappear, as mist before sunshine, when confronted by the persistent testimony of consciousness as to the validity of its own operations — testimony which all men accept in practice, and when they do not rashly lose themselves in efforts to probe unfathomable mysteries of the human mind.

reality. The question should be, Are external realities what we are conscious of perceiving them to be? We maintain that they are; although we grant, of course, that they are also more than we perceive.

Kant says, p. 18, "In a phenomenon I call that which corresponds to the sensation its *matter*; but that which causes the manifold matter of the phenomenon to be perceived as arranged in a certain order, I call its *form*. Now it is clear that it cannot be sensation again through which sensations are arranged and placed in certain forms. The matter only of all phenomena is given us *a posteriori*; but their form must be ready for them in the mind *a priori*, and must therefore be capable of being considered as separate from all sensations." Kant takes a good deal for granted. He cannot prove that the form of phenomena is *contributed* and *not perceived* by the mind; nor is there the slightest warrant for separating the form from the matter in phenomena. If we perceive phenomena at all, we perceive form in them. Formless phenomena cannot be perceived at all or conceived of. No doubt it is because of our mental equipment that the forms of phenomena (spatial and temporal) are perceptible; but it is as irrational to assume that to treat the forms as objective is to hypothecate new sensations, as it is to suppose that because we perceive phenomena as objective *phenomena*, we thereby create another object. If we perceive phenomena we perceive their form, for formless phenomena are no possible objects of contemplation. See Flint, *Agnosticism*, ch. iv. § iv. pp. 170–184.

III. *Faith-Knowledge*

§ 10. What has been said as to the rational nature of faith points to its cognitive nature, for the function of reason is to arrive at knowledge and apply it to life. This does not mean that all faith is knowledge, for reason does not always include or attain to knowledge. But, just as the unaided reason in general seeks, and in due course attains, to much knowledge of natural things, so the assisted reason — *i.e.*, faith — has the knowledge of many spiritual things for its proper function and final result. Mere beliefs, or opinions which involve elements of doubt, characterize the less developed stages of faith; and many spiritual things escape sure knowledge all along. But when belief in Christian doctrine is adopted as a working hypothesis in daily life — which is the meaning of "the venture of faith" — it may and does develop into spiritual knowledge. The manner of this development, when open to analysis, is analogous in a measure to the processes of verification in natural science. But the attainment of "faith-knowledge," if we may thus name the knowledge which faith makes possible, is usually more or less implicit, and beyond analysis.

The points to be insisted on are that, whether faith-knowledge is conditioned by discursive thought or is intuitive: (*a*) Its *criteria* are the same in essence as those of other knowledge — the testimony of consciousness, and its working value in our widening experience; (*b*) The assistance of grace in faith does not subvert its

rational conditions, which agree, whether explicit or implicit, with those of other knowledge; (*c*) Faith-knowledge does not in this life include sight of God; but is none the less truly rational and cognitive.

§ 11. The process of attaining faith-knowledge involves a dependence upon authority. But, as has been indicated,[1] this condition attends natural reasoning and, consequently, natural knowledge. Its necessity in faith does not, therefore, reduce the cognitive capacity of that faculty in the least.

But, as in other departments of reason and knowledge, authority may not rightly be depended on in faith, unless it is credible — *i.e.*, capable of rational defence as trustworthy, or competent and truthful. The fact that certain channels of information of which faith makes use are supernatural adds no new difficulty in this direction, provided the reality and source of these supernatural means of instruction are rightly accepted. Such a fact merely indicates the lines of investigation and argument by which the claims of authority involved are to be vindicated to enlightened reason.

§ 12. Faith, as has been shown, involves in every stage of its progress towards knowledge certain operations of the affections and will, called moral factors, such as desire to know the truth, willingness to submit to the conditions of spiritual discernment, earnest purpose and attention, enthusiasm, scrupulous honesty and care, etc. Back of such conditions, without which

[1] See ch. iv. § 8.

they are likely to be wanting, is the element of personal character, such character as is involved in spiritual docility and affinity of mind to divine truth. The mind thus conditioned possesses a power of ethical and spiritual appreciation, and discerns what recent writers call "worth-values." The perception of worth-values is a valuable element in the process of discerning spiritual things, although it does not itself constitute that knowledge to which faith finally attains.[1]

These moral conditions are such as must attend all sound reasoning and knowledge of spiritual things.[2] They do not, when rightly present, make for credulity, or unreasoning belief, but are both consistent with and necessary to a rational and spiritual knowledge of reality and truth. To know, the man must have all of his faculties in gear with each other, for his intellect can no more act successfully out of due relation to his emotional and volitional faculties than can the eye out of proper connection with the brain and nervous system. And, as the eye is not nullified as a perceptive organ by reason of the sensorial conditions which attend its exercise, so the human intellect is not subverted as a discerning faculty because it operates under the conditions of emotional and volitional activity.

[1] The error of the Ritschlians lies in limiting spiritual knowledge to a perception of worth-value of doctrine, and a refusal to accept it by what is called an existential-judgment, as having scientific certainty. See Flint, *Agnosticism*, pp. 590–603; Orr, *Ritschlianism*, esp. ch. viii.; and, in this volume, chap. i. § 26; chap. iv. § 7, esp. note 1, p. 103.

[2] See ch. iv. § 4.

§ 13. The due adjustment of man's faculties to the discernment of spiritual things requires the supernatural assistance of divine grace, and without such aid that development of spiritual character and mental affinity to divine things which makes sound growth in spiritual knowledge possible cannot be realized. To put it briefly, the holy things of God cannot truly be laid hold of except by holy persons; and holiness is the result of both divine grace and self-discipline. Both are requisite for the successful theologian.

But to acknowledge this in nowise weakens the contention that we can truly know divine things by grace. Should we explore subterranean caverns, we should need to carry a torch. But what we then see we truly see, none the less, and with our eyes. So, when the mind contemplates the hidden things of God, it does not contemplate them less really, or less rationally, because it makes use of the light of grace.[1]

Nor does the position here taken altogether exclude the bulk of mankind from spiritual knowledge. It is true that wide differences in spiritual knowledge exist, although no wider than have prevailed in other departments of learning. The Logos, we believe, "lighteth every man that cometh into the world." It has been widely held in the Church that some measure of prevenient grace is afforded to all men, so that no race is cut off altogether from spiritual knowledge. No doubt it is in view of this truth that St. Paul declares, that that which may be known of God was manifest in the

[1] See ch. iv. § 2.

Gentiles, and that "the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead." [1] If men fail to attain to any knowledge of these things, it is because grace has been repelled, or else unhappy conditions have rendered it ineffectual. In fact, no race of men can be shown to be totally wanting in spiritual knowledge, unless it be so degraded as to constitute in its abnormal condition a non-relevant exception. If we say that men cannot know God, we mean without supernatural aid. If we say that men can and ought to know God, we mean that God affords the aid required, and has put us to a probation of knowledge by doing so.[2]

It remains to say that divine grace has ascertainable methods and laws which we need to observe in order to obtain large and sure knowledge of divine things. The higher forms of faith at least are conditioned by covenantal and sacramental terms. In the Church of God, and there only, is the full assistance available which a theologian ought to have. This accounts for the unique internal coherence of catholic theology, as well as the impregnable security and agreement as to its fundamental propositions which prevail in every portion of the Catholic Church. Many diverse opinions can be found among catholic theologians, but the primary verities of the catholic faith are maintained

[1] St. John i. 9; Rom. i. 19–20.

[2] See ch. iv. § 6, and the notes there given.

to-day in their ancient meaning by all catholic schools of theology.[1]

§ 14. This consent has been accompanied and conditioned by the fullest and freest exercise of reason in all of its forms.

(*a*) The trustworthiness of the immediate sources of truth — the Church and Scripture — upon which catholic theologians depend for their knowledge of the contents of supernatural revelation, has undergone the most searching scrutiny of reason in successive generations, and in diverse manners. And the result of each scrutiny has been to increase the apologetical material available for vindicating the fundamental dogmas of theology.

(*b*) Intuition has been exercised, in the form of spiritual insight, upon the contents of revelation, and their truth has been discerned directly by the power of grace, in ways which transcend the slow processes of articulate reason, without contradicting their results.[2]

(*c*) Deductive reason has been at work, bringing forth new treasures out of the original contents of

[1] A catholic school of theology means one that accepts in good faith the teaching authority of the Catholic Church, and all catholic dogmas, making them the unalterable premises of theological developments and speculations. The distinctive and speculative opinions of such schools are, of course, neither on a level with catholic doctrine, nor necessary to be believed.

[2] We do not refer here to the vagaries of certain mystics who confound the symbolic images under which they contemplate the unseen with objective reality. Mysticism is not a delusion. It represents the penetrating vision of love. But like all heavenly things it is liable to perversion.

revelation, converting what was always held with implicit faith into an explicit theology. This has been the ordinary line of what is called development of doctrine — a development which continues to produce new theological propositions, but which may not enlarge the area of necessary doctrines contained implicitly in the original faith of the Church, or contradict them.[1]

(*d*) Inductive reason has also been employed in every generation to bring into the form of generalized propositions the divine significance of the natural order, and to verify by ever widening comparison the harmony of the truths of supernatural revelation with the contents of growing empirical knowledge. The highest and most satisfactory exercise of reason in this direction is found in the moral sphere, and consists of innumerable verifications in personal experience which are made by holy men, both implicitly and explicitly.

In short, catholic theology involves the fullest and most exalted exercise of reason known to man, an exercise which is shared in its securest form only by those who practice the "obedience of faith" and enjoy the fulness of sacramental grace. Catholic theology

[1] Says Forbes, *Nicene Creed*, p. 17, "Explicit faith is that by which we assent to any doctrine which with its terms is known to us. Implicit faith is that by which certain truths are believed, not as recognized in themselves, but as contained in some other great verity. This is the case of many ignorant Christians." Christians ought to accept all the catholic faith; but the area of their explicit faith depends upon the progress of dogmatic definition, and upon each individual's opportunity and capacity to become acquainted with and understand ecclesiastical definitions. See Newman, *Arians*, ch. ii. § i. 3, pp. 143–145.

accepts no authority without sufficient reason, and stretches the reason with divine aid to its utmost limits in assimilating, verifying, and applying what has been rationally accepted as capable of illuminating experience, life, human progress, and duty.

§ 15. The process of faith in the attainment of spiritual knowledge varies in practice according to the conditions and mental temper of individual seekers after God. Yet there is a logical order, however widely varied from by individuals, which is capable of analysis and exhibition. The process presupposes a personal subject in whom some measure of prevenient grace is present, with a disposition and harmonious ordering of faculties suited to the acquisition of spiritual knowledge. The process that follows is strictly scientific, although often implicit and unreflective.

(*a*) The mind starts with implicit trust in itself, and in its power to know truth and to recognize the difference between knowledge and opinion. This trust extends also to the general rationality of things and their consequent intelligibility.

(*b*) Empirical knowledge commences with particulars, and gradually introduces the reason to the cosmos by which it is environed. This is the first conscious stage.

(*c*) The mind soon begins to acquire a notion of God as the Creator and Governor of the universe — the theistic hypothesis. This notion is obtained in various ways: by the instructions of others, by reflection upon what is implicit in mental assumptions and processes,

or by inference based on external experience. The process of acquiring the notion may be largely or wholly implicit and unreflective.

(*d*) An opinion is gained that the theistic hypothesis is true, one which varies in different individuals, and in different stages of mental and spiritual development, all the way from hesitating conjecture up to practical certainty. An instinctive tendency of the human mind guarantees the development of such assurance in those whose environment is not too unfavourable and whose mental faculties are sound.[1]

(*e*) The "venture of faith," or determinate guidance of one's life, both mental and moral, by the theistic hypothesis, comes next in order. The children of properly disciplined Christian households are not necessarily conscious of making such a venture; but, having implicit confidence that they are being taught truly of God, *grow up with* a life controlled by this teaching. Yet the docile spirit thus exhibited is an implicit equivalent of the venture of faith, and has the rational and spiritual value of that venture.

(*f*) The result of living according to the theistic hypothesis is an ever widening verification of its truth from experience, a banishment of doubt, and a final attainment of rational certainty and knowledge. This verification is apt to be of implicit nature, unaccompanied by abstract reflection; for the majority of men are not abstract thinkers or theologians. But when it is achieved consciously and described scientifically, its

[1] It is presupposed in this assertion that prevenient grace is present.

outlines are such as are exhibited in various theistic treatises.

The theistic hypothesis furnishes the mind with premises of thought — *præambula fidei* — of the most fruitful nature, and widens the spiritual outlook. New truths are continually presented to the mind of a believer in God, coming through any or all of the various avenues of truth. In each case the same process may be gone through with — conviction, the venture of faith, and higher assurance, having knowledge for its goal. Thus, the man advances from faith to faith, each new level of belief opening up richer hypotheses, to be acted on in turn and thus verified.[1] But all along, the logic of assent is truly scientific and rational, although the process in each mind varies widely, and is made successful only by divine assistance.

§ 16. The faculty of faith carries reason and knowledge far beyond their unassisted or merely natural range; but its capacity is none the less human and finite.

(*a*) The laws of human reason remain unsubverted by the assistance of grace, and men cannot apprehend divine truths except in the manner, and to the extent, that minds like theirs can be enabled to apprehend them. The finiteness of human faculties remains in all

[1] By accepting the catholic faith the devout Christian attains, implicitly at least, the goal of his earthly growth in faith. This is so because the catholic faith contains, either explicitly or implicitly all that men can know of divine mysteries in this life. Henceforth his growth consists in riper assurance and more adequate explication of what he has already accepted implicitly.

possible forms of their exercise. And just as the telescope does not enable the eye to see except in the manner of an eye, so divine grace does not liberate the human mind from the necessity of acting according to its nature. The limitations of human forms of thought remain, and heavenly verities can only be discerned through these forms. Thus the eternal is seen through the window of time, and the divine "immensity" through the window of space.[1] The limitation of finite attention, or our incapacity to consider more than a finite range of ideas at once, remains in the loftiest flights of spiritual apprehension.[2] Consequently many divine truths are held by men in incipient forms only. That is, we discern beginnings of truth simply, or lines of true thought, the full lengths of which transcend our spiritual vision. Such truths are held in partial approximations, which are true as far as they go, but are symbolical of more than we can grasp.[3] Divine person-

[1] See Flint, *Agnosticism*, pp. 352–353; Powell, *Prin. of the Incarn.*, pp. 42–43, 140–142. The whole subject of anthropomorphism, true and false, is here involved. See Moore, *Science and the Faith*, pp. 50–53; Forbes, *Creed*, pp. 41–42; Illingworth, *Personality*, pp. 219–222; Iverach, *Theism*, pp. 268 *et seq.*; Martineau, *Religion*, Vol. I., pp. 313–318; Row, *Theism*, pp. 35–44.

[2] Powell, *Prin. of the Incarn.*, pp. 43 *et seq.* For references on the whole subject of attention see Baldwin, *Dic. of Philos.*, "Attention."

[3] Mozley, *Predestination*, ch. ii. pp. 17–23. Richey, in *Truth and Counter Truth*, shows that truths are often seemingly opposed, for this very reason. In this case we must acquiesce in mystery and hold them together. See Introd. Also Fiske's *Idea of God*, ch. viii., xii.; St. Thos., *Summa Theol.*, I. xiii. 1, 3, 5; Bright, *St. Leo on the Incarn.*, note 127, who gives passages from the Fathers.

ality is a truth of this kind — a mystery of which the term person is a true symbol, but which in its fulness transcends all human thought and language.[1]

To reveal infinite mysteries *fully* to human understanding lies beyond the category of power, so that even the Almighty cannot thus reveal them. Our Lord had to translate whatever He revealed of God into forms capable of assimilation by the human understandings of His Apostles; and even His own human mind could not grasp the contents of His divine mind, except in the forms of human conceptions.[2]

(*b*) The faculty of faith is also limited by the fact that the Holy Spirit imparts grace in different measures to individual souls, distributing His gifts to each as He wills.[3] So it is that men have to wait on the Spirit for the power to discern spiritual things, and the excellencies of faith are not uniform even in faithful souls. Some excel in knowledge, some in understanding, some in wisdom, and some in counsel. It is this diversity of gifts which accounts for varied types of believers and the diverse capacities of men in the several departments of sacred learning.[4]

(*c*) Our faith is also hampered by our sinfulness, which is not at once overcome even by the aid of grace.

[1] St. Thos., *Summa Theol.*, I. xxix. 3; Illingworth, *Personality*, Lec. iii. and note 12, pp. 243 *et seq.*; Powell, *Prin. of the Incarn.*, pp. 169–170.

[2] Powell, *Prin. of the Incarn.*, pp. 42–43, 140–142, 230. Hall, *Kenotic Theory*, pp. 215–218, and note 2, p. 216.

[3] 1 Cor. xii. 4–11.

[4] The gifts of the Holy Spirit are considered in ch. ix. § 11.

To the extent that we fall short of perfect holiness, to that extent we are hindered from rising to the direct clearness of knowledge which is promised to the pure in heart.[1] Faith is a virtue as well as a faculty, and its perfection as a faculty waits upon its perfection as a virtue.[2]

(*d*) Finally, faith is not, in this life, a faculty of sight but of belief in, and knowledge of, the unseen. Faith is "the evidence of things not seen." [3] Hereafter we shall see God as He is,[4] knowing Him, in this sense, as we are known by Him. In so far as faith signifies knowledge of what is not seen, it will be done away by the beatific vision.[5] But, considered as a faculty by which to understand spiritual things, it grows forever. There is a *theologia beatorum*, as well as a *theologia viatorum*, and its glories transcend our present understanding.[6]

[1] St. Matt. v. 8. Cf. Isa. vi. 5–7.

[2] The term "justify" employed by St. Paul means etymologically and strictly to account, rather than to make, righteous. But that writer treats justification as bringing sanctifying grace to the soul — the earnest and potency of righteousness actually to be realized. And this righteousness must be realized, if the state of justification is not to be nullified. In agreement with this he treats the faith by which we are justified as itself of virtuous nature, the root and germ of all holiness in us. No acceptance of Christ can please God which does not exhibit the elementary beginnings at least of the holiness that is pleasing to Him. See Liddon and Sanday in *Rom.* i. 17.

[3] Heb. xi. 1; 2 Cor. iv. 18; v. 7. See ch. iv. § 2, and note 1, p. 88.

[4] 1 John iii. 2. [5] 1 Cor. xiii. 9–12.

[6] Eternal life consists in the knowledge of God, according to our Lord. St. John xvii. 3. Cf. 1 Cor. xiii. 8–12. See Martensen, *Dogmatics*, § 45.

CHAPTER VI

SOME PRINCIPLES OF STUDY

I. *Sense of Value and Difficulty*

§ 1. The importance of theology as the veritable queen of all the sciences, and the keystone of all knowledge whatsoever, has been dwelt upon in our first chapter. We saw that man's intellectual, moral, and spiritual nature is not fully equipped for its intended exercise, until he has in some degree acquired a firm grasp upon the central truths of God and the principles by which the course of the universe and of human history is governed. The very end of man is to live with God and enjoy Him forever; for this is eternal life, that we might know personally and intimately the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom He hath sent.[1] And even now we have need to equip ourselves for life by the practice of true religion, which practice depends upon a correct apprehension of divine things — an apprehension which is made possible, humanly speaking, by the existence of a true science of God. Such a science depends for its existence upon the devotion of many to its study and enrichment. Possibilities of holiness, without which no man can enjoy God,[2] are

[1] St. John xvii. 3.
[2] Heb. xii. 14.

dependent also upon such study; for holiness requires the mental atmosphere of God. This atmosphere is apt to be dissipated by our worldly environment, and can neither be developed nor preserved without habitual consideration of the truths that are expounded in theology. Without this consideration we cannot maintain that heavenly conversation which alone prepares us for the life to come.[1] The minister of Christ needs to consider these truths scientifically, and is peculiarly dependent upon a study of theology. Only with the aid of such study, lovingly fostered, can he hope adequately to teach of God and holy things to his people, or to teach clearly and securely, without error.

It should be clear to every thoughtful mind that no science can be grappled with successfully, without due appreciation of its value. We cannot understand unless we appreciate. This is true of theology, and our appreciation must be proportionate to the transcendent glory and vital bearing of this science. Any disparagement or neglect of it by the clergy must proceed at least from ignorance and folly, if not from moral perversity.

§ 2. But if we would avoid superficiality, and the evils which follow in its train — sophistry, clerical inefficiency, and error — we must realize at the outset that theology is the most difficult of all sciences. A surface acquaintance with the truths of God is easily mistaken for secure and accurate knowledge. Many a priest owes his looseness of thought, his vagaries and

[1] Philip. iii. 20.

false liberalism, to an initial failure to understand how ignorant he is of the foundation principles of our faith. Nothing is more noticeable to a wise theologian than the utter incapacity of many a brilliant leader of heretical and liberal thought, so called, to understand the real content and bearing of the ancient faith of the Church. The saying of Hooker should be recalled in this connection, that because a "Divine mystery is more true than plain, divers having framed the same to their own conceits and fancies are found in their expositions thereof more plain than true." [1] The crowd is naturally drawn to what is easily made plain, and only those who have discovered by their own studies that what seems so plain derives its simplicity from its superficiality can undertake with hope of success to refute the dangerous plausibilities of popular error.

God is infinite and our understanding is finite. The divine nature and ways constitute, therefore, the most difficult of all subjects to consider. It is true that the Infinite has left traces of Himself upon the face of nature and history, and above all in our own moral and spiritual nature, so that we can by divine grace discern somewhat of His attributes. He has also blessed mankind with certain precise revelations of Himself and His purposes. But all such knowledge, at its best, is the result of translating the infinite into finite forms of thought and language. These forms are true, but in no sense adequate to what they represent. They do not and cannot convey to our minds

[1] *Eccles. Polity*, V. lii. 1.

more than an incipient idea of Him who in His immensity is inscrutable and ineffable.[1] This inadequacy of human thought and language accounts sufficiently for the difficulty of theology, and for the precariousness of speculation when it attempts to soar beyond the limits of clear revelation. What is certainly revealed must indeed be accepted and earnestly thought on. But inadequate premises, however certain in themselves, leave our thoughts involved in difficulty, especially since they bring us continually to boundaries beyond which our minds cannot soar.

Moreover, the truths of revelation bear on many practical problems of complicated nature — made more complicated by the mystery of evil. We are assured that the faith contains the ultimate solution of every problem. But "the mills of God grind slowly," and our mastery of the practical bearing of revealed truth is correspondingly slow and difficult. The sciences of nature and history are continually opening up new perspectives and compelling us to new mental adjustments, lest the intellectual confusion which must otherwise ensue should destroy our ability to employ the means which divine truth affords of interpreting all things according to their divine significance.

Then, too, our minds are spiritually dulled, partly by their absorption in mundane affairs and studies, and chiefly by the entail of natural corruption and spiritual blindness which constitutes the handicap of every child of man. This entail makes us naturally

[1] See ch. v. pp. 138-140.

inclined to dwell upon what is carnal and sensible, and to fail in appreciation of what is divine and spiritual.

Finally, a babel of contending sects and opposing systems of theology causes peculiar difficulty for the modern theologian. Unhappily, writers within the Church have arrayed themselves along party lines, and the trumpet seems to give forth an uncertain sound. As a natural though deplorable outcome, a powerful school has arisen which, reacting from the dogmatism and intolerant spirit of modern sectarianism, denies man's accountability for his creed, and divides the religious consciousness sharply from scientific consciousness or intellect, as if man had two mutually unrelated consciousnesses instead of one. An *a priori* agnosticism touching divine things is defended, not merely by assailants from without, but by many within, who by reason of the confusion of the time have abandoned hope of justifying their faith in the intellectual and scientific sphere.

There is indeed a way out. The official teaching of the Church remains the same in spite of the vagaries of her preachers and writers; and it is still possible to fall back upon what has been held everywhere, always and by the generality of catholic theologians. But, and this is the point, much painstaking study is required to put the language of the day to the test of the rule of faith. That rule, as will be shown in our next volume, is not a substitute for study, but indicates its method. If theology could stand still and ignore the progress of human knowledge and the mutations of human

thought, no doubt the theologian would have an easier task. But the truths of theology bear on each new phase of thought, and its language has to be adapted to each age. Consequently each generation of theologians is under the necessity of going back to the beginning, in order to adjust theological language in such wise that the faith may be made rationally intelligible to men of new learning without subversive alteration of its ancient contents.

§ 3. In view of the vital importance of theology for the maintenance of saving truth, the difficulties which attend its mastery call for use of every available aid in its study. Adequate preliminary training is essential, and the education of our clergy should include not merely an imparting of sufficient learning, but a discipline of the intellectual and spiritual faculties. Without such discipline the mind must prove quite unequal to the herculean task of extricating divine truth from the plausible caricatures with which modern systems have disguised it, and of exhibiting it unmistakably and persuasively to those whose mental attitude is determined by modern learning and philosophy. Divine grace is indeed essential and is sufficient, but it does not displace the necessity of training.

It is also vital that the theologian should keep before himself with scrupulous care the single aim of mastering and propagating a true and exact faith. The spirit of this age is not helpful to such an aim. Many leading minds are inclined to set life over against dogma, partially, no doubt, because they consider only the

one-sided systems of modern date, but also because they fail to realize that the life which is acceptable to God cannot be fully practised except in the light of the catholic faith as held in its purity and integrity. An impression prevails in some quarters that an exact faith is unattainable, and that precision in this direction is somehow a hindrance both to thought and life. This unhappy state of mind is easily accounted for. It grows out of the confusion of protestantism and the inability of sixteenth-century systems to retain their hold upon thoughtful minds. Of such and of all merely human systems it may be said,

> "Our little systems have their day;
> They have their day and cease to be;
> They are but broken lights of Thee,
> And Thou, O Lord, art more than they." [1]

But the catholic faith is no man-made system; and, while in this life we see "but darkly," [2] what we discern when we hold this faith will never cease to be true, even when with open vision we see the King in His beauty.

The teaching of the Spirit-guided Church of God is essential — not indeed as an anodyne, quieting our efforts to grow in spiritual knowledge, but — because what she teaches is true forever, and affords the divinely revealed premises of correct thought concerning divine things. Sacramental grace is also necessary; for by

[1] Tennyson, *In Memoriam*.
[2] 1 Cor. xiii. 12.

means thereof we are united to Him who is the Truth,[1] and receive those spiritual gifts by which the blindness of our natural minds is remedied and our faculties are enabled to discern spiritual things. We need not dwell upon all this here. The subject will receive proper attention elsewhere.

§ 4. A theologian has need to labour much. For him to shrink from toil involves disastrous consequences, both to himself and to the Church at large. He must do much reading of the great theological classics of previous ages; and must keep abreast of modern thought and knowledge, in order to master their theological import and understand the conditions of success in expounding divine truth to modern minds. Much thought must be added to his reading, thought which is guided by sound principles, and much careful formulating of such thought. Nor can a theologian achieve the best results without expounding orally. He should preach often upon the wondrous divine themes that engage his studies and his pen. All these lines of labour have to do with his success as a theologian.[2]

Moreover, "the priest's lips should keep knowledge," for this very purpose that "they should seek the law at his mouth, for he is the messenger of the Lord of hosts." [3] It should not be forgotten, however, that the immediate preparation of a sermon does not consist in

[1] St. John xiv. 6.

[2] The reader will recall Bacon's words, in his Essay on *Studies:* "Reading maketh a full man; conference a ready man; and writing an exact man."

[3] Mal. ii. 7.

acquiring something new to say, for what is new is raw. Rather it consists in arranging and freshening for convincing and helpful utterance the matured results of long-continued study and spiritual experience. The week just passed affords no adequate opportunity for a ripe mastery of what is suitable to be delivered in the pulpit.

The rewards of theological study are great, and become greater all along. Theology itself takes on richer meaning and becomes more glorious and satisfying. An adequate theology — one which is no mere skeleton of abstract formulas — constitutes an undying source of inspiration both to thought and life. A world of reality is opened up whose boundless vistas and transcendent glories surpass the wildest dreams of natural science. And one of the glories of theology is its inexhaustibleness. At every step in its mastery we apprehend reality, although of the super-sensible order; but our discernment of the richness of its meaning and of its value for ourselves, as well as for others, increases day by day until our minds become, as it were, enthroned at the centre of all things. We discern all things truly, and our spirits are filled with the glory of God. Such uplifting leaves no place for pride, for those whose conversation is in heaven estimate all things at their true and absolute value. The greatest reward of all is the attainment of a closer and personal touch with God. It is indeed the pure in heart who see God,[1] and without such purity all theological study

[1] St. Matt. v. 8.

becomes vanity. But surely the pure in heart are enabled to enter more adequately upon the meaning and value of what they contemplate by a systematic study of God. Theology is the science of such study.

II. *Presuppositions*

§ 5. In no department of thought or learning is it possible either to begin or advance without taking something for granted — *i.e.*, without presuppositions. An analysis of our every-day experiences shows that they become intelligible to us by reason of certain *a priori* assumptions which are latent in our minds all along, and which constitute the interpretive principles necessarily employed by the understanding. Without these assumptions empirical phenomena would exhibit no rational order or meaning. They are themselves beyond demonstration, since they are already implied in our primitive conceptions and constitute the premises rather than the conclusions of our logical processes. We do not derive them from experience, although it is only after reflection upon experience that we become conscious of employing them. In short, our use of these assumptions precedes our taking note of them. But when we do take note of them we perceive that they have been assumed unconsciously and unavoidably in our earliest mental operations.

These assumptions are universally made, and therefore constitute a philosophy of "common sense" really employed by all as the working hypothesis of every-

day life.[1] Even those who are led by abstract thought, utterly divorced from reality, to deny the validity of this philosophy share in the common necessity of assuming its truth in the practical ordering of their lives. Those, for instance, who deny the intellectual validity of the principle of causation are compelled to make use of it to interpret the march of ordinary events. This philosophy of common sense is not the product of abstract reasoning, but is perceived, when we reflect upon our mental operations, to be involved in all human experience. It hypothecates, as the indestructible postulates of all knowledge whatsoever, the reality of an ego and of an external world, truly cognized so far as its phenomena are embraced by our apprehensions. It also hypothecates those universal laws and principles according to which all men, by reason of their native mental habit, co-ordinate and interpret the phenomena of experience. Finally, it hypothecates and trusts in a supreme reason which governs all things and all relations — a reason which subsequent reflection shows to be grounded necessarily in a Person.[2]

[1] In speaking of a philosophy of "common sense," we are not committing ourselves to Reid's exposition of it. We merely insist that a correct philosophy must be in accord with the necessities of thought that are experienced by men in general in their practical conduct of life.

[2] Kant acknowledges the subjective necessity of the transcendental ideas of ego, the world, and God. Our point is that the non-existence of prior grounds of demonstration does not invalidate them as bases of knowledge and science. The necessary postulates of reason cannot be impugned without stultifying the reason which we exercise in doing so. We have but one reason.

§ 6. Such in brief is the working philosophy with which all men begin, and which they continue to employ in fact, to whatever extent it may be lost sight of by those who are concerned too exclusively with abstract speculation. But, in addition to these universal assumptions, every particular science is dependent for possibility and rational progress upon peculiar assumptions of its own. No physics is possible unless the reality of matter and force, whatever these terms may signify, is assumed as beyond dispute. No biology can hold its own except on the assumption of the reality and distinct nature of life. And it in no wise destroys the necessity and validity of such assumptions to acknowledge, as we must, that the realities of matter, force, and life are imperfectly understood and enveloped in mystery.

Moreover, the progress of every science consists in an adoption of one hypothesis after another; and this adoption is prior, in each case, to demonstration of its validity; for such demonstration, so far as possible at all, depends upon the hypothesis being assumed at the outset for working purposes. The only proof available comes after such assumption, and consists in the duly tested working value of what has been assumed.[1]

In brief, when we acknowledge that theology involves presuppositions which have to be taken for granted at the outset, and which come to no other logical demonstration than their working value and the rationality which they import into the facts con-

[1] See ch. v. § 1, pp. 109–111, and note 1.

sidered, we are but confessing that the same laws of progress in knowledge hold good in theology which are observed in every other science. Using an invidious term in a good sense, the theologian, in common with all other scientists, starts with his own bias or prejudice — *i.e.*, with the presuppositions and prejudgments that are necessary for his particular line of investigation. No such thing exists as entire freedom from such bias or prejudice.

§ 7. But we must say more, or we shall be misunderstood. While presuppositions or prejudgments of some kind are the necessary conditions of science, it is also required for successful study in any department of investigation that the scientist should be aware of his presuppositions and understand their precise nature. It is necessary also that what is assumed at first should at every stage stand the test of working value, and be retained or rejected according to its success or failure to stand such test. This also holds good in theology. If its presuppositions are found to impart intelligibility and rational coherency to divine truth, and to give such truth a reasonable place within the general domain of truth, they ought to be maintained to the end as valid. But if they fail in these respects, if they reduce the theological mind to lawlessness and chaos, and produce a hopeless conflict between revealed truth and other truth, they must be surrendered or modified. Irrational science is not science at all, and no conceptions of truth can be taken seriously as credible which are in hopeless contradiction with truth in other direc-

tions. God is the final source of truth, and He cannot contradict Himself. Reason is God-given, and cannot without sophistry be used in the interests of propositions really inconsistent with each other. No doubt we must acknowledge the presence of mystery — of that which transcends our reason — but the human mind can distinguish between propositions whose harmony transcends our understanding and those whose mutual contradiction is clear.

We conclude, then, that theology, in common with other sciences, requires the acceptance of certain presuppositions before it can be developed or mastered rightly.

§ 8. (*a*) In the first place, a theologian must take for granted at the outset the contents of that philosophy of common sense, above described, which constitutes the necessary condition of all intelligible experience and rational thought whatsoever. That philosophy includes the assumption that human reason is itself to be trusted as touching its fundamental laws, so that whatever knowledge is attained correctly on the basis of such an assumption is to be taken as true knowledge.

The peculiar sphere of the theologian's investigation, and the divine assistance upon which he depends, do not and cannot subvert the laws of his mind or the assumptions which are native to human intelligence. Faith, as we have seen, is not a separate organ of apprehension, having unique laws of its own, but is a genuine department and exercise of the natural human reason, directed on divine things and assisted without

being subverted by supernatural grace.[1] That our reason does not lose its trustworthiness when exercised upon divine things, and assisted in such exercise by divine grace, is one of the specific assumptions of theology. This assumption is often overlooked and even denied by metaphysical thinkers and theologians, but the truth and validity of theology depends upon its validity, and no sound theologian denies it in practice, however much he may disregard it in his speculative philosophy.

§ 9. (*b*) Theologians also assume the objective reality of religion and of its necessary implicates — the validity of moral distinctions, the truth of man's accountability, the being of God as the supreme Ruler and Judge, a future life, and the possibility and fact of divine revelation. Such assumptions constitute the *præambula fidei*[2] or premises which are taken for granted in approaching a study of divine revelation, although verifiable also by means of its contents.

§ 10. (*c*) Theologians necessarily assume the trustworthiness, inerrancy, and absolute authority of divine revelation. Out of a preliminary study of this revelation, the authentication of which comes through various lines of proof, emerge certain conclusions which stand by themselves as conditions of sacred study rather than as articles of faith in the strict sense. These conclu-

[1] See ch. iv. § 2.

[2] St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, II. II. ii. 4. These truths he says are both assumed and published by revelation, apart from which they would be discovered only by a few, after long labour, and with liability to error. *Gratia*, however, *naturam non tollit, sed perfecit.*

sions become a part of the presuppositions of catholic theology. They are, in brief, (*a*) the inherent and absolute teaching authority of Jesus Christ, the Word of God Incarnate; (*b*) the derived authority of the Catholic Church to exercise a dogmatic office and to determine controversies of faith, this authority being accepted as trustworthy and final, on earth, by reason of the sure guidance of God's Holy Spirit; (*c*) the divine inspiration of Holy Scripture in general and in every part — an inspiration which is limited in purpose, but which, *within the limits of that purpose*, affords an inerrant literature touching divine things.[1]

§ 11. We are confronted at this point by the difficulty that the second of these presuppositions is rejected by protestant theologians. But the difficulty is not insuperable. A comparison between catholic and protestant theology brings out an instructive contrast. Catholic theologians have been divided into opposing ecclesiastical camps for centuries, and this division is accentuated by many an anathema as well as by race differences, and by diverging forms of thought and theological expression. But in the midst of these adverse conditions, and in spite of the loss of a cosmopolitan or ecumenical atmosphere in which theologians might interchange their views for friendly comparison, the consent of catholic theologians (*i.e.*, of those who accept ecclesiastical authority) covers a wide area of divine truth, this area comprehending all that the ancients held to be necessary for salvation. We

[1] The subject of authority will be treated of in our second volume.

cannot here enter upon particulars, but careful study of this point will astonish many, and should suggest the probability that a concurrence in theological conclusions which remains undisturbed by ages of mutual hostility and ecclesiastical estrangement cannot be accounted for without conceding scientific value to the presuppositions which have issued in such a result.

On the other hand, protestant theologians are in much closer touch with each other than are the theologians of the divided Catholic Church. Their sects are innumerable, it is true; but a certain mutual comity has survived, strengthened by a common interest, as against Rome and the apostolic Churches generally, and by the generally accepted formal principle that the Scriptures constitute the sole source and rule of faith. But, in spite of this comity, and in the face of modern and undenominational cosmopolitanism in protestant theology, the dissidence of dissenters increases, and perpetual and kaleidoscopic change of opinion on central truths prevails in every direction. All consent to protest and criticise, but the common and positive beliefs of protestant theologians grow continually more insignificant.

It seems to be a fair inference from this contrast between the secure agreement of catholic theologians and the feverish unrest and divergence of protestant theologians, that the presupposition which distinguishes catholic from protestant theology constitutes one at least of the conditions of success in attaining theological results capable of standing the test of time, schism, and

divergence of thought and expression. The further conclusion is suggested that the failure of protestant theologians to attain concurrent and lasting results has much to do with the tendency in certain protestant quarters to reject the scientific claim of theology.

§ 12. Such, then, are the chief presuppositions of catholic theology, and of this work. They are recognized to be presuppositions, and consequently are continually being put to the test of their working value. And this testing is along practical lines. It takes the form especially of application to the spiritual life. Divine truth affords the philosophy of true religion; and if what purports to be divine truth is found to be a satisfying guide in religious practice, the only available test has been successfully applied. Life within the Catholic Church, based on sacramental grace and controlled by catholic discipline, is the application to life of the presuppositions and contents of catholic theology. A multitude of saints whom no man can number have by common consent lived this life, and thus have come to know this doctrine[1] that it "works" and is true.

III. *Catholic Temper and Balance*

§ 13. Theologians have urgent need of a catholic temper and balance. By this is meant freedom from narrow and partisan bigotry, and the capacity to hold with proportionate emphasis the diverse and opposite truths of revelation. In short they must rightly divide

[1] St. John vii. 17; viii. 12.

the word of truth, comparing spiritual things with spiritual and holding them together.[1] They must be spiritually broad-minded and level-headed — impossible without divine grace.

Now, the most superficial minds can see that broad-mindedness is desirable. But the very obviousness of its value leads often to inadequate and misleading views of its nature. It is apt to be perverted into a false liberalism — the very opposite of true breadth of mind. The interests of true theology require that we should distinguish carefully between real breadth and what has popularly but falsely been mistaken for it.

§ 14. Some of the catch phrases of liberalism are (*a*) catholic spirit; (*b*) progressive interpretation; (*c*) toleration; and (*d*) comprehension.

(*a*) A "catholic spirit" ought to mean a combination of steadfast and intelligent loyalty to the catholic faith and religion, with a sympathetic realization, grounded in divine charity and grace, of the limitations which hinder men from laying hold upon the fulness of revealed truth. As often taken, it leads many to a sacrifice of loyalty to exact truth in the interests of counterfeit charity and false unity — as if charity could flourish on an erroneous foundation, or unity be preserved without interior agreement touching vital truth. The confusion of thought which the modern systems of protestantism have introduced has led many to regard such agreement as impossible. They have come to look upon the conflicting creeds as on a dead level,

[1] 2 Tim. ii. 15; 1 Cor. ii. 13.

both of merit and non-finality — as expressing for the time being so many diverse aspects of truth which human minds are incapable of holding together in just proportion and permanent terms. Divine truth, they say, is too profound to be grasped except in fragmentary and imperfect forms, forms which must undergo constant modification with the advance of human intelligence. They deny that any of its elements can be defined once for all. Naturally they regard an insistence upon test words of orthodoxy as both mistaken and uncharitable.[1]

Now, it has been acknowledged that the truths of our religion are mysterious, that is, but partially understood by human minds.[2] But this does not mean that our partial knowledge is indeterminate and incapable of precise definition. It means simply this, that what we can know of divine things, precise though it be, is incipient, carrying our minds clearly enough to a certain point but leaving our knowledge inexhaustive and limited. What we can know can be, and in a measure has been, defined in terms capable of permanent justification and fixedness of interpretation. The catholic spirit requires among other things an acceptance of all such definitions, and persistent effort to persuade men of their truth and saving value. The consent of catholics of every race and clime, which, as we have shown, persists in spite of distressing schisms and loss

[1] Such is Sabatier's position, in *Religions of Authority;* and Réville's, in *Liberal Christianity.*

[2] See ch. v. pp. 139–140.

of charity, is a standing proof that permanent agreement touching dogmatic truth is possible among men.

§ 15. (*b*) "Progressive interpretation" stands among the so-called liberal theologians for the contention that, if ancient Creeds are to be retained, they must be held with new and larger meanings, suited to advancing thought. Thus, when the Nicene Fathers declared that the Son of God is ὁμοούσιος, of the same essence, with the Father, they assumed that the divine and human natures are ἑτερούσιαι, mutually diverse; and meant that our Lord is divine in a sense not true, even in a lesser degree, of other men. In our day many are asserting pantheistically an essential oneness of the divine and human, and agree to the term ὁμοούσιος as signifying that our Lord's oneness of essence with the Father means the perfection of His manhood simply. They add that all men are really ὁμοούσιοι with God, although this co-essentiality is obscured and unrealized because of our imperfections.[1]

All this is revolutionary, and is equivalent to the adoption of a new and anti-Christian belief under dishonest pretences. "Fixedness of interpretation is of the essence of the Creeds." Their language, if true originally, remains true in its original sense forever; if false in its original meaning, should be abandoned for truer language. Such is the course of honour as well as of faithfulness. The Creeds of the Church may indeed take on wider bearings and implications with

[1] Something like this appears in Heber Newton's *Church and Creed.*

the progress of knowledge and the addition of new realms of fact to be illumined by them. But these implications lie outside the strict content of the Creeds. The ancient faith is not a mutable or growing thing. It contains truths which were delivered once for all, and were revealed for the permanent guidance of souls seeking the way of life.[1] To insist upon such truths

[1] The American House of Bishops authorized six of its members to issue a pastoral in 1894, and this pastoral was duly accepted by the House in its pastoral of 1895, and printed in the Journal. See *Journal of the Gen. Convention* of 1895, pp. 382; 411 *et seq.* They say, p. 417: "The Creeds of the Catholic Church do not represent the contemporaneous thought of any age; they declare eternal truths, telling what God has taught man and done for man, rather than what man has thought out for himself about God. . . . Grave peril to souls lies in the acceptance of the letter of the Creeds in any other than the plain and definitely historical sense in which they have been interpreted by the consentient voice of the Church in all ages. Fixedness of interpretation is of the essence of the Creeds, whether we view them as statements of facts, or as dogmatic truths founded upon and deduced from these facts, and once for all determined by the operation of the Holy Ghost upon the mind of the Church. It were derogatory to the same Blessed Spirit to suggest that any other than the original sense of the Creeds may be lawfully held and taught."

There is no insuperable difficulty in ascertaining what is the meaning of each article of the Creeds that binds. It is in each case the meaning which the article must have had grammatically and historically when imposed by the Church. Thus the article on the Virgin-Birth was historically intended to assert a fact, that our Lord was born of a virgin, without earthly father. The language used is not capable of other meaning. An interpretation which involves a denial of the fact there asserted is not habilitated by being called spiritual. It is simply a contradiction of the article.

One article uses figurative language, "right hand of the Father." Our knowledge of immemorial Christian belief teaches us that it

and upon their immutability is not narrowness, but enlightened regard for the interests of mankind.

§ 16. (*c*) "Toleration" is highly to be commended when it signifies a recognition in conduct of the principle laid down by our Lord that the truths of the Gospel are to be spread by preaching and persuasion,

must have been meant to be figurative, for God has never been thought by the Church to have a right hand. Therefore, to interpret it figuratively, as signifying the exaltation of Christ's Person after his ascension, is to preserve the original meaning of the Creed.

The article on our Lord's resurrection is historically, and by obvious linguistic interpretation, meant to assert more than personal survival. It is a recovery from death at a certain interval after death. "He rose again." The meaning intended is contradicted by a denial of His reassumption of His body from the grave.

Again, when we profess to believe "One Catholic and Apostolic Church," the proposition is limited and has nothing to do with theories touching the extent and headship on earth of the Church. All that pertains to theological conclusions outside the actual assertions of the Creed. We profess simply to believe the Church which has historically been known as One, Catholic and Apostolic — an entity easily to be identified.

Finally, when we "look for the resurrection of the dead," or believe in "the resurrection of the body," we say no more than we say, and what we say has a meaning capable of historical and grammatical proof. We may think that such a resurrection requires a reassemblage of bodily particles — the same as were buried in the grave. But that is not asserted in the Creed. It is an inference of the believer which he is left free to abandon in the light of wider physical knowledge of the body. What we may not say, without impugning the truth set forth in the Creed, is this: that our bodies will not rise again from death.

These are but samples to illustrate the rationality of the contention that we can in our day accept the Creeds in their original meaning. We cannot accept them in any other without in fact repudiating their teaching.

without resort to compulsion. Unhappily, the alliance between Church and state in Constantine's time sowed the seeds of another policy, in which persecution and physical force were employed against heretics and unbelievers. What was sown in the wind came to be reaped in a whirlwind. Mistaken modes of propagating truth have led by inevitable reaction to a repudiation of the means of spiritual discipline whereby the truth is preserved in the Church's own pulpits.[1]

Toleration has come to mean an allowance of erroneous teaching by those who are ordained for the purpose of officially propagating the Church's faith. This goes quite beyond toleration, or the recognition of a man's inalienable right to be guided by his own persuasions in the attainment of religious knowledge. It means that the Church should not only tolerate error in this sense, but should bless it with privileges which require a true faith for their safe enjoyment, and should connive at the propagation of error in her own name. To depose and excommunicate those who persist in endeavouring to draw men away from the Church's faith is not to curtail the right of personal conviction or true freedom of thought, for the exercise of such right does not depend upon ecclesiastical privilege. Rather it is to protect the Church herself in fulfilling the divine purpose of her being, and the faithful in undisturbed enjoyment of immutable truth. The

[1] Brooks' *Lectures on Toleration* fall into this mistake. For a suggestive treatment of the whole subject see Creighton's *Persecution and Tolerance*.

Church must speak the truth at all costs. She ought to "speak the truth in love." [1] But she cannot speak falsely in love, nor will genuine charity permit her to allow her ministers to propagate error in her name.

A specious objection needs to be considered. It is said that a man's Churchmanship is a spiritual birthright which he must retain at all hazards, and that his share in divinely instituted privileges may not be nullified by humanly devised discipline.[2] The answer is clear. The discipline referred to has been created by God-given authority, and has for its purpose to secure that the Church shall continue to be what she was established to be — a divinely instituted propaganda of revealed truth.[3] All the rights of her members are conditioned by this essential element in her constitution. No one may strive to convert her into an open court of debate with impunity, for she is either a divine propaganda of the faith committed to her by God, or she is no longer the Church of God. If she is to con-

[1] Ephes. iv. 15.

[2] This was urged by the counsel for the defence in the recent trial of Dr. Crapsey at Batavia, New York.

[3] Says Creighton, *Persecution and Tolerance*, pp. 126, 127, "The Church is a witness to the Truth, and her primary duty is to see that her witness is true. The means by which she is to accomplish that duty is to see that no teaching is given under her authority which contradicts or impairs the essential elements of that Truth committed to her charge. To those who claim an irresponsible liberty of speculation, the Church must always seem intolerant, for she must deny such a claim. Of such it has been well said: 'They confuse the right of the individual to be free with the duty of the institution to be something' (Amiel, *Journal Intimè*, ii. 59)."

tinue to be what God has made her to be, she must protect her faith from subversion by those under her authority by such measures as circumstances may require — even if deposition or excommunication result.

It is also objected that repressive measures never make for the persuasion of men, but always for exasperation, a crystallization of the views sought to be suppressed, and sympathy in behalf of the victim of ecclesiastical tyranny. Truth should be propagated by persuasion, and other methods are doomed to failure.[1] Such an objection is based on misconception. The discipline here called repressive, when wisely administered — *abusus usum non tollit* — is brought to bear on those who have refused to be persuaded by the Church or her chief pastors, and who are subverting the very machinery by which the persuasion of others is undertaken. The discipline of heretics is not an instrument of persuasion, nor is it put in motion on such supposition. It is, however, a means, made necessary by human obstinacy and spiritual insubordination, for removing obstacles to the Church's propaganda and to the persuasion of others — obstacles that would prove fatal if allowed to continue unremoved. It remains that liberty of conviction is not tampered with. What is rightly subjected to discipline is the attempt to use ecclesiastical privilege and function for the purpose of subverting the Church's propaganda of truth.

[1] Also urged in the Crapsey trial.

§ 17. (*d*) The "comprehension" which liberal writers advocate is an extreme development of the false toleration which we have been considering. It means that the Church should welcome all professing Christians unto her membership, and give them her privileges without reference to their acceptance of her faith and submission to her divinely appointed ways. This policy is a caricature of the principle laid down by our Lord that the Church should gather fish of every kind into her net.[1] That principle is indeed one which the Church may not disregard, but it is coupled by our Lord with the conditions of faith and repentance, that is, of acceptance of the faith once for all delivered to the saints, and forsaking of one's own way for the way which the Church was established to inculcate. This way cannot be maintained without the exercise of a real disciplinary authority, and no discipline can be effective which men may defy to the end without loss of ecclesiastical status.

There is an unconscious but sad humour in the attitude of dissenters of to-day towards the Church of God. They have rejected her ways, ways which she teaches to be necessary for the maintenance of saving truth and grace, and then accuse her of narrowness and uncharitable bigotry because she will not "unchurch" herself to comply with their revolutionary demands.[2]

[1] St. Matt. xiii. 47.

[2] We do not mean to deny the earnest sincerity of dissenters. Their position is an inherited one, and carries with it certain prepossessions that hinder them from perceiving the historical significance of dissent.

Unfortunately, these demands find some support from misguided Churchmen. No doubt the failure of charity which bore fruit in the organization and perpetuation of dissenting bodies did not occur altogether on one side. The hierarchy of bygone days did not always regard the principle of striving not to quench a smoking flax, and employed methods which savoured of external tyranny. But the faith and order of the Church is divine, constituting a "sacred deposit" which is "incapable of compromise or surrender." [1] Accordingly, while charity must be restored, the only road to visible unity is along the ancient paths of the Catholic Church and religion. When the Christian world becomes persuaded of this, visible unity will become possible, and not before.

§ 18. The position of liberalism which we have been considering is narrow to a degree, and would not be mistaken for breadth, if men were in the habit of going beneath the surface of things. A broad mind fosters a catholic spirit, but this means the spirit of the catholic religion — the only religion which is suited to all men's needs. It is progressive, not because it modifies the ancient foundations of truth, but because it enters more and more adequately into the bearing of the Creeds on related departments of truth and life. It is tolerant in that it respects every man's personal liberty, and seeks to propagate truth by simple persuasion, while incapable of seeming to make terms

[1] See *Declaration on Unity*, issued by the American Bishops, *Gen. Convention Journal*, 1886, p. 80.

with error. It seeks to extend the benefits of truth and grace to all mankind, but not by methods that are likely to extinguish the light of truth forever, if generally employed. It is above all things charitable, while realizing that full-orbed truth is the necessary basis of charity.

§ 19. Genuine catholicity and balance is exceedingly rare, and is easily misconceived. Yet the interests of a true theology are bound up with it. A further exposition of its nature and requirements seems desirable. A survey of the chief forms of narrow and unbalanced tempers will perhaps prove serviceable to this end.

(*a*) First in order comes *the partisan temper*. The truths of religion, as we have seen, are but partially understood, and the partial nature of our knowledge leaves a certain appearance of opposition between truths and counter truths. These oppositions represent our inability to grasp the grounds of harmony which must be assumed to exist between all truths whatsoever. Thus we learn that our Lord is very God and very Man, and yet that in Him the Godhead and Manhood have but one personal Subject. We can lay hold of each of the two factors in this mystery, but are quite unequal to explaining how God and Man are one Christ.[1] Now the partisan in the presence of such seeming oppositions of truth surrenders his mind and life to one truth, while neglecting and disparaging more

[1] There is a splendid though brief treatment of the necessity to hold truth and counter truth together in the Introduction of Dr. Thos. Richey's *Truth and Counter Truth*.

or less the other. He may start with a laudable motive. He may see that the truth which he emphasizes so one-sidedly is in danger of obscuration. But his partisanship lies in a loss of balance, and an inability or unwillingness to leave sufficient room in his mind and language for a just maintenance of both sides of truth.

Partisans are found in every school and every so-called party. This does not mean that every one who is described by a party name is a partisan or lacking in balance. One needs only to contend for particular truths to be looked upon as belonging to a party, but it is possible to do this in a manner which does not disturb the proportion and analogy of the faith. The essence of partisanship is one-sidedness, as expressed in exaggerated presentations of single truths or groups of truth, tending to obscure counter truths.

The partisan picks and chooses among truths, instead of cherishing the entire faith and practice of the Church, and is apt to become heretical. Heresy means choice of a truth to maintain, accompanied by actual rejection of counter truth.[1] Arius maintained the sonship of our Lord at the expense of His co-essential Godhead. Apollinaris exalted the Godhead of Christ at the expense

[1] We are concerned here with the ecclesiastical use of the term, rather than that of the New Testament. The distinction should be noted between formal and material heresy. Heresy becomes formal only when some explicit dogma of the Church is consciously and avowedly rejected — that is, when a position is explicitly adopted which the Church has declared to be heretical. Material heresy is any real rejection of catholic doctrine, whether dogmatically defined or no. See ch. viii. § 6 for a further consideration of heresy.

of His complete Manhood. Nestorius championed the duality of natures in Christ at the expense of His personal unity. Eutyches and his monophysite successors of every age maintain the personal unity at the expense of one or both of our Lord's two natures and twofold operations. So it has been all along. Each heretic has fastened his mind exclusively on some isolated truth, both caricaturing what he maintains and denying some other article of the faith. He is narrow, one-sided, and uncatholic altogether. Yet he is merely a partisan "writ large." So far as the forms of reason are concerned he is often logical, but by starting with inadequate and one-sided premises he is truly illogical. Thus, Calvinism is a supremely logical system formally speaking, but by starting with the divine aspect of salvation to the neglect of human probation the Calvinist is materially illogical as well as heretical.

A common form of partisan and heretical narrowness is the reactionary temper. This is the fruit of impatience at the presence of error, and leads to an attempt to recover suppressed truth without taking into account the truth which the original heresy has caricatured. Thus, reaction often issues in turn in heresy of its own, and such heresy is "the vengeance of suppressed truth." There should be no such vengeance. Heresy cannot be remedied by reactionary methods, but only by a right division of the word of truth. The reaction of Apollinarianism was no true cure of Arianism, nor was that of Eutychianism a remedy for Nestorianism. The true way was pursued by Leo in his great Tome,

and by the Council of Chalcedon, which enunciated truth and counter-truth together, without attempting the impossible task of solving the problem of their unity.

Every age has suffered from reactionaries, whose narrow-minded impatience has wounded the Body of Christ. Unguarded reactions against mediæval corruption produced modern dissent, and the same narrow temper accounts for many a sad surrender to Roman claims in order to escape Anglican difficulties. Difficulties are found in every part of the Church on earth.

§ 20. Partisanship, heresy, and reactionary violence cause much distress among gentle souls, and by their turmoil raise dangerous questions as to the possibility of maintaining a catholic faith which shall be true and afford permanent guidance to all the faithful. Dogma becomes confused in men's minds with the passing shibboleths of contending factions, and suffers deplorable disparagement. Thus appears the latitudinarian or liberal temper. We have already considered its characteristic principles and have endeavoured to make clear their falsity.

(*b*) The *latitudinarian* professes to be broad-minded. He is in fact lamentably deficient in breadth. He contemplates only the surface of things, and misses altogether the meaning and importance of the catholic faith. His inevitable tendency is humanitarian and secular. He seeks truth in human philosophy, and continues to seek without arriving. Adopting a detached and therefore remote and undiscerning standpoint, he pities what he does not understand, and

evolves an interpretation of Christian history that is more plausible than true. He has facilitated the downgrade of protestantism, and would convert the Church of God into a mere philanthropic society, having only earthly and semi-political ends for its justification. He deals in large and earth-born generalities, and deceives many into supposing that a certain faith and a fixed order of supernatural grace and life is the "baseless fabric of a dream." The liberal temper is inconsistent with maintenance of any determinate and fixed body of doctrine. It is, therefore, more serious in its results than any other form of narrowness. Unfortunately, it is making much headway, being mightily aided by the confusing suddenness with which modern science has enlarged the bounds of secular thought.

§ 21. (*c*) There is a boldness displayed by liberalism which helps to disguise its weakness. But the same causes which have produced the latitudinarian temper in those who are in closer touch with modern thought than with ancient doctrine has caused a certain timidity in many of those who would cling to the faith and yet are confused by the doctrinal conflicts of our time. These have adopted the *via media*, or safe way between extremes,[1] as their guide — an opportunist's position, and a substitute for brave facing of every issue.[2]

[1] Ovid's *Medio tutissimus ibis*, is the catch phrase. We ought indeed to walk in safe paths, but to do so is not an adequate ideal. We should seek always to walk in the truth. Then safety comes as an incidental result.

[2] The late Dean Hook used the excellent figure of a ship at anchor, facing every opposing wind and current without drifting. So a

The *via media* was commended by Aristotle in the ethical sphere. He maintained that virtue is a mean between the extremes of excess and defect.[1] Generosity, for instance, is a mean between extravagance and miserliness; and temperance lies between excess and abstention. The Church of England applied the principle to determine her ritual usage. She sought in this regard "to keep the mean between the two extremes, of too much stiffness in refusing, and of too much easiness in admitting any variation" from her previous public liturgy.[2] Thus the phrase *via media* has in historical use referred wholly to matters of conduct which admit of degree.

It was the misfortune of Anglicans after the reformation to find themselves between two hostile forces. The Romanists ranked them with protestant dissenters generally, and the dissenters classed them with Romanists. Thus they came to occupy a middle position in a new sense — that is, they found themselves in the line of firing between the opposite forces of Romanism and dissent. It was certainly not the ideal of Anglicans thus to be placed between hostile camps, and such a *via media* can hardly be looked upon as other than an unhappy incident in the maintenance of an uncorrupt catholicity — and one which we pray

Christian should be anchored to the "ground of the truth," and face every wind of false doctrine, and every current of erroneous thought, without drifting.

[1] *Nicomachian Ethics*, Bk. II., ch. vi., vii.

[2] See Preface of the English *Book of Common Prayer*, opening words.

may be dissolved some day into unity of faith and love.

Such a condition of things, however, tends to produce insularity of mind, and a strong prejudice against the doctrinal language employed by Rome and dissent, even when such language is sound in itself. So the phrase *via media* came to be applied to Anglican principles themselves, as describing their essential nature. This novel use of terms was adopted under stress of controversy by Newman during his Anglican days,[1] and has been favoured ever since by a certain class of Churchmen to signify their desire to avoid the extremes of Roman and protestant teaching.

Such a use of language is misleading, and tends to narrow the position of those who employ it. It has indeed been employed in senses which, if they agreed with the obvious and historical use of terms, would be defensible. Thus some writers use it to signify a comprehensive position, which accepts whatever is true in Roman and protestant theology, purified of one-sided caricature.[2] But the phrase *via media* is not obviously

[1] His *Lecs. on the Prophetical Office of the Church viewed relatively to Romanism and Popular Protestantism*, 1837, are dominated by this conception of Anglicanism. They are now published in the volumes entitled *Via Media*. Retractations are added.

[2] So Gore in *Roman Catholic Claims*, ch. i. He says, "the Church was for this very reason called the 'via media' because she held her way between opposite extremes, *persisting in holding together* a complex scriptural idea or truth which one-sided heresies would have torn asunder." (Italics ours.) He is mistaken in saying "It was

applicable to such a position, for its natural implication is exclusive rather than comprehensive.

Again, the phrase might be used to indicate that we are to reject whatever either adds to or subtracts from the ancient faith. But, while we should undoubtedly do so, this is not the ordinary sense in which it is adopted, nor does such use escape the disadvantage which inheres in the term protestant, considered as describing an ideal — that is, its purely negative significance. To define our position by what we reject must have a narrowing effect upon ourselves.

The phrase is often employed in the vague sense of moderation in doctrine. In short, an attempt is made to take over the ethical principle of virtuous degree into the sphere of doctrine. This is highly confusing, and stands too often for a timid and vacillating temper. There is no such thing in reality as moderate doctrine. Doctrine is either true or false. To speak of its being moderately or immoderately true is absurd. There should indeed be a moderate and judicious *temper* in the assertion of truth, but truth itself is neither moderate nor immoderate; nor can the term extreme be applied properly to a doctrine at all, except by confusing it with the temper of those who maintain it. We may indeed reject an over extreme (which means exclusive) manner of emphasis upon a truth; but if the truth thus mishandled is true, we may not rightly reject it as itself

a phrase in which the Church of old gloried as a proper description of her position." She indeed gloried in her comprehensive retention of truths, but not in the phrase *via media*.

extreme, or because its present maintainers adopt an extreme temper and caricature it.

Our ideal should be positive and impartial. We should accept all that is true, all that belongs demonstrably to the explicit or implicit content of the ancient faith, even though this should associate us in ignorant and prejudiced minds with those who have disturbed the proportions of the faith. The *via media* tends to isolate, provincialize and narrow those who maintain it, unless they maintain it in what we have shown to be an unnatural and unhistoric sense, and it also misleads others.

§ 22. We come again at last to the catholic temper, the only true temper of a theologian. We have indicated what it is negatively. It is free from impulsive one-sidedness, and consequently neither heretical in tendency, nor given to reactionary impulse. It is not deceived by the conflict and ephemeral nature of modern systems of doctrine, nor led to suppose that catholic dogma can ever cease to be true and vital in its practical bearing. It does not confound charity with indifference to truth, or the catholicity of the Church with disregard of the conditions which she is required by her divine Head to exact of those who would partake of her grace. Finally, it is not afraid to accept and maintain in their integrity those truths which have been unduly emphasized and caricatured by others, but avoids insularity and provincialism of every type.

Positively the catholic temper involves that a theologian should take his stand fearlessly, scientifically,

and discreetly at the centre of things. The orthodox thought of every age is his inheritance, and, while he should cling especially to those truths which have come down from the beginning, no legitimate development of theology is withdrawn from his consideration and use, whether ancient, mediæval, or modern.

Again, every theologian owes a peculiar loyalty to that part of the Church which, by reason of providential circumstances, is entitled to his obedience. Of this we shall speak again. Yet, as a catholic theologian, he should keep in touch with catholic theology, wherever it is to be found, sharing in the entire intellectual wealth of the Church of God. While loyal to his own portion of Church, he should breathe an ecumenical atmosphere, and help his neighbours to breathe the same.

The true catholic theologian is limited to no age and to no provincial bound. He has, in fact, no theological limitation except the rule of faith and the purpose of rightly dividing the word of truth, with due regard for the limitations of those among whom he serves his priesthood. The glories which are spread before his contemplation transcend the capacity of little minds to discover, whether partisan, heretical, liberal, so-called, or insular. The number of such theologians is, alas, but small. Perhaps it is necessarily so. But no theologian has a right to acquiesce complacently in a lower or narrower ideal.

CHAPTER VII

PROVINCIALISM

I. *Anglican Authority*

§ 1. There is a provincialism which means insularity, and which involves inevitable narrowness of mind and poverty in practice. But every catholic Christian, and therefore every catholic theologian, is under obligation to exhibit cheerful loyalty to the provincial authority under which God has placed him,[1] and to keep in edifying touch with the faithful and the local conditions of his own portion of the Catholic Church. He has obligations toward his immediate co-religionists which he cannot satisfy if he holds himself aloof, as it were, from their religious thought and life. The chief virtue of Christian life is charity, and this should begin at home. Again, genuine charity involves the grace of sympathy, and this requires real touch with the conditions of those about us. In short, there is a kind of provincialism which is not the fruit of narrowness at all, but of whole-hearted acceptance of one's particular vocation and place in the Lord's vineyard. This pro-

[1] Ecclesiastical authority will be considered at large in our next volume. It is here treated of in certain provincial aspects, because of their bearing on the principles of theological study, now being considered.

vincialism needs consideration, in order that we may understand how to combine provincial loyalty with ecumenical breadth and catholic temper, and that without inconsistency — how, in particular, to be a catholic theologian and at the same time a loyal Anglican.

§ 2. The obligation of a theologian to his own provincial obedience is twofold. In the first place, it is his duty to render ungrudging obedience in all things lawful to the ecclesiastical authority to which he is immediately subject. The Catholic Church exercises her authority over him, in fact, through provincial and diocesan channels.[1] Presumptively and normally, the authority of the hierarchy and canon law of his own province and diocese is for him the authority of the Church universal. Thus, if the Anglican hierarchy is indeed a catholic hierarchy and lawfully set over us, we cannot be good catholics unless we are also good Anglicans. This is said necessarily under one limitation. All catholic authority is based upon and limited by the essential faith and order of the Catholic Church, so that no particular portion of the Church may lawfully impose what is in evident conflict therewith. But such conflict must be shown to exist beyond reasonable doubt, before one may rightly hesitate to render canonical obedience.

In the second place, a theologian ought to accomplish

[1] St. Cyprian's treatise on the *Unity of the Church* bases ecclesiastical unity on the episcopate as represented in each several jurisdiction by its own hierarchy. "The episcopate is one, each part of which is held by each one for the whole." ch. 5.

his work in a manner suited to those conditions which actually prevail among the faithful of his own God-given constituency. It is the vocation of an Anglican theologian to labour for the edification of Anglicans, and this means that he must adjust his modes of expression, and his practices as well, to the lines of thought and practice which Anglicans are able to lay hold of, in view of their provincial and hereditary circumstances and limitations. This holds good in spite of the need that he should preserve an ecumenical breadth and point of view. In short, to accommodate oneself in good faith to providential circumstances, and to the particular mission involved in them, is an essential part of catholic obedience.

§ 3. The writer believes sincerely that the Anglican hierarchy is truly catholic, that it has retained the essentials of catholic faith and order, and that it is entitled by divine appointment and providential circumstances to his canonical obedience and steadfast loyalty. He believes further that this obligation of obedience and loyalty rests upon all, whether clerical or lay, learned or ignorant, whose providential birth and training has made them Anglicans. The particulars of such obligation should be studied carefully.

The submission to authority which is involved is both doctrinal and practical. Happily, such submission includes, according to the express language of our formularies, an acceptance of the Creeds and Ecumenical Councils of the undivided Catholic Church. Moreover, the formal principle of the Anglican reformation

is an appeal to antiquity, or to that teaching which has prevailed in the universal Church from primitive days. It follows that Anglicans are committed to whatsoever can be shown to be included in such teaching, whether defined in ecumenical formularies or not.

Anglicans are also under an obligation of loyalty to the peculiar formularies of their own communion, it always being assumed that they do not demonstrably contradict the faith of the universal Church. Thus, the doctrines inculcated and implied in the Book of Common Prayer, as well as those contained in the Articles of Religion, ought to be adhered to, whether formal subscription to them is required or not. It is clearly inconsistent with any adequate notion of Anglican loyalty to dispute or reject such teachings, and loyalty pertains to all the faithful, whether clerical or lay. The clergy, as appointed to teach and as presumably capable of making intelligently an explicit and theological profession of belief, are required in various ways to engage solemnly that they will conform to the doctrine of that portion of the Church in which they minister.[1]

[1] In the American Church, Article VIII. of the Constitution of the General Convention requires every one, "consecrated Bishop, or ordered Priest or Deacon," at the time of his ordination to "subscribe and make the following declaration:"

"I do believe the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments to be the Word of God, and to contain all things necessary to salvation; and I do solemnly engage to conform to the Doctrine, Discipline, and Worship of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America."

Whenever one is ordered Priest he is asked before the congrega-

The condition has been here recognized that the teachings of a particular Church must not be inconsistent with the faith of the universal Church. Fortunately the Anglican communion accepted this principle at the time of the reformation in unmistakable ways [1]; and, in spite of the vagaries of parties and schools, has never forsaken it. We are bound, therefore, in the absence of certain proof to the contrary, to interpret

tion, "Will you then give your faithful diligence always so to minister the Doctrine and Sacraments, and the Discipline of Christ, as the Lord hath commanded, and as this Church hath received the same, according to the Commandments of God"; etc. The candidate is required to answer, "I will so do by the help of the Lord."

The clergy of the English Church, besides making an ordination vow similar to the above, are required to assent to the Thirty-Nine Articles.

[1] Stat. 23 Henry VIII. ch. 20 says, "Our said sovereign the king and all his natural subjects, as well spiritual as temporal, continue to be as obedient, devout, catholic, and humble children of God and holy Church as any people be within any realm christened." The Convocation of 1571, which finally imposed the Articles, enjoined preachers by a Canon to "teach nothing . . . which they should require to be devoutly held or believed by the people except what is agreeable to the doctrine of the Old and New Testaments, and what the ancient fathers and catholic Bishops have collected out of that said doctrine." Article XX. asserts the "authority of the Church in controversies of faith." The English Canon XXX. asserts that the Anglican Church does not intend "to forsake or reject the Churches of Italy, France, Spain, and Germany," where these Churches have not fallen from "their ancient integrity and from the apostolical Churches." The ancient ecumenical Creeds are faithfully retained. Our American Bishops in 1886 appealed to the principles of the undivided Church of ancient days, in their Declaration on Unity, as constituting a "sacred deposit," "incapable of compromise or surrender."

Anglican formularies as intended to be consistent with catholic doctrine.[1]

§ 4. Phrases can be found in both the Prayer Book and the Articles of Religion which are either obscure or ambiguous. And they have been taken by many in anti-catholic senses. The position here taken is that they are not rightly interpreted thus, and that their obscurity is due to a cause which leaves us free to regard a catholic interpretation as the true and legitimate one.

It is well established that the Articles of Religion were imposed as an eirenicon, rather than as a Confession of Faith in the usual sense of that phrase.[2] Their purpose was defined in their title as "the avoiding of diversities of opinions, and for the establishing of consent touching true religion." The conditions which gave them birth were exceedingly critical and unfavourable to the imposition of precise definitions. Much error, no doubt, prevailed, but the pressing danger of the hour did not take the form of well-defined and coherent heresy, such as might be shut out by deliberate and precise definitions of doctrine. But the difficulty to be met was of violent controversy touching many matters of unequal importance, which seemed likely to destroy the Church of England if not speedily quieted. Some of the questions at issue were

[1] See Palmer, *The Church*, Vol. II. pp. 283–285.

[2] See Palmer, *The Church*, Vol. II. pp. 266 *et seq.* What he says as to Rome's eirenical method of dealing with the theory of the immaculate conception of the B. V. was true then, but does not hold now.

of a speculative nature, admitting, therefore, of no dogmatic settlement.

Other differences existed which bore directly on the acceptance or rejection of catholic doctrine, and under different circumstances they could have been dealt with by means of precise and exclusive statements. But much confusion prevailed; and the authorities judged, whether wisely or no, that the interests both of peace and orthodoxy could be secured by the imposition of general statements, thought to be capable of acceptance by Marians and protestants alike, and by an insistence upon uniformity in worship. This policy was dictated by political as well as religious considerations. Queen Elizabeth herself pushed it through, and we know that she hoped to retain the Marians in the English Church, in spite of their attachment to Romish teaching.

The Thirty Nine Articles are, therefore, essentially articles of peace. They cannot, in view of the policy which determined their final shape,[1] be regarded rightly

[1] The personal intentions of legistators have binding force only so far as unambiguously defined in what is finally enacted. This is true of both civil and ecclesiastical law. It is not what Cranmer and Parker intended that binds, or what the others intended who had to do with framing and adopting the Articles of Religion. It is rather the existing language of the Articles themselves, interpreted grammatically and strictly.

Thanks to the unseen guidance of the Holy Spirit, the Church's corporate utterances transcend in wisdom the minds and intentions of individuals and majorities. The form of ecclesiastical procedure in legislation is by majority vote. Thus majorities are said to rule; but the mind that prevails by means of, sometimes in spite of, majorities is the mind of the body corporate, which is Spirit guided. So it was in the Ecumenical Councils, and so it is in every age.

as intended to innovate upon the traditional faith of the Church of England. They were designed to shelve controversies which seemed to be incapable of more satisfactory treatment. It remains that the Articles open with a clear and unambiguous reaffirmation of the primary doctrines of the faith, as contained in the Creeds and decrees of the undisputed General Councils.[1] And even in the more vague Articles care was taken to avoid committing the Church to the errors then chiefly prevalent, of popular mediævalism, Calvinism, Zwinglianism, and Anabaptism.

It may be acknowledged that terms and phrases may be found in certain of the Articles which betray a desire not to force an issue with Calvinists. But that the Articles are really Calvinistic can be disproved by a close scrutiny of these phrases, which are carefully purged of assertions peculiar to Calvinism. It can also be proved by the subsequent attitude of Calvinists towards the Articles. They were dissatisfied with them, and tried without success to secure their modification.[2] The Westminster Confession was the out-

[1] In Articles I–V. Thus Art. I. defines the doctrine of the Trinity; Art. II., the Incarnation and sacrifice of Christ for our sins; Art. III., the descent into hell; Art. IV., the resurrection and ascension of Christ in flesh, and His second advent to judge mankind; Art. V., the doctrine of the Holy Spirit.

[2] Gibson, *XXXIX. Arts.*, Vol. I., pp. 47–56, bears this out. The attempt of the Calvinists to have the Lambeth Articles added in 1595 is significant. See Hardwick's History of the Articles, pp. 159 *et seq.* A further attempt was made in 1604 to have Art. XVI. amended. When the Puritans obtained political supremacy they tinkered with the Articles, and finally set forth the Westminster Con-

come of their discontent. The royal declaration of 1628, requiring that the Articles should be taken strictly in their grammatical sense,[1] was generally taken as working against Calvinistic interpretations. The notion that such interpretations were right was of later date, and was the result of the prevalence of evangelicalism. It did not gain footing until the memory of the original design of the Articles had been forgotten. In time, however, the Articles had come to be interpreted by the multitude in the light of eighteenth-century evangelical traditions. It was the predominance of these traditions that made the interpretations set forth by Newman in Tract XC. seem non-natural and disingenuous. The fact is that Newman reverted to the earlier and strictly grammatical meaning of the Articles — the only meaning that may be considered in legislative documents as binding. It cannot truly be denied that the more closely the language of the Articles is examined, the more satisfactory and sound its proper meaning appears.

The conclusion of the matter is that an acceptance

fession. These facts, "contrasted with the readiness of Laud and his party to appeal to the 'literal and grammatical sense of the Articles,' . . . indicate not obscurely that the interpretation placed upon the Articles by the Laudian school of divines and their successors is historically correct." Gibson, p. 56.

[1] The pertinent clause reads, "And that no man hereafter shall either print or preach to draw the article aside in any way, but shall submit to it in the plain and full meaning thereof; and shall not put his own sense or comment to be the meaning of the article, but shall take it in the literal and grammatical sense." Given as a prefatory document with the Articles in the English Prayer Book.

of the Thirty-nine Articles, in their original, official, and grammatical meaning, is consistent with a full and hearty acceptance of the catholic faith and religion. No doubt those who look for precise and determinative language on controversial points will be disappointed. An eirenicon is not likely to please those who desire clear definitions; and, when the circumstances of its origin have passed away, its terms become obscure and try the patience of many. Happily, no Anglican is obliged to regard the phraseology of the Articles as in every respect admirable. It is enough to recognize their official purpose, and to perceive that a catholic interpretation of them is in line with that purpose and also with their grammatical sense.[1]

[1] Palmer, *The Church*, Pt. IV. ch. xiv. § 3, bears this out. In § 1 he refers to Hall, *Cath. Propositions* (cited in Bull's Works, Vol. II. p. 212, Ed. Burton); Laud, *Conference*, s. 14; Bramhall, *Schism Guarded*, Works, p. 348; Stillingfleet, *Grounds of Protestant Relig.*, Pt. I. ch. 2; Sparrow, *Pref. to Collec. of Canons*, etc.; Bull, *Vindic. of the Ch. of Eng.*, Works, Vol. II. p. 211, Ed. Burton; Burnet, *XXXIX. Articles*, p. 7, Ed. 1737; Nichols, *Comty. on the Arts.*; Randolph, *Charge on . . . Requiring Subscription*, 1771; and Cleaver, *Serm. on the Design . . . of the Arts.*, 1802, p. 1; as agreeing that not all the statements of the Articles are of dogmatic rank. The general position taken in this work is that of Tract XC., Bishop Forbes and most of the recent commentators.

Illustrations of the eirenical nature of the Articles may well be given. The policy adopted appears to have been to use, as far as safe, the phrases of those whose views were contending for mastery, but in contexts which deprived them of their distinctive partisan significance.

Thus, in Art. XI., the Lutheran phrase," we are justified by Faith only," is employed as describing "a most wholesome doctrine." But that phrase may signify a doctrine which Lutherans would reject,

II. *Anglican Conditions*

§ 5. The loyalty of an Anglican theologian to his portion of the Catholic Church includes a practical recognition of the peculiar conditions prevalent among Anglicans, and of the obligation he is under to edify the faithful in his own portion of the Catholic Church.

The providential mission of the Anglican Churches since the birth of Anglican dissent is unique in the history of the Church. It determines to a degree the

unless the terms "justified" and "faith" are used in Lutheran senses. The article refrains from saying this, and as Roman writers had also adopted the phrase in a sense other than the Lutheran, the Article may not be said necessarily to affirm Lutheran doctrine.

In Art. XVII. a method of statement touching predestination is adopted at the outset which was congenial to Calvinists. But close scrutiny shows limitations of assertion that keep the Church from committing herself to any distinctively Calvinistic view. To dwell on the predestination of the wicked is deprecated, and the general offer of salvation to mankind is indicated at the end. The Calvinistic theory of irresistible grace and necessary final perseverance is shut out by Art. XVI.

In Art. XXV. tortuous phraseology is resorted to in order at once to leave men free to adhere to the usage by which certain rites are "commonly called sacraments," while satisfying the protestant demand for a condemnation of departures from apostolic usage in their administration and undue exaltation. And in the closing paragraph, while the proper end of Sacraments is emphasized as against certain other purposes to which they had been put, the Church carefully refrains from denying the right to gaze on and carry about, when such practices do not interfere with the divinely appointed end or overshadow it.

The limitations of statement in the Articles are full of significance in an age given to bald dogmatizing. The only formal anathema given in the Articles is levelled against indifference as to the sect one professeth, in Article XVIII. — a form of liberalism.

temper which they must exhibit, and limits official language in various ways. This mission is to recover to the catholic faith and order the spiritual descendants of those who revolted altogether from ecclesiastical authority in an unbalanced reaction from mediæval corruptions and abuses. Those who have inherited the position of dissent misconceive much catholic doctrine, confusing it with the caricatures which caused the birth of dissent. They misconceive both the nature and the grounds of the Church's authority in doctrine and discipline, and need to be approached in a charitable spirit and with carefully guarded speech, if they are to be won from ignorance and dissent to an intelligent and catholic unity.

Moreover, the number of dissenters is very large. They surround us in every direction, coming into close social contact with Churchmen, and influencing their minds in many ways. Many Churchmen, therefore, are infected with the limitations of the dissenting mind, and labour under ignorant prejudice against principles truly catholic but which are thought to be peculiarly Romish.

One of the practical purposes of Anglican theology should be to enable our clergy to reach the understandings of this multitude, without becoming infected with error or one-sidedness. Such a purpose has dominated the best Anglican writers, but they have not always been able to avoid the one-sidedness to which they have adjusted themselves. They have often shown more anxiety to differentiate their theology from

Roman theology than to exhibit catholic doctrine in positive terms. Thus, much Anglican phraseology seems halting, inconsistent, and unsatisfactory. In many instances patient study will exonerate our writers from the suspicion of real error, but their writings are often too polemical towards Rome and too apologetic towards dissenters to have much value in the domain of systematic theology. This is no doubt unfortunate, but the reasons which account for it should protect these writers from hasty condemnation and captious criticism. The patient reader will discover that Anglican theology is by no means so impoverished as it seems on the surface, and that our writers have done much to enrich as well as defend catholic theology.[1]

§ 6. Anglican conditions and the peculiar mission of the Anglican hierarchy have led incidentally to a relaxation of ecclesiastical discipline. So far as this relaxation has had deliberate motive, it has been largely due to a desire not to quench a smoking flax, but to retain those who have felt impatient because of what they deemed to be the inadequacy of the Anglican reformation.

[1] Mediæval corruptions were an incidental effect of the efforts made by the Church in the dark ages to win the barbarians to Christianity. They were won, but brought in pagan conceptions and usages, against which their own posterity revolted in later ages So it may be hoped that when the Anglican Churches have won dissenters to the catholic fold, the limited conceptions which dissenters bring into the Church will be thrown off by their posterity. The leaven is necessarily mixed with the dough that is being leavened, and the process of leavening protestantism is necessarily spread out through centuries.

An unprecedented liberty of opinion and speech touching the Church's official teaching has been the outcome of this policy. The so-called high, low, and broad Church parties exhibit divergences of doctrine and practice which are more radical and mutually antagonistic than are allowed to be expressed openly in other portions of the Catholic Church. Different theological schools, such, for example, as the Thomist and Scotist, have appeared elsewhere; but their divergences have been confined, at least in their open expression and ecclesiastical toleration, to speculative questions. Anglican parties differ openly on fundamental questions, while professing allegiance to formularies and usages which ought in time to make for unity and a more adequate acceptance of the catholic faith and religion. We cannot accept the position of any one of these parties, at least in its partisan aspect, as adequate.

But without undertaking any full discussion of their peculiar principles,[1] we have to recognize the fact that

[1] The high Church party has stood for an emphasis upon historic Christianity, the divinely appointed authority of the Catholic Church, sacramental doctrine, and catholic usages.

The low Church or evangelical party has emphasized the individualistic aspects of Christianity, justification by faith, the sole mediatorship of Christ, and the protestant aspects of Anglicanism.

The broad Church party has emphasized the right of individuals to freedom in truth seeking and to be guided by personal conviction, the necessity of keeping abreast of modern learning and thought, and the humanitarian aspects of Christianity. It claims to be above party — a disputable claim in practice.

Each of these parties contains those who over-emphasize and

these parties exist, and cannnot any one of them be excluded from the Anglican Communion. The theologian should take cognizance of them, while endeavouring as far as possible to escape their limitations. He should seek to discover the positive truths and catholic principles which are retained by each party, in spite of the one-sided manner in which these truths and principles are often presented. He should do this in order not to overlook the points wherein all are at one, and in order to adjust his language to existing conditions. He should avoid, as far as may be, the use of partisan shibboleths, and seek to build upon what all accept a theology which will supply most persuasively and reasonably what is lacking in partisan views. He may not, of course, sacrifice any portion of the catholic faith, but must aim to absorb the defective conceptions prevailing among many Anglicans into a full-orbed catholic theology, expressed in terms which Anglicans can most readily understand, but not so expressed as to complicate the problem of catholic unity. His temper must be sympathetic and eirenical

caricature their chosen principles, and whose negations are deplorable. On the positive side the affirmations of high Churchmen are, comparatively speaking, most full and adequate.

It ought to be noticed that not a protestant sect in Christendom could survive without division the continuance of such organized partisan divergences in its midst as are tolerated amongst the clergy and laity of the Church. The reason why the Church survives, and grows more and more equal to her catholic mission, is that her constitution and institutions are divine and supernaturally protected. Her working system lives on, and makes always for catholic doctrine and practice.

on the one hand, and unbending in loyalty to the faith and practice of the universal Church on the other hand.

§ 7. To bring all these considerations to their practical issue, the Anglican theologian has need to observe the following rules:

(*a*) The norm of all theological explication should be the ecumenical language of the catholic Creeds and the undisputed General Councils. This rule is indispensable for the preservation of an ecumenical outlook, and for loyalty to the highest dogmatic authority on earth. It is also necessary to be observed in the interests of the future reunion of Christendom.

(*b*) Terms which, without being ecumenical in a formal sense, are of general acceptance and use in the Catholic Church may not safely be repudiated. For instance, a wise theologian will not deny that Confirmation, Penance, Orders, Matrimony, and Unction are Sacraments or Mysteries. He is justified on ecumenical, as well as Anglican, grounds in refusing to put them on the same level with "Baptism and the Lord's Supper." The whole Church agrees that these alone are generally necessary for salvation, and that no other Sacraments have their visible signs, *sacramenta*, laid down in the Gospels.[1] The theologian

[1] Article XXV. employs somewhat tortuous language touching the lesser Sacraments, with obvious desire to avoid alienating opposite partisans. The phrase "commonly called" is not itself repudiative, for it is used elsewhere in the Prayer Book without such meaning — *e.g.*, "commonly called Christmas-Day." Moreover, there can be no question that this Church treats several of

may no doubt rightly exercise at times judicious reserve with regard to such terms, since they are not, as terms, imposed upon the faithful. The point is that by simply repudiating them he runs inevitable risk of seeming to repudiate the truths connoted by them. Thus, to repudiate the term Sacrament altogether in connection with the lesser Sacraments, "commonly called," by that name, is likely to be understood as a denial that they are divinely sanctioned instruments for conferring sanctifying grace. This is what is generally signified by the term.

(*c*) An Anglican is at liberty to avoid terms of any mere school of theology or of another and merely provincial portion of the Church, provided he does so in a manner which does not prejudice catholic doctrines associated therewith. He may even find it desirable to do this in particular instances, by reason of the misleading connotations which the terms rejected have for Anglicans. Thus the term transubstantiation is rightly used with hesitation and caution; because, although used widely to signify merely the revealed truth that the Eucharistic Bread and Wine are made to be the Body and Blood of Christ in a mystery by their consecration, it has come to stand among Anglicans either for a physical and destructive change of the elements, or for a philosophical explanation of the

the lesser Sacraments as divinely appointed means of grace — *e.g.*, Confirmation and Orders. The "corrupt following of the Apostles" cannot therefore refer to their retention in the Church, but to the manner in which they had come to be administered.

mystery. But a rejection of this term, so widely used elsewhere in the Church, should be accompanied by positive assertion of the truth expressed in our Lord's words, "This is My Body," etc.

In this connection caution should be exercised in the use of terms not usually employed or rightly understood by Anglicans. The practice of copying indiscriminately the terminology of a foreign theology is to be avoided, especially as the English language is rich and precise enough to express every necessary element of catholic truth without such deference to foreign schools. This does not mean that no foreign terms should be taken over under any circumstances. If and when our theology can really be improved by such means, we shall do well to borrow terms and phrases from other portions of the Catholic Church. And it is not to be forgotten that the interests of ecumenical outlook and unity require us to keep in reasonable touch with the theological developments of the Catholic Church beyond our borders. The point to be maintained is that we ought not to get out of touch with Anglican thought, or fall into foreign provincialisms, in our anxiety to avoid Anglican provincialism.

(*d*) An Anglican theologian should be careful to do justice to the terms employed in Anglican formularies. This means that he should not repudiate them because many use them in defective senses, but should emphasize their catholic meaning. The necessity of such procedure should be evident. We are bound to take the formularies of our own ecclesiastical authority

in that sense which justifies our recognition of this Church as a catholic body, and as sharing in the teaching office of the universal Church. This cannot easily be done, if we openly disparage or neglect her language. Moreover, faithful Anglicans generally must, in so far as they are faithful, defer loyally to the official language of their own portion of the Church. Our only means, therefore, of fortifying them in catholic doctrine is to use Anglican phrases freely in catholic senses. Happily, this involves no deceit or non-natural use of terms. It involves simply that we should extricate these phrases from the anti-catholic senses which post-reformation controversies have caused to be read into some of them. Taken historically and strictly, our formularies are not uncatholic. The worst that can be said truly is that, in certain instances, a desire to shelve dangerous questions has caused the use of terms and phrases which require patient analysis and some knowledge of history for their correct and catholic interpretation.

(*e*) Finally, Anglican theologians should be careful to avoid an exaggerated estimate of the divergences between the different schools of theology tolerated in our midst. There can be no question as to the existence of seemingly defective views among the members of certain schools. Much language is used by them which seems hard to reconcile with any adequate hold upon the catholic faith and religion. On the other hand, language is used in some quarters which seems to many loyal churchmen to caricature the truth, in-

stead of exhibiting it in just proportion. To give examples in either direction seems undesirable and invidious. But, on the one hand, allowance should be made for the desire to exclude superstition and a dogmatism which exceeds what is warranted by Scripture and the faith of the universal Church. On the other hand, we must remember that a movement in the interests of neglected truth is inevitably accompanied by exaggeration. We believe that if the partisans to whom we refer would take pains to understand each other, they would discover that, in spite of their diverse points of view, their implicit faith contains larger elements of agreement than is usually acknowledged by them. We do not, of course, deny that real differences exist; but we are convinced that the majority of these differences are more likely to be remedied by generous emulation in devotion to the working system of the Book of Common Prayer, than by mutual recriminations. At all events an exaggerated view of divergences cannot make for the interests of truth, and is fatal to the highest success in the theological sphere.

CHAPTER VIII

PASSING THOUGHT

I. *Types of Thought*

§ 1. We have been speaking of the attitude to be maintained towards what are called the parties of the Anglican Communion. But a theologian who looks further afield is confronted by rival schools of theology in all parts of the Church. A notable instance of what we mean has been mentioned — the Thomist and Scotists schools,[1] which have divided Latin theologians on various important questions, chiefly speculative, since the scholastic period. Their positions should be understood.

§ 2. Again, an orthodox theologian cannot altogether ignore non-catholic theology. If no other motive impels him than a desire to exhibit its defects and to convince dissenters of their errors, his love of divine

[1] Addis and Arnold give a convenient survey of the differences between the Thomists and Scotists, in *A Catholic Dictionary*, "Scotism." It should be noticed that these schools developed somewhat. Thus Thomism is not necessarily a faithful echo of the views of St. Thomas. Scotism is best known to-day for the view that the Incarnation would have occurred if man had not sinned.

The ancient Church also had its schools, especially the rival ones of Alexandria (mystico-theological) and Antioch (rationalistic and literalistic).

truth must move him to make some study of their views. Moreover, the most serious heresy is based upon a one-sided maintenance of precious truth, and one who is well grounded in the truths which heretics neglect can often derive valuable hints from the language they employ in defining and defending the truths which they continue to hold. It cannot be denied that some very valuable works have been written by unorthodox writers on subjects wherein they agree substantially with the teaching of the Church.[1] To omit a study of such works involves real loss to a catholic theologian. At all events it cannot reasonably be denied that theologians will often find it desirable to formulate their attitude towards particular schools of heretical thought, if they are to exercise any influence beyond the orthodox pale. That they should exercise such influence, when opportunities occur, ought not to be disputed.

§ 3. Beyond the sphere of heretical Christian theology is that of non-Christian thought, whether religious

[1] For example: Flint's *Theism ;* Dale's *The Atonement ;* Milligan's treatises on the *Resurrection* and the *Ascension* of our Lord. Such systematic works in doctrine as those by Dorner (Lutheran); Hodge (Presbyterian); Martensen (Danish Lutheran); and A. H. Strong (Baptist) — each having its own lines of error — contain many valuable chapters and statements.

Proportion in theological reading is of course very necessary. Only those whose minds are adequately saturated with sound catholic theology can expect to avoid being infected with error, if they read much dissenting literature. A firmly grasped point of view is everything; and young students should absorb themselves chiefly in strictly orthodox literature.

or philosophical. Neither non-Christian beliefs nor secular philosophy can be wholly disregarded by a theologian who seeks to mould the minds of his contemporaries. This is always the case to a certain degree, but particularly so in modern times, when all the ends of the earth are being brought together, and are comparing notes on all subjects whatsoever. A theologian who is not equipped as a Christian apologist is seriously handicapped, even in the sphere of positive exposition of revealed truth. If the faith is to be set forth in a way to secure the attention and acceptance of thinking men, it must be set forth in terms which will not show ignorance on the part of the theologian of alien systems of thought which are, for good or ill, being studied by many. It is not necessary in our age to be a missionary to the heathen in order to have need of ability to exhibit the faith persuasively to men who are infected with non-Christian ideas. Apart from the influence of alien religions, we always have with us systems of philosophy which determine to a great extent the attitude of multitudes towards Christian dogma, and which require apologetical consideration by those who would succeed in teaching these multitudes the truths of Christianity.

II. *Theological Speculation*

§ 4. Schools of theology which are really catholic differ only in their modes of exhibiting the common faith of the Church, and in their speculative views. It is inevitable that men who meditate deeply touching

the mysteries of the faith should be led to consider matters which are not revealed, or at least not with sufficient fulness to warrant precise and certain doctrine, and should arrive at personal opinions about them — opinions held with varying degrees of confidence. Nor may the formation of such private opinions be considered to be a mistake, unless we are prepared foolishly to deny the propriety and value of earnest meditation upon the things of God and life eternal.

Among the speculative opinions thus arrived at are:

(*a*) Theories which are thought to serve the scientific purpose of connecting the contents of revelation in a coherent and rational system, for greater facility in the contemplation of revealed truths as parts of one organic body of truth.[1]

(*b*) Deductive inferences from the dogmas of the faith, having reasonableness and validity in proportion to the range and adequacy of the dogmatic premises employed, and the absence of logical fallacies.[2]

[1] Thus the Scotist view — that the Incarnation is part of the original and eternal plan of God, and would have occurred in any case, even if man had not sinned — is employed by its maintainers to exhibit the relation between the doctrines of creation and the incarnation. Similarly, various theories of the passion of Christ are used to exhibit its relation on the one hand to the fall, and on the other to the present economy of grace and justification.

[2] The scholastic theory of transubstantiation, or the conversion of the substance of the sacramental species into the substance of our Lord's Body and Blood, is a deduction from the revealed truth that the consecrated species are rightly called the Body and Blood of Christ, although before their consecration they are merely bread and wine. Of the soundness of this deduction we shall have somewhat to say when we come to it.

(*c*) Conjectures such as fill the pages of works on eschatology, based on altogether inadequate knowledge, but supposed to be justified by *a priori* considerations and *a posteriori* analogies.[1]

(*d*) Inductive hypotheses based upon the contents of human experience, whether natural or spiritual, and chiefly connected with apologetics.[2]

§ 5. The purpose of all legitimate speculation in theology is to fortify our faith in revealed truth, and to enrich our mental apprehensions of it. Our opinions should be governed in brief by the desire to hold the faith securely and with fuller edification; and by the purpose of bringing others to the same happy consummation. We should never seek to gratify vain curiosity, which ministers to intellectual and spiritual pride; and we should carefully avoid curious and profane questions which do not minister to godliness.[3]

The limits of proper speculation should be evident. No speculation is permissible which looks to a conversion of its conclusions into articles of faith, imposed as necessary to be believed for salvation. Nor may any speculative views be held by faithful believers, or propounded by them, which have the effect of modi-

[1] For instance, the several opinions concerning the manner in which souls are perfected in the intermediate state. One of them, called Romish, is rejected by this Church. Otherwise the subject is left open.

[2] Opinions concerning the place of evolution in the divine plan belong to this class.

[3] 1 Tim. vi. 4; 2 Tim. ii. 23; Tit. iii. 9.

fying revealed truths. In short, all legitimate speculation starts with the assumption that the faith once for all delivered contains the fixed and permanent premises of catholic thought, as well as its primary and unalterable subject-matter.

Among the rules which should govern speculation are the following:

(*a*) Speculative views may not, by reason of the mysteriousness of the subjects dealt with, and the limits of revelation, be treated as having the certainty of faith. They should be held provisionally, therefore, and tentatively, subject to possible reversal in the light of the life to come.

(*b*) The right of the Church, and of any portion of it, to determine the permissible attitude of the faithful under its jurisdiction towards such opinions should be conceded loyally. The ecclesiastical mind is more weighty than that of individual theologians and schools, and the authority of particular Churches to protect the faith within their bounds by extraordinary measures should be recognized. A Church may not only forbid the propagation of particular views, but may also, when the existing conditions of thought seem thus to require, embody speculative opinions in her formularies, provided such views are not set forth as necessary to be believed for salvation. It should be added in this connection that a Church may, for the same reason, revise her formularies so as to shut out speculative opinions previously contained in them, provided the catholic faith continues to be maintained in its purity

and integrity.[1] This disciplinary authority does not interfere with the freedom of private opinion touching matters left open by revelation, but determines only the open and official status of such opinions.

(*c*) Speculative views, whether of individuals or of theological schools, should not be given a dominating place in theology, lest somehow they should colour and modify our belief in the fixed doctrines of the ancient catholic faith. To put this in another way, our point of view in the contemplation of divine truths should not be speculative, but should be the catholic faith itself.[2]

(*d*) Speculative views should not be the subject of strenuous defense or attack, or of divisive controversy, so long as they cannot be proved to be necessarily connected with or opposed to the maintenance of the faith, either in themselves or in the manner of their setting forth. Being in their nature neither demonstrable nor provably false they are, on the one hand, *dubia*, or opinions which ought to be held tentatively only; and, on the other hand, "pious opinions," which may be held without blame when not allowed to overshadow or alter fundamental dogma. *In essentiis unitas, in dubiis libertas, in omnibus caritas.* Subject to the exigencies of ecclesiastical discipline, the right to private opinion in speculative matters may not be

[1] See Palmer, *The Church*, Pt. IV. ch. xiv. § 2, pp. 266 *et seq.*

[2] The Scotist theory, defined in a previous note of this chapter, is often given a place in theology that is not warranted by its purely speculative nature; and the result is often to reduce the importance of the doctrine of atonement and subvert some of its revealed content.

gainsaid, and the right to repudiate such opinions for oneself, subject to the same limitation, is also inalienable. The general prevalence of an opinion in the Catholic Church does not make its acceptance of obligation unless it is held by the Church universal as necessary to be believed for salvation. The same is true of general practices. They are not generally obligatory upon Christians, unless they are taught to be thus obligatory by the whole Church.

The principles and rules which we have stated make clear the real weight of school opinions. They have weight in proportion to the theological reputation of those who maintain them, but they have no authority whatsoever in the sphere of saving faith. The same is true of school terminology. Thus, while it is to be acknowledged that, as a rule, it is scientifically precarious and rash to reject pious opinions and theological terms which are generally prevalent among theologians, the right to reconsider and even to reject such views and terms may not be denied. It should also be added that an exaggerated deference to particular schools of theology is a fruitful source of one-sidedness, and must impoverish the theology of those who are thus limited.[1] There can be no permanent crystallization of school theology, as distinguished from ecumenical dogma, without damage to the interests of higher theology and of fresh and vigorous faith. Theologians should always be ready to adjust their specu-

[1] Bacon's remarks on the *idola theatri* are pertinent. See *Novum Organon*, Bk. I. aph. 44, 61 *et seq.*

lative views and their terminology to the advances of human knowledge and the constantly recurring changes of their mental environment, if they wish to bring men's minds into subjection to the immutable truths of Christianity.

III. *Heretical Theology*

§ 6. The task of theologians would be much simplified if there were no heresies among professing Christians. Yet it must be acknowledged that the conflict of the Church with heresy has been a fruitful cause of theological development and enrichment. Thus God has overruled the progress of error to the benefit of His Church. Many an exact and illuminating definition of revealed truth has been suggested and made possible by the cross-questioning to which the Church has been subjected by those who have imperfectly grasped fundamental truths.

Heresy, αἵρεσις, means etymologically the choice of a truth to cherish, even at the expense of other truths equally necessary to maintain.[1] Negatively it results in the denial of some portion of the faith, and practically in the impoverishment of spiritual life. It might

[1] Heresy and the temper that leads to it, have been considered in ch. vi. § 19. The distinction between material and formal heresy is given in note 1 of p. 171. Illingworth, *Reason and Revelation*, pp. 121 *et seq.*, shows that heresy is usually the result of attempts to rationalize Christian doctrine in the interests of system and simplicity. The Church's dogmas are framed simply to reassert the truths thus sacrificed. Mozley, *Development of Doctrine*, pp. 41–43, shows that the heretic appeals to formal logic, starting with self-chosen and inadequate premises.

be shown that every leading truth of Christianity is repudiated in our age by some heretical school or sect. What is called "our common Christianity," or "undenominationalism," or "fundamental Christianity," is really a vacant thing, lacking in every determinate catholic doctrine. Yet, happily, no heretical system can live unless it embodies some truth worth believing and living by. No doubt this truth is held out of its proper connection and caricatured; but it remains, and can be extricated from its erroneous connection and significance by catholic theologians, if they will exercise the patient care which is necessary in order to do this.

§ 7. Theologians are called upon to neglect no means of enriching and remedying the defects of such systems of thought as they meet with. It is their duty, in the presence of heresy, therefore, (*a*) to define the truths which are caricatured by heretics, in their right connection with other revealed truths and in just proportion; (*b*) to restate rejected truths, in ways which will clear up any misapprehensions that may have caused their rejection; (*c*) to acknowledge fearlessly and thankfully whatever is rightly maintained by heretics, and to appropriate for the service of catholic theology any useful statements framed by them.

To do all this requires an adequate knowledge of heretical thought and literature, and especially of the principles, whether valid or sophistical, which determine the lines of contemporary speculations. It requires, of course, the ability to discriminate accurately between what is sound and what is either erroneous or tends

to error. This ability depends largely upon the thoroughness with which the theologian has previously grounded himself in the foundation truths of the catholic faith. Amateurs in theology cannot safely undertake such work. Finally, it requires sympathy with those whose position is less fortunate, and appreciation of honest love of truth wherever it is found, and however imperfect may be its theological point of view. This sympathy should not be extended to erroneous systems, but to souls seeking truth under adverse conditions. Ignorance and false doctrine are not invariably the sign of a perverse spirit. Heredity and unavoidable misapprehensions and prejudices account for much.

A theologian may never forget that he has more to do than merely to formulate the faith with abstract accuracy to the exclusion of error. It is an important part of his God-given mission to convince men who are prejudiced, and to wean them from their prejudices by using persuasive exposition and terminology. He may not rightly pass by on the other side. The theologian is indeed a watchman set to guard a precious heritage. But he must take care lest he shut out from the treasures in his keeping those whom God wills should enjoy them by unloving and strange phrases which conceal instead of teaching what they need to know. The theologian is one thing, the disciplinarian another. An over-zealous heresy hunter is *ipso facto* a defective theologian, and incipient malice is the explanation of his failure.

IV. *Non-Christian Thought*

§ 8. These remarks hold good in relation to non-Christian religions. The study of what is called "comparative religion" is a needed part in the equipment of catholic theologians. No religious system can live which is wholly empty of truth. The falsity of all other religious systems, except that which was given its finished faith and order by Christ, lies in their claim *as systems* to supply men with the true way of approach to God. They each teach some precious truths of Christianity, but these truths are embodied in systems of thought and life which are erroneous and false.

As in the case of heresy, therefore, it is the part of theologians to exhibit the truths contained in non-Christian systems in their proper connection with the fuller contents of divine revelation, clearing them of their perverted application, and stating the distinctive truths of Christianity in such wise as to draw non-Christians on to a more adequate and satisfying knowledge of divine things, rather than in a manner calculated to destroy what measure of true belief they already possess. Theologians should recognize truth thankfully wherever they find it, however fragmentary and grotesque its mode of expression may be; and should employ it as the basis of apologetical presentation of what is wanting.[1]

[1] St. Paul affords us an example of what we mean, in his address to the Athenians on Mars hill. Commending them for their interest in religion, he made their worship of the unknown God the basis of

§ 9. It is desirable to avoid being prejudiced against a sympathetic study of alien systems by the unfortunate circumstance that the science, so called, of comparative religion has been promoted largely by scholars who assume a defective and rationalistic point of view.[1] We may not put all religions, as is so often done, in the same category, as if each were the result of natural evolution and each without finality, and as if it were possible for students of comparative religion to evolve a religion superior to any existing system by resorting to an eclectic method.

instruction concerning the God whom they ignorantly worshipped, and appealed to truths borne witness to by one of their own poets. Acts xvii. 22–31.

[1] The science of comparative religion, recent as it is, has produced a bewildering bibliography, for which consult Jordan's *Comparative Religion*, 1905. A few titles only can be given here. The most useful and sound introductory books are perhaps Liddon's *Some Elements of Religion;* and Hardwick's *Christ and Other Masters*. Among the more scholarly manuals are Macculloch's *Comparative Theology;* Tiele's *Outlines of the History of Religion;* De La Saussaye's *Handbook of the History of Religion;* Jevons' *Introduction to the History of Religion;* Menzies' *History of Religion;* and Freeman Clarke's *Ten Great Religions*. The point of view of some of these is objectionable, but they afford materials for truer thinking.

Some of the works treating of particular religions are W. Robertson Smith's *Religion of the Semites;* Sir Monier-Williams' *Brahmanism and Hinduism;* Coplestone's *Buddhism Primitive and Present;* Legge's *Religions of China; Non-Christian Religious Systems*, a series of 11 vols., S. P. C. K.; *The Wisdom of the East* series, now being published; various vols. of the Hibbert and Gifford Lectures; and Margoulouth's *Religions of Bible Lands*.

E. B. Tyler's *Primitive Culture;* Frazer's *Golden Bough;* Lang's *Making of Religion* and *Magic and Religion;* and Max Muller's works are also important.

The eclectic theory is that all religious systems, including Christianity, are imperfect; but that each presents some phase or phases of divine truth; and that, for the avoidance of narrow and distorted views, we should seek the truth in all systems, making gradually an eclectic system of our own which will include the partial truths of all religions. This theory is erroneous:

(*a*) It implies that Christianity is mistaken in its claim to be a religion of permanent divine appointment for all men.

(*b*) It assumes that man's reason is capable of discerning all divine truth without the assistance of supernatural revelation, and independently of the teaching of the Church of God. That is, it is rationalistic.

(*c*) The aspects of truth which Christian enlightenment enables us to detect in human systems are imperfect and broken reflections of what can be seen in their just proportions and proper connections in the catholic faith alone.

(*d*) Eclecticism ignores the organic nature of divine truth in general. The sides of a triangle become mere straight lines when mutually isolated. The reflections which are seen in a rough mirror or a troubled sea are not in agreement with those which can be seen in a perfect mirror. The significance of particular truths depends as certainly on their mutual connection as upon their several contents.

(*e*) Eclecticism involves a human putting together of truths that are divine not only in their several

elements, but also in their organic relations, as summed up in the Church's Creeds.

There is a true eclecticism, even in the study of alien religious systems; but it concerns forms of thought and language, which a theologian borrows from every quarter, and makes use of for a more intelligible and persuasive statement of divinely revealed truth. In this eclecticism human systems become the hand-maids of catholic theology, not its mistresses or the instructors of the Church.

§ 10. Certain principles need to be remembered in connection with comparative religion:

(*a*) The true idea of religion — of a covenant relation binding men to God in spiritual communion and fellowship [1] — is to be found by an examination of its best and most completely developed form, *i.e.*, Christianity. And the history of the development of religion cannot be rightly understood except in the light of its goal.

(*b*) The development of religion has pursued two

[1] Cicero, *De Nat. Deorum.*, ii. 28, derives the word religion from *relego*, to con over again, and refers it to an anxious habit of studying whatever bears on the service of the gods. "Qui omnia quæ ad cultum deorum pertinerent, diligenter retractarent et tanquam relegerent, religiosi dicta sunt ex relegendo." Lactantius, *Div. Inst.* iv. 28, derives it from religo, to bind back. "Vinculo pietatis obstricti, Deo religati sumus, unde ipsa religio nomen cepit." Liddon says, *Some Elements*, Lec. I. p. 19, "Lactantius may be wrong in his etymology, but he has certainly seized the broad popular sense of the word, when he connects it with the idea of an obligation by which man is bound to an invisible Lord." The whole lecture is valuable. Baldwin, *Dic. of Philos.*, "Religion," accepts Lactantius' derivation.

lines — that under authentic supernatural guidance, culminating in Christianity; and that which was guided by the light of nature only, at least without authentic and articulate supernatural revelation.

(*c*) Natural or non-biblical religions contain certain truths of nature's teaching, and often represent genuine seeking after God. No doubt they are the result also of providential guidance. But this guidance is not determinate, and no religion secures for its adherents an authentic communion with God except revealed religion. It is this failure to achieve the real end of religion which is referred to when such systems are termed false religions.

(*d*) Non-biblical religions are preparatory for Christianity in this sense, that they indoctrinate men in truths which help them to understand and receive Christianity. But they are not preparatory in the sense in which the Mosaic dispensation was — *i.e.*, they do not and cannot develop into Christianity. They must, as religions, give way to it.

(*e*) The defect of modern Judaism lies in its being an arrested development. It represents a refusal to receive truths needed for its completion. It cannot now be regarded rightly as a permissible substitute for Christianity, and lacks authentic and covenant security. In this sense it fails to achieve the purpose of true religion and is false.

(*f*) The further distinction should be made between genuine and non-genuine religions. A genuine religion, like that of Mahomet, seeks relations with God. A

non-genuine religion represents an effort to satisfy the religious instinct — hence its name religion — without seeking to enter into relation with God. Such was the original Buddhism, which substituted the merging of individuality, through the suppression of desire, into the ocean of universal, formless, and passive being.

(*g*) It remains that men are to be judged by a just God, and according to their available knowledge, whatever may be the nature of the religions to which they adhere.[1]

V. *Philosophy*

§ 11. So far as philosophy seeks to discover and exhibit the ultimate truths of being and life without recourse to supernatural revelation, its history is rightly described to be the history of failure. The mind and purpose of God affords the only solution of ultimate problems, and this mind and purpose is not ascertainable apart from the revelation of Jesus Christ. So it is that the conclusions of speculative philosophy never afford permanent satisfaction.[2]

[1] This does not mean that a non-Christian will be saved "by the Law or Sect which he professeth," — a proposition rightly rejected in the 18th Art. of Religion on the ground that "Holy Scripture doth set out unto us only the Name of Jesus Christ, whereby men must be saved." Nor does it mean, on the other hand, that non-Christians have no real or sufficient probation in this life, and will have one after death. It implies simply that, if men strive to live up to the light they have, even though ignorant of the Gospel, divine revelation does not exclude the *hope* that they will receive an opportunity of being saved, after death, by "the Name of Jesus Christ." The problem of future opportunities for the heathen is not solved by revelation. We are left to conjecture.

[2] Cf. ch. i. § 33.

Yet the tendency to philosophize is natural to men and divinely implanted, we may well believe. To explore the boundaries of the intelligible helps us to realize our own mental limitations; and causes the development of exact forms of thought and language which facilitate an intelligent apprehension of revealed truth. Nor need we reject the opinion of Clement and other members of the ancient Alexandrian school, who believed that ancient Greek philosophy constituted a sort of pagan dispensation, providentially overruled by God to prepare the world for Christianity.[1]

But these fathers realized the truth that the facts of the Gospel are central data which have to be allowed for in a sound philosophy, so that it was only when philosophy became Christian that it could attain to such success as the human mind is capable of in this life when speculating upon fundamental problems.[2]

§ 12. In the light of such considerations the following principles appear to be necessary for the guidance of philosophical study and speculation.

(*a*) No philosophy can be considered adequate, even within the limits which are imposed upon human understanding, which refuses to take into account as fundamental premises of thought the contents of divine revelation.[3] In brief, to be a sound philosopher one

[1] Clement Alex., *Stromat.*, vi.; vii. 2; Newman's *Arians*, ch. i. § iii. 5. Cf. note 1, p. 58, of this volume.

[2] Illingworth, *Reason and Revelation*, ch. vi., shows how the revelation of the Incarnation revolutionized philosophy.

[3] See Illingworth, *Reason and Revelation*, pp. 139–140, on this point.

must also be a sound theologian, for theology alone affords the primary data of true philosophy.

(*b*) Philosophy can never be rightly regarded as the mistress of theology, but should ever be treated as its hand-maid. It is useful to afford forms of accurate thought and language and to facilitate our grasp of revealed truth, but cannot correct the contents of revelation, nor independently discover them.

(*c*) It is a serious mistake for a theologian to commit himself finally to any philosophical system, however specious and seemingly helpful, for each philosophy is but a passing phase of speculation which must give way to other philosophies, and may not dictate the point of view of theological thought without laying foundations of future embarrassment. To define the faith in the terms of a philosophy is permissible, but to subject men's minds to such philosophy in their apprehension of revealed truth is plainly a mistake.

(*d*) A study of the history of philosophy is more helpful to a theologian, in the first instance at least, than the mastery of any particular system. Such study enables us to enter into the full richness of human thought, and to appreciate the true and limited value for theological purposes of each passing system. For this reason a knowledge of the history of philosophy is a needed prerequisite to the more exclusive study of single systems.

(*e*) Apologetical rather than dogmatic interests are subserved by philosophy. It is true that dogmatic theology and ecclesiastical formularies have borrowed

a limited number of technical terms from philosophy, but not doctrines. These come from divine revelation. Moreover, when philosophical terms are employed in the formulation of revealed truth, they acquire new and theological significance, and become crystallized so as to express ideas which transcend human philosophy.

(*f*) We must assume a theological standpoint, therefore, in order to interpret theological terms which have been borrowed from philosophy. Subsequent developments of such terms in philosophy do not determine their significance in theology. Thus the terms person, hypostasis, nature, essence, and the like, have meanings in theology which are not to be ascertained by the study of modern philosophy and psychology. They can be ascertained only by studying the history of doctrine.[1]

[1] The term person, for instance, has its philosophical use controlled by psychological analysis of human personality, whereas in catholic theology its meaning is determined by its application to God and to the Word-made-flesh. That in Christ which is the subject of both divine and human attributes is His personality, and three persons may be hypothecated of one and the same divine essence, according to the theological use of the terms.

CHAPTER IX

THEOLOGY PRACTICAL AND SPIRITUAL

I. *Theology a Practical Science*

§ 1. It cannot be insisted upon too earnestly that theology is a practical science. It shares this characteristic with every science worthy of the name, but there are peculiar reasons for insisting upon the practical aim and method of all sound theology.

The source of inspiration which has sustained the fruitful labours of modern physical scientists is the knowledge that a mastery of the secrets of nature is conducive to the material welfare and civilization of mankind. Every science possesses its technical and abstract formulas, but these are adopted simply as necessary aids to precision and the generalization of multitudinous facts, so that they may be considered together in their common bearing and significance. Even the most abstract terms and propositions stand or fall as they lend themselves to a successful mastery of nature's actual working and to its utilization for men's practical purposes.

The same is true of catholic theology. The inspiration of a sound theologian is to enrich men's practical knowledge of God and things spiritual, and to advance the interests of their higher life and eternal welfare.

And in the proportion that the eternal is of greater value to men than the temporal, in such proportion is the practical aim and method of the science of eternal things to be peculiarly emphasized.[1]

As in other sciences, the exigencies of accurate study, and intelligent mastery of the totality of spiritual things knowable, require a use of many technical terms and more or less abstract propositions. In no other way can one make an intelligent survey of the contents of divine revelation and of the spiritual teachings of nature, so as to perceive the general harmony of spiritual truths and their internal relations to each other. Such a survey is exceedingly helpful and necessary to a secure and sufficient grasp upon eternal verities. But its ultimate purpose is practical; and no theological *formula* can hold its own with thinking men unless it is seen to have some bearing, direct or indirect, upon the spiritual interests of mankind. Abstractions which merely exercise men's wits, and serve no other end than the gratification of a speculative curiosity, must sooner or later fall into deserved discredit.

In this connection it should be noted that the truths of revelation are not imposed upon men, either by God or by His Church, as mere burdens of faith. There is indeed a probation of faith. We must believe much that we cannot fully comprehend. But theologians

[1] It is true, as St. Thomas points out, *Summa Theol.*, I. i. 4, that theology is speculative rather than practical in its immediate and scientific end, for that end is the rational and coherent exposition of divine truth. But the ulterior purpose which gives value to such exposition is the eternal and practical welfare of mankind.

should accept as axiomatic the principle that no doctrine is imposed upon men as necessary to be believed for salvation, the holding of which does not somehow subserve the practical interests of man's advance toward his eternal destiny. It should be the aim of theology to show in detail, as far as possible, that this is so; and to set forth the bearing of each doctrine of the faith upon spiritual practice.

§ 2. That many of our clergy do not get beyond an abstract knowledge of doctrine is undeniable. And this proceeds not from the technical methods which have to be employed in theology, but from the fact that clerical studies are often limited to the abstract meaning of technical propositions, without reference to their practical bearing. The clergy do not go on to enrich their hold upon the truths which are thus defined for the sake of their exact apprehension. They fail to study them in their illuminative setting in Scripture, and in their manifold bearings on daily life and experience.

The evils which ensue are numerous and deplorable, and bring technical theology — the only theology which can equip the teachers of men adequately — into disrepute.

(*a*) In the first place truths which are mastered in the abstract only do not appeal with living force to the minds of the clergy who are thus limited in their apprehensions. Abstract propositions retain an atmosphere of unreality until they are related concretely and satisfyingly to the needs of men. It is not surprising,

therefore, that clergy whose knowledge of theology is confined to rudimentary and technical text-books should occasionally fail to possess a living hold upon the truths thus apprehended, and should degenerate into rationalism and secularity. The connection between latitudinarianism and inadequate study of revealed truth is more frequently exemplified in modern vagaries than is sometimes realized. It is certainly praiseworthy that certain clergy of unsound views should be animated by the desire to increase their practical touch with human needs. The sadness of it all lies in their ignorance of the real difficulty, which consists of their purely abstract and altogether barren mastery of that catholic faith which alone can satisfy human needs.

(*b*) Again the technical tyro in theology, having never grasped the rich value and bearing of the truths which theological formulas merely define in themselves, cannot teach these truths satisfyingly or persuasively to his people. Sooner or later he discovers this to be the case, and is in danger of abandoning the labour altogether. His preaching gravitates to moral truisms, and even to secular topics of the hour. Many a sensational preacher is made to be such by his never having realized the meaning of the Gospel, or its absorbing interest and value when practically exhibited. No doubt the laity often complain of dogmatic preaching. But the reason is clear. The dogmatic preaching which they usually receive is abstract preaching. They are never led on to grasp and value dogma in its bearing on duty and their personal and spiritual interests.

True preaching is both dogmatic and practical. Every sermon should either set forth doctrine in its bearing on life, or base practice upon the fundamental truths which account for its obligation and necessity. No preacher can achieve this end in the pulpit unless he has made use in his own studies both of the technicalities which will keep him in exact line with truth, and of the practical considerations which will make the truths thus defined live in the hearts and minds of men. The purpose of technicalities is not to determine pulpit phraseology — this blunder is often made — but to afford an exact and sound point of view from which to speak in language "understood of the people."

(*c*) The last evil we shall mention is the effect of purely abstract doctrine on apologetics. A theologian who does not realize the vital connection between catholic doctrine and life cannot exhibit that relation to the minds of unbelievers, whose doubts are indeed largely due to this very defect. The effect on apologetical treatises is twofold. In the first place certain truths are relegated to the background, the right exhibition of which would go far to remove the practical difficulties felt in connection with such doctrines, for instance, as the personality of the Infinite and vicarious atonement. The doctrine of the Trinity, practically treated, gives reality and significance to divine personality; and that of the mystical Body of Christ, and our sacramental identification with Christ, helps to remove the difficulties which surround the vicariousness of Christ's passion in non-sacramental theology.

Again, when apologetical writers look upon the central articles of the faith as so many abstract burdens upon the intellect, instead of as affording needed light to live by, their apologetical presentations of Christian truth are much impoverished and reduced in persuasiveness. There is no stronger argument for Christianity than a coherent exhibition of the whole round of Christian doctrine in its relation to every-day problems and human conduct. The fragmentary nature of the truths set forth in the majority of apologetical treatises reduce their power in human hearts, and leave an impression that the Christianity to which they look is not much above the level of natural religion, so called. Many of them could be written by unitarians as well as by truly Christian theologians. We do not mean that an apologetic treatise should exhibit all the inner mysteries of our religion in detail. This would invite rough handling of sacred things. But the leading truths which differentiate Christianity should be set forth in an ample manner such as will prepare minds and hearts to accept inner mysteries. This can only be done by a master of all saving truth — one who discerns the working value as well as the nature of the contents of the faith.

§ 3. Theology, it is clear, must be made practical, if it is to hold its own among our clergy, and if the clergy are to be equal to their work of preaching the Gospel so as to make the truths of Christianity live in the hearts of men. Happily there are methods by which this end can be accomplished, determinate con-

ditions the observance of which will qualify the preacher and apologist for his work.

(*a*) First of all a reasonable and accurate mastery of the technicalities of theology is required. The purpose of theological terms is to define with exact precision the contents of what is known of divine truth. In fact technical theology fulfils in a wider area the function of a Creed, although without any other authority than belongs to the generally recognized results of scientific study. It is, of course, not to be expected that every priest will attain the profound knowledge of technicalities which is possessed by great theologians. But such knowledge as will give him a secure and accurate mastery of what he is to teach his people ought to be attained by every preacher of the divine Word. No priest is capable of teaching clearly, truly, and persuasively without an accurate apprehension of what he is endeavouring to teach. In urging this we do not forget the limitations of mere technicalities. They constitute the skeleton only, and need to be surrounded with a living body of exposition, illustration, and application in order to be of practical value. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that theological terms discharge their function in the priest's study rather than in the pulpit. Their use is to qualify the preacher, not to determine the phraseology of sermons, except to a very limited extent and where they have been imposed by the Church upon all the faithful.

(*b*) The bearing of technical doctrine is made clearer to the mind by a study of the history of doctrine —

especially of the Church's conflict with heresy. Such study can hardly fail to bring to light the practical reasons which intensified the Church's efforts to maintain an accurate faith among her people. A consideration of the controversies, for instance, which resulted in the definitions of the ecumenical councils will not only make our hold upon the mystery of the Incarnation and related truths more secure and precise, but will enable us to realize more fully that these truths are saving truths, the knowledge of which is required for the spiritual welfare of souls.

(*c*) Still more vital for practical purposes is an extended study of Holy Scripture. The Scriptures are related to the faith somewhat as the face of nature is related to physical science. They contain the doctrines of the faith in their concrete setting and practical working. By studying the Scriptures we can discern the living relations which connect truth with truth, and all truths with the spiritual life. The Scriptures constitute the divinely provided storehouse of illustration of what the Church is divinely guided to teach. The effect of this is that preaching is apt to be practical in proportion to the fulness of the preacher's study of Scripture. Such study should not be limited to exact exegesis of particular parts, but should have in view familiar acquaintance with the entire range of Scripture by means of continual and extended reading of it. Were it not for an existing practice, it would seem unnecessary to add that the reading of books about Scripture cannot take the place of saturation with Scripture itself

(*d*) Another means for a practical mastery of doctrine is the study of moral and ascetic theology. This should be very obvious, for moral theology is the science of the practical application of revealed truth to human conduct and virtue. It is the connecting link between Dogmatic Theology and a priest's daily experience. All acknowledge that a priest cannot hope to preach practically and effectively without personal experience. But it needs also to be realized that moral theology exhibits in connected order the lessons of such experience which have been gathered by countless men of wisdom and practical discernment in the ages gone by. Moreover, moral theology brings the immutable truths of revealed religion to bear upon the interpretation of experience, and is practically an indispensable aid to intelligent spiritual observation. The young priest especially cannot expect to be able to apply truth to life wisely, if he trusts to his own limited observation, without profiting by the wisdom of his predecessors, which is made available in moral theology. Without such assistance he will be sure to repeat ancient blunders, and shorten the practical value of his preaching and guidance of souls.

In this connection it may be useful to step aside a little from our subject and give two hints touching the choice of subjects for sermons. A preacher should never venture into fields with which he is unfamiliar; and this means that he should deal with practical matters very guardedly in the beginning of his ministry, and until his moral studies and ministerial experience

have enabled him to deal wisely and effectively with them.[1] Hoary-headed men and women are not apt to regard with deference the purely practical counsels of a man who has but recently emerged from academic surroundings. In brief, a young preacher's sermons should be predominantly doctrinal and expository, with such practical applications as are indisputable.

Again, the preacher will find that sermons on the spiritual life are usually most effective in bringing out the connection between doctrine and life. He will therefore be wise if he increases the proportion of such preaching in his own case as the enlargement of his practical experience permits this to be done with good effect. Such preaching stills controversy, and is often the most effective means of inculcating the truths that are apt to be dissented from when presented in a formal or direct way. It is a truism that doctrine and life should be kept together in all preaching, no matter which element may constitute the primary topic of discourse.

(*e*) It should not be forgotten, in making use of the adjuncts of practical study above referred to, that divine truth itself needs to be defined in the preacher's mind freshly all along. It is not safe for him to abandon for any long interval the habit of reading accurate treatises in Dogmatic Theology. And his hold upon fundamental doctrine will be inadequate unless his doctrinal studies extend beyond the sphere

[1] The late Bishop Churton gives some wise remarks on this point in the Introduction of *The Missionary's Foundation of Doctrine*.

of little compendiums and seminary text-books. He should read, so far as practicable, the works of great masters, for it is in these and these only that he will find anything approaching an adequate and rich exposition of revealed truth along exact lines. He should read not only the larger and general works, but also monographs upon particular doctrines, such, to give an ancient and a modern example, as St. Athanasius' treatise on *the Incarnation* and Canon Liddon's Bampton Lectures on *the Divinity of our Lord*. If he devotes such time to sacred studies as his ordination vow requires him to devote, he will have time to read sufficiently in this direction.

II. *Theology a Spiritual Science*

§ 4. Sound theology is directed to subserve spiritual interests. This is consistent with its task of expounding truth; for divine truth is not correctly apprehended apart from its spiritual bearing, and spiritual interests are not subserved when divine truth is incorrectly set forth.

No doubt it is possible to allow imperfect notions of what subserves spiritual interests to pervert one's understanding of divine revelation. What we think ought to be true may hinder us from perceiving what is true. Still it remains that the spiritual "worth-value" of truth, rightly discerned, enables us to master the contents of revelation more soundly and practically, which means also more scientifically.

The realities with which theology is concerned are

vitally related to man's spiritual life and destiny. Their correct mastery makes us acquainted with facts, laws, and purposes involved in them, that determine the manner of a successful life — that is, of a life such as will secure the fulfilment of man's chief end and his everlasting blessedness. Man's chief end requires that he should enter into personal fellowship with God, based upon spiritual sonship, in order to glorify and enjoy Him forever. This destiny is attained by obedience to the divine will and to the laws of the spiritual world. Theology exhibits in connected order the facts, laws, and divine purposes which men need to know in order to practice this obedience intelligently and successfully. If it exhibits them truly, it sets them forth in their relations, in their bearing on this obedience, that is, in such a manner as to make men wise in matters pertaining to the spiritual life. In brief, theology shares with other sciences the necessity of being practical; and its practical end is to advance men's spiritual interests. It has no value apart from this end.

Accordingly, theology is in effect, although not by strict definition, the science of religion; for the realities with which it deals are those which determine the nature and conditions of true religion. It treats of God, Who is the Object and End of religion; of man, in so far as he is its subject; of the relations subsisting between God and man and their history; and of those truths which are called saving and sanctifying, because our knowledge of them enables us to perceive how our

relations with God — that is, our religious state — may be rectified and perfected forever.

§ 5. These considerations serve to emphasize the sacred nature of theology, whereby it is lifted far above the level of every earthly science. So true is this that theology ceases to be truly scientific — ceases to be itself — when developed in a non-sacred manner or with unsanctified intellectual acumen. Its contents transcend the power of unspiritual natures to appreciate rightly, and are assimilated in their true proportions and relations only by the saints. Moreover, and this is our present point, when we consider that the life to which the saints aspire consists pre-eminently in knowing God,[1] we are led on to see that theology, rightly studied, is the peculiar handmaid and possession of saints. We do not mean that the large scientific capacity which is possessed by theologians like St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas is invariably necessary for a lofty spiritual perfection; but simply this, that such perfection requires for its attainment the direction of one's powers of spiritual discernment, such as they are, along those lines of orderly exercise upon divine things which are pursued by true theologians. A saint may be illiterate, and in the ordinary sense intellectually stupid; but his success in seeking holiness is bound up with his success in exercising his faculties according to their capacity in the habitual consideration of God and divine things. And all the saints profit by the labours of great theologians.

[1] St. John xvii. 3.

Theology is inextricably bound up with religion. When religion is unintelligent it is also superstitious; and to be intelligent in one's religion means to have made some progress in that knowledge and in those intellectual though spiritual exercises which have created the science of theology. A mere intellectuality or a purely abstract theologizing is indeed alien to religion; but true theology directs the spiritual faculties upon those truths on which the possibility of holy religion depends. A religion without a theology can never satisfy human instincts. It is a mere superstition, or a characterless and nondescript emotionalism, or a religion which is dying of mental starvation — a ghost of true religion.

III. *Spiritual Qualifications*

§ 6. The qualifications of a theologian of course include those which are necessary for scientists in general, such as a liberal education calculated to discipline and emancipate the mental faculties, the ability to grasp manifold truths and aspects of truth in comprehensive unity and just proportion, that patient and balanced temper which is needed to protect scholars from hasty and one-sided conclusions, natural ability in logical processes and intuitional discernment, with love of truth as such. No one who is defective in these respects should expect to become a great theologian or even a sound one. It is not necessary or possible that every priest or student of divine things should become a great theologian; but an unsound theologian is a

positive hindrance to the interests both of good theology and the work of the ministry. We need not dwell on all this.

But it is well to emphasize the value to a theologian of a general knowledge of secular sciences, not only because they exhibit many data which have to be considered and employed in sacred science, but because such knowledge constitutes an important factor in the cultivation of a scientific mind and temper.

In addition to those qualifications which are required by scientists of every class, theologians need special ones peculiar to the spiritual sphere of their labour. Spiritual realities are spiritually discerned.[1] They are discerned by the spiritual faculty which is called faith; and faith requires for its correct development the assistance of divine grace, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, spiritual character and habit, or personal holiness, and a love of divine things which depends upon a life of prayer.

And it should be remembered that these qualifications are not less scientific and conducive to trustworthy results because they are peculiar to theology. Other sciences require peculiar personal qualifications and a resort to peculiar aids in research, aids not employed by men at large and requiring special training for their use. It is true that these qualifications and aids are not supernatural, and that their value for trustworthy science is generally acknowledged, even by those who

[1] 1 Cor. ii. 14. St. Athanasius teaches that to learn of God requires a pure mind and life. *De Incarn.*, ch. 57.

do not possess or use them; whereas theologians avowedly depend upon qualifications and assistances of a supernatural order, the value of which is disputed by many thinking men. But scepticism touching the scientific validity of the spiritual reason is based upon a denial of the supernatural. This is not the place to discuss such a denial.[1] Acceptance of Christianity itself, however, depends on belief in the reality of the supernatural, and if the supernatural is real, an acknowledgment and use of it, rightly guided, does not reduce the scientific validity of the knowledge thus acquired.

§ 7. The leading qualification of a theologian is the spiritual faculty called faith. We have already discussed the nature of this faculty, and the conditions and stages of its exercise.[2] What has here to be taken note of is its holy nature. This appears in the fact that faith is a virtue as well as a faculty of spiritual discernment. The virtue and the faculty are inseparable, for the subjective conditions which make spiritual discernment possible, and guarantee its trustworthiness, also constitute the first elements of holy virtue and spiritual character. The ability to discern and understand divine mysteries increases with the growth of personal holiness, and apart from such holiness there can be no high development of spiritual discernment — no theology which is worthy of the name or truly scientific.

[1] See chap. ii. of this volume.

[2] See chaps. iv. and v.

The most obvious of the subjective conditions which are essential to a sound theological mind and to personal holiness alike, making the two mutually inseparable, is a trustful and docile temper towards God and towards all teaching authority which has divine sanction. This temper is really a specialization of the temper which is necessary for success in any science whatsoever. Unless men trust in the universe — which means in the mind which orders all events, and accounts for the laws which they observe — they cannot rationally establish their scientific generalizations, or be free from doubt as to the permanent validity of the laws of nature. If there is no trustworthy mind and will directing the course of the universe, there is no ground for confidence that the indications of that mind and purpose which are discoverable in the observed order of phenomena will be verified by future events. In short, lack of confidence in the truth of God's revelation of Himself, and His purposes in nature, is as fatal to the natural sciences as a similar lack of trust in supernatural revelation is to theology.

This docile trust is grounded in a sense of divine fatherhood, in a filial spirit. Faith is wrapped up in the conviction that God is our Maker and the Author of our being, and of that very reason wherewith we consider His perfections and operations. Having such a conviction, our belief in the truthfulness of His mind is all one with our confidence in human reason itself, for the mind of God is the ground of all reason.

Moreover, this filial spirit is deepened when we con-

sider that God is our Father in other respects than as our Maker. When we realize that God is a personal, and that He wills to enter into personal relations with His rational creatures, that His watchful providence is ever over us, and that He has bought us with the blood of His Only-begotten, and made us His peculiar children by adoption and grace, we acquire a confidence in His truthfulness which no passing circumstances can overthrow. God will not deceive His own children, and our filial relation to Him enables us to perceive that He cannot lie.

Furthermore, the filial spirit depends for its full development upon an assimilation of character in the child to the character possessed by the parent. The child understands and trusts the parent because it trusts itself and finds itself in its parent. So the child of God acquires the fulness of faith in God, with ability to understand His mind, in proportion to its advance in the holiness of God. Without such advance no theologian can be rightly qualified for his sacred study.

It has been said that "Satan is an acute theologian." [1] In a sense this is no doubt true, and many men of unsanctified characters have made reputations for theological acuteness. But acuteness does not necessarily signify more than a natural and logical skill directed upon theological propositions and systems. Such skill is a useful handmaid of theology, and its possession enables one to gain a theological reputation in the world; but no degree of natural acuteness or learning

[1] So said Calvin somewhere.

can qualify a sound theologian, or one whose work will stand the test of ages in the Church of God, unless the theologian is also a devout and holy child of God. Only he who doeth His will can know the doctrine [1] in its true significance and bearing.

§ 8. These considerations teach us that successful theologians have to practise the rules of spiritual progress which are laid down in ascetic theology. They have to be men of disciplined lives, keeping the flesh in subjection and making the spirit rule all their members in the practice of virtue and the drawing near to God. They have to be men of prayer and habitual meditation upon divine mysteries; and their studies in Scripture and other spiritual literature have to be as truly devotional in spirit and motive as skilful in method. This is no abstract contention. It must be admitted that many scholars whose tempers and methods are secular rather than saintly have made and are making theological reputations. But none of these are able to take rank with those catholic doctors whose work commands the permanent approval of the Church, and of men qualified to estimate its value by reason of personal experience in the mysteries of the faith. If we seek an Athanasius, an Augustine, or an Aquinas, we must look among the saints — not among men of worldly spirit and methods.

The most successful theologian is compelled by self-knowledge to confess his imperfections, and that he falls far short of the holiness which is ordained for him

[1] St. John vii. 17.

by God. And it is because of this that no perfect individual theologian has ever appeared in the Church militant. One and all fall short of the mind of Christ, and He alone has exhibited on earth in their full glory the qualifications required in theologians.

Yet we need not despair. We do not hesitate to acknowledge the genuine virtue, and honour the sanctity, of many imitators of Christ, although we know that no one of them has exhibited the all-round perfection of Christ. In like manner we need not fear to accept the soundness of theologians because we see that they have not attained to the level of the only perfect Theologian, Jesus Christ. And, just as we find the holiness of our great example exhibited in the saints collectively considered, rather than in any one of them, so we regard as the true science of theology that which is developed by the devout labour of all holy theologians together, rather than the work of individual theologians, however skilful and spiritually gifted they may be.

§ 9. The character of a saint includes virtues of manifold variety. Some of these virtues are more elementary and central than others, so that their presence goes far to redeem a character otherwise defective. The greatest of all Christian virtues is love, and while love in its fulness is comprehensive in its range, it is not holy love unless God is its central object. One may love his fellow men without loving God, but such love is not Christian love, and does not constitute that holy charity which saints are required to exhibit to their neighbours.

Now this holy love of God constitutes not only the primary and most indispensable element of sainthood, but also the leading qualification of a sound theologian. Love illuminates the understanding and gives the mind a capacity of discernment which nothing else can supply. Only those who love us deeply can understand us fully, and do justice to us amid the confusion of circumstances. This is seen in childhood. The loving child discerns the mind and will of its parents before a word has been uttered, and hastens to fulfil what has been intuitively discerned as best meeting the lovingly appreciated nature and disposition of the parents. So it is in discerning the nature and will of God. Only the loving child of God enters rightly into the mind of God. Such an one intuitively reads the divine nature and character as an open book; for love can always understand love, and God is love.[1] And with this understanding of God's character there is present an ability to interpret the slightest indications of the divine mind and purpose rightly, and to translate them into words as well as actions.

A theologian cannot get on truly without the illuminating power of this love of God. A loveless theologian is necessarily an unsuccessful one. But the possession of sincere affection towards God and the things of God goes very far towards securing success for a theologian in spite of his spiritual defects in other directions. Were this not so, were there not some central virtue,

[1] "Everyone that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not knoweth not God; for God is love." 1 John iv. 7–8.

the possession of which would help us to understand God prior to an entire assimilation of ourselves to the divine character, we could not hope to build up a true science of theology. God would be beyond our interpretation altogether — a baffling enigma instead of the solution of every difficulty. His government of the past, and His revealed purposes, would seem arbitrary and capricious instead of glorious exhibitions of a nature and character wherein perfect reason and wisdom have their source and abiding place.

So it is that a penitent sinner is better qualified to become a sound, and even a great theologian, than is the man of upright life whose heart has not been deeply touched with love towards God. Penitence means the triumph of love over one's past weakness or perversity, for what distinguishes penitence from remorse and from every other substitute is the presence of love as the motive for shame and hatred of one's sins. Our Lord Himself bore witness that one who has been forgiven much loves much.[1] Love is what makes one persevere in advances towards perfection. In its earlier stages it is the germ and promise of perfection. In its ultimate development it constitutes perfection and assimilates us to God. Therefore, one who possesses it, and is increasing in it, has laid hold of the supreme and most necessary qualification of a true theologian.[2] Other and mental qualifications, such

[1] St. Luke vii. 41–47.

[2] The story is told of St. Thomas Aquinas, the wonder of the schools, that one day, as he was praying, the figure on a crucifix

as have been described elsewhere, are indeed also necessary, but they will be possessed in vain, if the spiritual ones, especially the love of God, are lacking.

§ 10. If what has been said touching spiritual qualifications is true, it is in fact indisputable, the need of divine grace should be sufficiently clear. In man's natural state, by reason of the effects of sin, "every imagination of the thoughts of his heart is only evil continually." [1] The will cannot be turned in the first instance towards God except by the impulse of prevenient grace; and the spiritual culture which must be possessed by a successful theologian is impossible without sacramental grace. Spiritual capacity involves for its realization the possession of spiritual life — the life which is resident in the Body of Christ, and which is communicated to us through the instrumentality of Holy Baptism.

Moreover, the regenerate mind is not fully equipped for the knowledge of God apart from those special illuminations which are involved in the gifts of God's Holy Spirit, conferred in the Sacrament of Confirmation. And the value of these gifts depends not only upon our cherishing and using them, but upon a

turned towards him and said, "Thomas, thou hast written well of Me; what reward desirest thou?" "Nought save Thyself, Lord," was the reply. It was personal love for a living Lord that enabled St. Athanasius to divide the word of truth rightly in the midst of conflict with subtle heretics of opposite type, and to maintain the faith *contra mundum*. He never sank to the level of embittered and one-sided partisanship.

[1] Gen. vi. 5.

frequent renewal of our spiritual vitality by means of habitual reception of the living and life-giving Body and Blood of Christ.

Furthermore it is "requisite," not only to a worthy reception of the Sacrament of the Altar, but also to clearness of theological vision, that no man should come to the study of divine things "but with a full trust in God's mercy, and with a quiet conscience." Sin, if it has not been purged away by penitence and absolving grace, clouds the spiritual understanding and is responsible for many a perversion of divine truth. To secure this grace penitence must be sufficiently deep and effectual. If this condition is inadequately fulfilled love grows cold, some of the blinding effect of sin remains, and the theologian is seriously handicapped. Thus it is that, whenever sacramental absolution is needed to perfect repentance and secure perfect cleansing and quieting of the conscience, it is also needed to qualify the sinner for theological work.

No doubt what has been said will command assent so far as it concerns the relation of the Sacraments to personal salvation. But the point here made is that, in the strictest scientific sense, a use of the Sacraments is indispensable for acquiring and maintaining the equipment of a theologian. One can no more succeed in mastering divine mysteries, as a theologian is required to master them, without habitual resort to sacramental assistance, than a chemist can succeed in analyzing what he is continually defiling with alien

matter through neglecting to cleanse frequently and chemically his hands and his instruments.

§ 11. The effect of divine grace in qualifying a theologian will be more readily perceived, perhaps, after a brief description of the sevenfold gifts of the Holy Spirit in their relation to the spiritual mind.[1]

(*a*) The gifts of understanding and wisdom have to do with divine mysteries, and are peculiarly necessary for dogmatic theologians. Thus that of *understanding* imparts intuitive and discerning power with which to penetrate into the realities of the spiritual world and perceive their true and exact nature. It increases the analytical faculty in things pertaining to God — a faculty of great importance in the study of theology.

(*b*) The gift of *wisdom* enables the mind to apprehend divine mysteries in their bearing on other truths and upon life. It enlarges the faculty of perceiving the spiritual value and likelihood of theological propositions, and of co-ordinating truths together in their correct relations. Thus it increases the synthetic faculty, whereby the manifold truths of theology are grasped in a scientific manner — that is, so as to exhibit their unity as constituting one organic body of truth and one faith.

(*c*) The gifts of knowledge and counsel pertain to

[1] We follow in general the mind of St. Thomas. See *Summa Theol.*, II. II. viii., ix., xix., xlv., lii., cxxi., cxxxix. Ewer gives an admirable popular exposition in *Operation of the Holy Spirit*, Conf. iv. Cf. Hutchings, *Person . . . of the Holy Ghost*, pp. 192–206, 244–247, 265–272.

the study of moral principles and laws, and their application to conduct. They are especially valuable to moral theologians. The gift of *knowledge* assists in the perception of moral obligations in a manner somewhat parallel to the working of the gift of understanding in the study of divine truth. That is, it enhances the analytical faculty, and enables it to penetrate into and discern accurately the nature of moral principles and obligations.

(*d*) The gift of *counsel* corresponds in the moral sphere to that of wisdom in the theoretical sphere. It is a synthetical faculty of practical judgment, peculiarly valuable to the casuistical theologian. By means of it the bearings of general moral principles upon particular cases of action are perceived, and the conscience is enabled by the Spirit "to have a right judgment in all things." [1]

Doctrine and life are vitally connected, so that the gifts which enable us to discern and judge accurately in one help us to do the same in the other. Thus all four of the gifts thus far described are helpful both to dogmatic and moral theologians.

(*e*) The gift of *ghostly strength* fortifies every faculty of the soul, and, in particular, the faculty of faith. It supplies the courage needed for what is called the "venture of faith," or the bold and persevering committal of one's life and conduct to the control of divinely revealed mysteries. We have seen in an earlier chapter that faith does not attain that certainty which is equiv-

[1] For which we pray in the collect for Whitsunday.

alent to knowledge apart from living the life which our faith marks out for us. We must verify doctrine by personal experiment, by spiritual experience, before we can feel that we know its truth, and do not merely accept the knowledge of another on trust. No theologian, therefore, can dispense with the gift of ghostly strength.

(*f*) The gift of *true godliness* or religious piety deepens our tender affection for divine things, and is thus directly concerned with what we have seen to be a primary qualification of the true theologian — the love of God and of all that pertains to Him.

(*g*) The gift of *holy fear* qualifies the theologian in a way which we have not yet described. Fear may be *servile*, called forth by anticipation of future punishment; *mundane*, produced by contemplation of judgments from people in the world; or *initial*, concerned with a prospective loss of heaven. *Holy* fear is distinct from these and more worthy. It is practically anxiety to please God, accompanied by lowly reverence before His divine majesty. Isaiah felt such fear when he cried out, "Woe is me! for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips; for mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord of Hosts." [1] It is not a fear of the wrath of God, but self-abasement, intensified by love in the presence of transcendent holiness and spiritual glory — a fear actuated by the sense that such an One as God must in the nature of things be approached in

[1] Isa. vi. 5.

the garb of holiness or lowly penitence, if approached at all.

The theologian requires such a grace, not only for the avoidance of vain presumption in dealing with his sacred subject — a presumption which brings spiritual death in its train — but also for success in his scientific work. The nature of God cannot truly be apprehended apart from a sense of His spiritual infinitude and the utter inferiority of man, especially of sinful man. The study of theology cannot be approached safely or successfully in the familiar and self-assured manner which characterizes scientific labour in non-theological spheres. God is indeed immanent, and not far from any one of His children; but He is in His nature transcendent, so that when we contemplate Him the place whereon we stand is holy ground. We must remove our sin-stained shoes from off our feet.[1] Until we can look upon Him with reverential and adoring love, and this is impossible save by the grace of holy fear, we shall misapprehend Him altogether.

§ 12. A perfect theologian is a perfect man. There has been but one such. But by disciplined exercise of the gifts of God's Holy Spirit, and such other qualifications as are necessary for scientific pursuits, one can become at least a sound theologian, and thus a source of inestimable blessing to his fellow men. The Spirit distributes His gifts in diverse proportions to the children of God, severally as He wills, and the gifts which

[1] As Moses was ordered to do before the burning bush. Exod. iii. 5.

qualify the theologians of the Church are not imparted to them in the same measure or proportions.[1] So it is that some are fitted to excel in one branch of sacred study, some in another. But no devout priest need fear that the Spirit of truth will refuse him such a measure of gifts as is necessary in order that he should become at least a sound theologian, properly qualified to guide souls through the mental and spiritual snares of our modern and chaotic religious atmosphere.

We do not feel justified in closing this Introduction to Dogmatic Theology without insisting upon the necessity and obligation of such spiritual exercises, and such labours in theological study, as are required for a fulfilment of the inspired demand that "the priest's lips should keep knowledge." [2]

But the Church needs those who are called to be great theologians, whose eyes are quickened and enlarged to see that no labour on earth has so precious a reward immediately as the study of the nature, the operations, the purposes, and the glory of the King in His beauty. Would that more of our clergy might realize this, and perceive that when the Church is wanting in masters of the sacred science she becomes the stamping ground of error and, as in our own day, of specious and altogether baneful and hateful liberalism.

To be great is a natural and justifiable ambition, when not perverted by the spirit of vain rivalry. When

[1] 1 Cor. xii. 4–31.
[2] Mal. ii. 7.

we take into account the spiritual character and gifts which are involved in theological study, and the exalted value of the queen of sciences, we feel justified in expressing the conviction that a priest who is also a truly great theologian is greatest among all the children of men — greatest in character, greatest in mind, and greatest in achievement. We would rather take rank with an Athanasius or an Aquinas than with a Cæsar, with a Darwin, or with any of those upon whom the world bestows its applause. The time will come when such applause will cease to satisfy. The world which Cæsars rule and Darwins study —

> ". . . the great globe itself,
> Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve;
> And . . . Leave not a rack behind." [1]

It will give place to another world, the laws of which theology alone considers of all the sciences. Both the work and the glory of a true theologian continue forever, and afford benefits and satisfactions which are at once holy and immortal.

[1] Shakespeare, *Tempest*, Act IV, Sc. 1.

CHAPTER X

LITERATURE OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY

I. *The Use of Previous Theological Literature*

§ 1. It has been seen in previous chapters[1] that, although grounded in the immutable premises of the catholic faith, Dogmatic Theology grows richer and more mature as the ages roll on; and that each age takes up the theological developments of previous ages in order to carry them further. Theologians are therefore dependent upon what their predecessors have done, and have need to be familiar with the previous literature of Dogmatic Theology, both patristic and of later date.

It has also been seen, on the one hand, that previous writers are none of them infallible, so that it is their consentient teaching rather than the views of single writers and schools which has authority; and, on the other hand, that early writers have this peculiar value, that their success in exhibiting the Church's real mind in the several subjects of their discussions has been fully ascertained, so that we are able to learn what weight may be attributed to their several opinions.

It remains, then, to make a rapid survey of classic literature in Dogmatic Theology, with especial atten-

[1] See ch. iii. § 14; viii. § 14.

tion to patristic writings, and to name treatises which are of especial importance to theological students.

§ 2. Each successive age has shown a tendency to devote itself especially to the development of some particular department of dogmatic truth. Thus, in the patristic period theologians were engaged in consolidating tradition, in meeting pagan attacks, in defining the leading doctrines of the traditional faith in such wise as to shut out heresy, and in illustrating the faith by scriptural exegesis. The exigencies of controversy with heretics led to special attention being paid in the East to the Trinity and the Incarnation, and to anthropology and soteriology in the West. The peculiar metaphysical temper of the Easterns and the juristic and practical temper of the Westerns accentuated this difference, which did not issue, however, in any general divergence touching fundamental doctrine.

It remained for the mediæval writers to undertake seriously the task of co-ordinating the Church's dogmas, to develop theological science in its comprehensive sense, to formulate sacramental doctrine, and to enlist in the service of theology the best thought of alien philosophy.

The protestant revolution threw all subjects into controversy, and led to further elaborations of the doctrine of the Church and the Sacraments, and the rule of faith. The subjects of justification and predestination were also more fully discussed.

Modern theology has had to face a sudden and staggering enlargement of knowledge in the physical

and historical sciences; and this has led to a reconstruction not only of apologetics but of much doctrinal terminology. The subject of eschatology has also received more adequate attention than heretofore. The superficial characteristic of contemporary literature is its exhibition of more or less chaotic confusion, due partly to the divided state of Christendom, which has fostered private judgment, and partly to the remarkable achievements of scientific experts. Private judgment is rampant, accompanied by exaggerated deference to mere expertness in criticism. Many truths seem to be in solution to those who have lost their hold on the catholic point of view, and futile efforts are being made to reconstruct theology on rationalistic and humanitarian lines. The time has come, evidently, for a revival of a Dogmatic Theology which shall be based on the ancient faith, but exhibit that faith in a light that will extricate the thinkers of our time from the chaotic confusion of new knowledge not yet sufficiently related to the old.

§ 3. Patristic literature is necessarily of the greatest importance to theological students. In the first place, the relative value and weight to be attached to the several writers of early ages and to their particular treatises has long been settled, so that we can study them with secure discrimination.

Again, it is only by resort to patristic writers that we come into living contact with the ecclesiastical mind and purpose that is registered in the decisions and decrees of the Ecumenical Councils. Their writings

lay bare the issues which were at stake, and thus enable us to perceive the bearing and importance of catholic definitions. A study even of the best histories of doctrine does not afford an adequate substitute in this direction; and that study, if sufficient, must include much consultation of the patristic sources from which its data have to be drawn.

Some of the Fathers lived in an age when oral traditions from the Apostles had not lost their vividness and value. So it is that a peculiar importance attaches to the literature of the sub-apostolic period. This importance has been exaggerated by some, and we have need to bear in mind that the so-called Apostolic Fathers were men of unequal capacity and were not invariably successful in perpetuating the apostolic mind and temper. They were certainly far from being infallible.

One advantage of going back to the Fathers must not be forgotten. By so doing we escape from the confusion of present-day controversies, and are able to consider the issues at stake as they were fought out under other conditions, conditions which interest but do not confuse us. Thus we freshen our hold upon the central truths and principles of our religion, and discover that the errors of our own time are but the raising of issues in new forms that were long ago determined by the Church.

An Anglican can least of all disregard patristic literature; for the appeal to antiquity is one of the great safeguards of his position amid the confusions of to-day, and is especially emphasized by all our great divines.

To make this appeal intelligently is impossible without much patristic study.

But the appeal to antiquity does not imply a disparagement of the literature of succeeding ages. When we maintain that our position is ancient we do not mean that it ceased to be maintained during the mediæval period. Continuity is vital to us. We appeal to that which has been held *always* in the Church. Accordingly, the *Summas* and other theological works of later date constitute for us the connecting link between the ancient definitions of the Catholic Church and present-day terminology. And unless our terminology is true to the legitimate and catholic developments of all the ages, it needs to be amended so as to become so. No age can safely construct a new theology without regard for its previous historical development.

§ 4. But theological literature is of vast extent, and no individual student can hope to do more than consider select portions of it. The traditional advice to read the Fathers is no doubt of value; but even the Fathers are of very uneven utility to a twentieth-century priest, who is usually hindered rather than helped in his theological studies by undertaking to read them consecutively, and without omissions, from the beginning. There should be a judicious selection of what has chief importance in relation to the Church's exercise of her dogmatic office, and is of the highest intrinsic and theological excellence. The same holds good of later theology. Many a weighty tome may be ignored

to advantage by all but specialists and advanced readers. Proportion in reading is exceedingly important.

Catenas, or collections of quotations from earlier writers, intended to show their consent in particular doctrines, have value, but may easily be abused. Their proper use is introductory simply. They show us where to read if we would ascertain earlier opinions touching the doctrines with which they are concerned. But quotations from ancient writings rarely preserve their precise original meaning and bearing when torn from their context and assembled in catenas. We need to read the context in each case, if we would be certain of the mind of the writers who are quoted.

The young student especially needs help in piloting his way through early literature. He can gain this by reading Church histories which give attention to ecclesiastical writers,[1] and histories of catholic doctrine in general or of particular doctrines.[2] Several useful

[1] Thus Dupin's, *History of Ecclesiastical Writers*, gives summaries of the contents of all the chief theological literature up to his own time (the 17th century). Wordsworth's *Church History* pays especial attention to patristic writers.

[2] Bethune-Baker's *History of Doctrine* should be mentioned; also those of Hagenbach, Seeberg, Neander, and especially that of Harnack. We do not commend these for their point of view and interpretations, but for their exact scholarship. The same may be said of Dorner's *History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ*. Among briefer works on sound lines should be mentioned Newman's *Arians of the Fourth Century;* and Pullan's *Early Christian Doctrine*. Bull's and Waterland's *Works* have great value; also Petavius, *De Dogmatibus*, and Thomassinus. Cave's *History of Ecclesiastical*

works can be consulted that deal directly with patristic reading.[1]

II. *Ante-Nicene Literature*

§ 5. Our aim in this chapter is to make a rapid survey of the more important contributions to Dogmatic Theology in all ages. To this end we shall divide this literature into four periods, viz., (*a*) Ante-Nicene; (*b*) Dogmatic period; (*c*) Mediæval; (*d*) Modern.

The period with which we are first concerned — the Ante-Nicene — introduces us to (*a*) the Apostolic Fathers, whose nearness in time to New Testament days gives their writings an importance not altogether dependent upon their intrinsic excellence; (*b*) the early apologists against pagan philosophers and heathen superstition and immorality; (*c*) those who wrote against early heresies and thus were led to define traditional doctrines — not always with complete success; (*d*) the Alexandrian and Antiochene schools, which emphasized

Writers (Latin) is a mine of information. Oxenham's *Catholic Doctrine of the Atonement*, Darwell Stone's *Holy Communion*, and Freeman's *Principles of Divine Service* are useful. These are merely samples.

[1] The little series of *Primers of Early Christian Literature*, edited by Geo. P. Fisher, is very serviceable. Also Schmid's *Manual of Patrology;* and Swete's *Patristic Study* — especially helpful to beginners. We have but skimmed the surface of helps to theological reading.

Most of the patristic writings referred to in this chapter are translated into English, and are to be found either in the Oxford *Library of the Fathers*, the *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, edited by Coxe, or the *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, two series, edited by Schaff.

somewhat opposed methods and tempers in theology; and (*e*) Western writers not included in the groups above mentioned.

§ 6. We come first to the Apostolic Fathers, so-called as having had contact with the Apostles, and as presumably able to recall personally their oral teaching. The student will quickly discover that these Fathers suffer by comparison with the Apostles, and were more loyal to tradition than capable of developing traditional doctrine theologically. The most important for our purpose are Sts. Clement of Rome, and Ignatius of Antioch.

Clement's *Epistle to the Corinthians* (about 95 A.D.) was caused by internal revolt against the ministers of that Church, and the writer is led to make important statements concerning the origin of the Christian ministry.

St. Ignatius' seven extant *Epistles* (about 110 A.D.) deal in a different way with the same subject and bear witness to the necessity of Bishops, Presbyters, and Deacons to a Church. The Virgin-birth of our Lord is also emphatically affirmed.

The *Didache* or *Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* is also important. It represents a somewhat undeveloped Judaic Christianity, and throws light on the development of the ministry and upon the two greater Sacraments as then administered.

The *Shepherd* of Hermas, a product of early Roman Christianity, is in form apocalyptic and figurative, but throws some light on the doctrine of the Church.

The rest of the writings of the Apostolic Fathers are less significant for our purpose, although the *Fragments* of Papias ought to be taken note of.

§ 7. The apologists of this period had to grapple with the philosophical bearings of Christian doctrine, especially of the Logos teaching of St. John. Thus they contributed to the early formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity.

The Letter to Diognetus, by an unknown writer; The two *Apologies* of Justyn Martyr; his *Dialogue with Trypho*, the Jew; Athenagoras on *the Resurrection of the Dead;* and Theophilus' *Ad Autolycum* and the *Apology* of Aristides, recently recovered, are of chief importance.

§ 8. The rise of Gnosticism and other heresies led to rich theological developments. St. Irenæus' great work, *Against Heresies*, has importance as registering Asiatic and Joannine traditions, and deals incidentally with many doctrinal questions.

Tertullian of Africa was a vigorous and acute writer, who did much to determine the future trend of Latin theology, as well as to crystallize certain terms connected with the Trinity and the Incarnation. His chief doctrinal works are *Prescription of Heretics*, which deals with the tradition of doctrine; *Against Marcion; Against Praxeas*, on the Trinity; *The Flesh of Christ*, on the Incarnation; and *The Resurrection of the Flesh.* These works are of primary importance in the history of doctrine.

Hippolytus' *Philosophumena* or *Refutation of all the*

Heresies, gives insight into Gnosticism and affords a third-century sequel to Irenæus.

§ 9. The schools of Alexandria and Antioch stood respectively for the mystico-theological and the literalistic-logical tempers. The Alexandrians were for two centuries the champions of orthodoxy, while the Antiochene school produced several of the heretical leaders of the ancient Church.

The writings of Clement, head of the Alexandrian school, 190 to 203 A.D., are apologetical in aim, and constitute a serious attempt to employ Greek philosophy as the handmaid of theology. His three chief works constitute a series. They are a mine of information touching the ancient world, and are rich in doctrine, although professedly written with reserve. They are *Exhortation to the Greeks;* the *Instructor;* and the *Miscellany.*

His successor, Origen, was the greatest genius of the ancient Church, but was daring in his speculations, and propounded opinions that the Church has since rejected. His *De Principiis* was the first attempt to produce a systematic treatise in doctrine on catholic principles. It has come down in a somewhat free Latin translation. As a pioneer work it was necessarily crude, and unsound in particulars, but can hardly be overlooked. His treatise *Against Celsus* the philosopher meets all the current objections against Christianity. His views are summarized in the *Philocalia*, compiled out of his multitudinous works by Sts. Basil and Gregory Nazianzen. Origen did much to develop

Trinitarian theology, but some of his statements lent themselves to Arian misuse later on.

§ 10. In the West the influence of Tertullian was strong, and shows itself in the writings of St. Cyprian of Carthage and Novatian the schismatic.

St. Cyprian's *Letters* are very interesting and touch on Episcopacy and the controversy as to the validity of Baptism by heretics. His treatise on *the Unity of the Church* constitutes an important land-mark in the development of the doctrine of the Church and its ministry.

Novatian wrote his *De Trinitate* before he became schismatic. It sums up previous theological developments in that direction, and pays some attention to the doctrine of the Spirit. It is clearly written.

III. *The Dogmatic Period*

§ 11. This is the period of the Ecumenical Councils, 325 to 787 A.D., one of central importance to Dogmatic Theology. Its writers may be grouped conveniently in relation to (*a*) the Council of Nicea; (*b*) the Council of Constantinople; (*c*) the Antiochene School; (*d*) Orthodox writers against Nestorianism and Eutychianism; (*e*) Western writers; (*f*) Later Eastern writers.

The decrees of the Ecumenical Councils are of primary importance, and their catholic authority requires that they should be thoroughly studied. They are gathered conveniently, with related matter, in Percival's *Seven Ecumenical Councils*.

§ 12. St. Athanasius' writings exhibit a richness and

balance that place them in the very first rank, quite apart from their unique place in the development of Trinitarian and Christological doctrine. His early treatises *Against the Gentiles* and *On the Incarnation* are both classic and mutually related. His later works were called forth by the Arian and Apollinarian heresies. Four *Orations Against the Arians; Epistles to Serapion*, vindicating the Person of the Holy Spirit; *Two Books On the Incarnation Against Apollinaris;* and *On the Faith to Jovian*, are of especial value to theology; but many others are important.

St. Hilary of Poictiers, rightly called the Athanasius of the West, wrote *De Synodis*, an eirenicon on the various Oriental symbols of faith; and *De Trinitate*, a full and logical vindication of orthodox teaching against both Arian and Sabellian perversions.

§ 13. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, a later confessor against Arianism, wrote *Catechetical Lectures*, which explain the articles of the faith. It constitutes an important compendium of Dogmatic Theology.

St. Basil the Great's most important theological treatises are his *Five Books Against Eunomius*, the Arian; and *On the Holy Spirit.* Some of his *Epistles* are also important.

The *Theological Orations* of St. Gregory Nazianzen pertain to Trinitarian doctrine. Some of his *Epistles* are valuable, especially one to Cledonius on Apollinarianism.

St. Gregory Nyssen was a somewhat speculative writer, and an admirer of Origen, but he was none the

less a powerful defender of the orthodox faith. His *Twelve Books Against Eunomius*, and two treatises *Against Apollinaris*, are best.

St. Epiphanius' *Panarion* against heresies, with an *Exposition of the Faith* appended to it, has considerable value in the history of doctrine. The *Ancoratus* is a rambling but historically important treatment of numerous doctrines. Its language on the procession of the Spirit is a connecting link between the Constantinopolitan Creed and the western *filioque*.

§ 14. The Alexandrian and Antiochene schools continued to exhibit wide divergences of temper, method, and teaching. Diodore of Tarsus, Theodore of Mopsuestia, St. John Chrysostom and Theodoret of Cyrus, were the chief lights of the Antiochene school. Of these Diodore and Theodore have been regarded as the real authors of the Nestorian heresy. Theodore and St. John Chrysostom were among the best of patristic commentators.

Theodoret alone of this school produced works of direct theological importance. Without actually sharing in the Nestorian heresy, he failed to realize the full bearing of it, and was unable to understand St. Cyril of Alexandria's language. Thus he occupied a false position for many years, and this destroyed the value of much of his writing. Yet his anti-Cyrilline productions have historical importance, and his *Polymorphus* is a valuable defence of the doctrine of two natures united without confusion in the one Person of Christ.

§ 15. St. Cyril of Alexandria, notwithstanding cer-

tain faults of temper, and an unfortunate phrase which was thought to be monophysite in spite of his careful explanations to the contrary, was one of the greatest theologians of antiquity, and his writings have importance but little below those of St. Athanasius. His *Twelve Anathemas* against Nestorius and his *Second Letter to Nestorius* have received ecumenical sanction. Besides these his *Five Books Against Nestorius*, his *Thesaurus* on the Trinity, *Dialogues* on the Trinity, and *The Incarnation*, are of the very greatest value.

John Cassian also wrote a treatise *on the Incarnation*, in opposition to Nestorius, which has some value.

After the death of St. Cyril the Alexandrians gave themselves up to the monophysite tendency, and Dioscorus supported the heresy of Eutyches. This heresy drew forth the famous *Tome* of Leo the Great (*Epistle* xxviii.), which was formally accepted by the Council of Chalcedon, and constitutes perhaps the most valuable brief exposition of the Person of Christ ever written. Dr. Bright has collected his Sermons and Letters on the Incarnation, and they should by all means be studied, as exhibiting a theological balance that is exceedingly rare.

§ 16. Coming to the Latin theologians not previously mentioned, St. Ambrose, who became Bishop of Milan in 374 A.D., wrote an important treatise *On the Sacraments*. Baptism, Confirmation, and the Eucharist are considered. His *Five Books of Faith* set forth the Trinity and the Incarnation against previous heresies.

On the Incarnation covers similar ground. His practical treatises anticipate St. Augustine on sin and grace, but with less one-sidedness.

St. Jerome was an impetuous controversialist, but of immense biblical learning and a sound theologian. His letters throw much light on current thought. His most important doctrinal works are his *Book Against Helvidius*, who maintained that the Blessed Virgin had other children than our Lord; and his *Dialogue Against the Pelagians*, vindicating the need of grace.

The Westerns were from this time on concerned with the doctrines of sin and grace. The denial by Pelagius and Celestius of the doctrine of original sin, and of our need of grace to will the good, and the later semi-Pelgian error that a good will may precede the assistance of grace, caused a conflict that coloured all subsequent Latin theology.

St. Augustine of Africa (d. 430 A.D.) was the greatest of all the Latin Fathers, and his writings have exercised far more influence in the West, even to this day, than any other. They are wondrously rich, and very few of them unimportant. *On Faith and the Symbol* is a brief explanation of the Creed. The *Enchiridion* is a fine short treatise of Christian doctrine, a classic of the first rank. *De Trinitate* is perhaps hard to read, but may not be neglected by any theological student. *The City of God* is the greatest of ancient apologies, and contains a summary of doctrine. His numerous treatises against the Manichæans deal with many problems of importance. His *Utility of Believing* treats of

the nature and authority of the Church. His treatises against the Donatists contain much ecclesiological doctrine.

But his works against the Pelagians, from which it is difficult to make a selection, exhibit most directly his distinctive views and his limitations. That he emphasized the doctrines of grace and predestination one-sidedly is certain, although his acceptance of sacramental doctrine and his avowed belief in human freedom and accountability should qualify this judgment somewhat.

St. Prosper carried on the conflict with Pelagian and semi-Pelagian teaching for thirty years after St. Augustine's death. His most important work is *On the Grace of God and Free Will.* He followed St. Augustine.

St. Vincent of Lerins, who died about 450 A.D., wrote the famous *Commonitorium*, in which his well-known rule of faith is set forth and explained. An Anglican can afford least of all to neglect it.

St. Fulgentius, Bishop of Ruspe in Africa (d. 533 A.D.), was a shining light in a dark age. For the barbaric Thrasamund he wrote two treatises *Against the Arians.* He also wrote a *Book on the Trinity; On the Incarnation;* and *On the Truth of Predestination*, which last influenced the Council of Orange, 529 A.D., the acts of which have almost ecumenical weight and require careful study. His work *On Faith* is a satisfactory compendium of doctrine on traditional lines.

St. Gregory the Great produced no treatises of

importance to Dogmatic Theology, but reflects in many passages the views of his age.

St. Isidore of Seville (d. 636 A.D.) crystallized all the learning of his time in numerous writings. Only his *Three Books of Sentences* require mention. They constitute a compendium of doctrine and morals, taken from the Fathers, and gave way as a text-book only to Peter Lombard's similar work in the twelfth century.

§ 17. Turning once more to the East, the writings attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite, who was converted by St. Paul at Athens, but which were produced in the sixth century, had immense influence in the Middle Ages. *The Divine Names; The Celestial Hierarchy*, which gave birth to the traditional ninefold classification of angelic ranks; and *The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy* are the most important.

St. Sophronius of Jerusalem (d. 638 A.D.) wrote a *Synodical Epistle*, in which the doctrine of the two wills and operations of Christ was clearly set forth. This treatise was sanctioned by the sixth ecumenical council, and thus has especial importance.

The same subject was treated of by St. Maximus (d. 662 A.D.) in his *Disputation Against Pyrrhus*. *The Guide of Life*, written by St. Anastasius Sinaita, deals with monophysite errors, and throws valuable light on the monophysite controversies. He also produced a short and clear *Exposition of the Faith.*

St. John of Damascus (d. before 754 A.D.) crystallized the doctrine of the Easterns in his classic treatise *On the Orthodox Faith*, which still continues to be the

most influential systematic treatise of doctrine in Eastern literature. His *Discourses Against the Iconoclasts* constitutes also the standard Eastern defence of the use of images.

IV. *The Middle Ages*

§ 18. Later writers may be dealt with more rapidly. The *Consolation of Philosophy* of Bœthius (d. 525 A.D.) had immense influence in precipitating the division of later Christian writers into the rival schools of realism and nominalism, the latter theory usually employed in heretical interests.

St. Anselm (d. 1109 A.D.) is called the father of scholastic theology. His *Proslogium*, in which the ontological argument for the being of God was set out; *Cur Deus Homo*, wherein the Anselmic theory of the Atonement was elaborated; and his *De Fide Trinitatis*, against nominalistic tritheism, are classic, and reveal splendid theological genius. His treatise *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit* has historical value.

The *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, early in the twelfth century, compiled from the Fathers, became a recognized text-book of doctrine, and the basis of numerous treatises.

The thirteenth century saw the culmination of scholasticism. The great *Summas* then appeared, *e.g.*, of Alexander of Hales and Albertus Magnus (incomplete), but especially the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas Aquinas, the Angelic Doctor (1225 to 1274 A.D.). It is without doubt the greatest of all treatises

in systematic doctrine (moral topics are considered also) ever written; nor has the progress of theological development nullified its value. Many modern problems are anticipated in its pages. Its scholastic method is, of course, peculiar to that age. St. Thomas also wrote many other valuable treatises, especially the *Summa contra Gentiles*, an apologetical work.

In the same generation appeared St. Bonaventura's *Breviloquium*, a sort of condensed *Summa*.

After this the decay of scholasticism set in, and the literature of the next two centuries need not detain us.

V. *Modern Writers*

§ 19. It is impossible to do more than give a list of the works that register the course of theological development or have unusual intrinsic value. An asterisk is attached to each of the latter.

Among the numerous Roman writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries should be mentioned Canisius (1511–1597), *Summa Doctrinæ Christianæ*, a modern Book of Sentences; commentaries rich in doctrinal matter of Cornelius a Lapide, on all the Scriptures*; Maldonatus (1534–1583), on *the Gospels;* and Estius, on *the Epistles of St. Paul;* Bellarmine (1542–1621), *Disputationes**, around which much literature gathered; Stapleton, *De Principiis Fidei Doctrinalibus;* Suarez (d. 1617), *Summa*;* Ruiz, *De Deo**; Petavius, (1583–1652), *De Dogmatibus** historical in method; Thomassinus, *Dogmata Theologica* (1680–1684).

A decay of Roman theology followed until the nine-

teenth century. John Milner (1752–1836) evoked much popular polemics by his *End of Controversy*. Mœhler (1796–1838), *Symbolism**, an important survey of the differences between catholics and protestants.

Among recent writers are Klee, *Histoire des Dogmes** (translated from the German); Perrone, *Prælectiones Theologicæ**; Franzelin, *De Deo*, *De Incarnatione*, and *De SS. Eucharistica ;* Schouppe, *Elementa Theologiæ Dogmaticæ**, very clear and handy; Kenrick, *Theologia Dogmatica ;* Tanquerey, *Synopsis Theologiæ Dogmaticæ**, much used.

§ 20. Eastern theology of modern times is not very rich. The decrees of the Council of Bethlehem (1672), with the *Orthodox Catechism of Peter Mogila ;* and the *Holy Catechism of Nicolas Bulgaris* (both translated into English), are important. See *Libri Symbolici Ecclesiæ Orientalis* by Kimmel. Also Macaire, *Théologie Dogmatique Orthodoxe**; and Guettée, *Exposition de la Doctrine de L'Eglise Catholique Orthodoxe.*

§ 21. Anglican literature is largely controversial, especially with reference to Roman claims and "Romish" tenets. This is particularly the case with writings of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Archbishop Cranmer, after abandoning the doctrine of transubstantiation, wrote *A Defence of the True Catholic Doctrine of the Sacrament*, etc. Gardiner replied in *An Explication and Assertion of the True Catholic Faith*, etc.; and Cranmer rejoined in a still fuller work. It is Calvinistic. John Jewel (d. 1571), *Apol-*

ogy for the Church of England; and Bilson, *Perpetual Government of Christ's Church* (1593).

Richard Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity** (1593–1600) was epoch-making, and initiated a remarkable display of learning in the seventeenth century. Richard Field (1561–1616), *Of the Church;* John Davenant (1576–1641), *Disputatio de Justitia Habituali et Actuali;* Bishop Andrewes (1555–1626), controversial works, *Sermons* (especially *On the Nativity**) and *Pattern of Catechistical Doctrine;* Thos. Jackson (1579–1640), *Works* (treatises on the Creed); Wm. Laud (1573–1645), *Conference with Fisher;* Wm. Chillingworth (1602–1644), *Religion of Protestants;* Herbert Thorndike*, *Of the Government of Churches; The Covenant of Grace;* and *The True Principle of Comprehension;* Wm. Forbes of Edinburgh, *Modest Considerations** (dealing with justification, purgatory, invocations, etc.); Jeremy Taylor (1613–1667), *The Real and Spiritual Presence of Christ;* and *The Liberty of Prophesying;* John Cosin (1595–1672), *History of Transubstantiation;* Archbishop Bramhall (1593–1663), *Just Vindication of the Church of England;* Henry Hammond (1605–1660), *Practical Catechism;* Joseph Mead (1586–1638), *The Christian Sacrifice;* John Pearson (1612–1686), *Exposition of the Creed**; and *De Deo**; Isaac Barrow (1630–1677), *The Unity of the Church; the Pope's Supremacy**; and *Sermons on the Creed;* Wm. Beveridge (1638–1708), *Thirty-Nine Articles;* and *Thesaurus Theologicus.*

Bishop Bull* (1634–1710), *Harmonia Apostolica* (on

Justification); *Defence of the Nicene Faith; Judgment of the Catholic Church; The First Covenant and the State of Man Before the Fall;* and *The Corruptions of the Church of Rome* (in answer to Bossuet's queries); Wm. Sherlock, *Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity* (accused of being tritheistic); Daniel Waterland (1683–1740), *Works* on the Trinity and Divinity of Christ* (drawn forth by Samuel Clarke's high Arian *Scriptural Doctrine of the Trinity*); Bishop Butler (1692–1752), *Analogy of Religion Natural and Revealed** William Law (1686–1761), *Three Letters to Hoadley** (against latitudinarian views); John Johnson (1662–1725), *The Unbloody Sacrifice;* Wm. Wall (1648–1728), *History of Infant Baptism**; Wm. Jones of Nayland (1726–1799), *Catholic Doctrine of the Trinity** (wholly biblical); and *Essay on the Church**; Wm. Paley (1743–1805), *Natural Theology**; Samuel Horsley (1733–1806), *Tracts against Priestley** (brief in form but notable).

Wm. Magee (1763–1831) initiated nineteenth-century theology with his *Dissertation on Atonement and Sacrifice.* Mant's *Bampton Lectures* of 1811 contained two lectures on Regeneration and Conversion that roused the Calvinists; Alex. Knox (d. 1831) followed with *The Doctrine Respecting Baptism Held by the Church of England**; S. J. Coleridge (1772–1834), in *The Friend* and *Aids to Reflection,* sowed the seeds of broad church thought developed by Maurice, Arnold, and Stanley. *Tracts for the Times** (1833 *et seq.*), initiated the catholic revival, and changed the whole

tone of Anglican theology for the better. John Keble (1792–1866), *The Christian Year; Eucharistical Adoration**; E. B. Pusey (1800–1882), *On the Phrase "And the Son"**; *Holy Baptism** (Tracts for the Times); *The Real Presence** (two works); *Eirenicon**; *What is of Faith as to Everlasting Punishment**; and numerous smaller works of critical importance; J. H. Newman (1801–1890), *Arians of the Fourth Century**; *Justification**; Notes in his translation of *St. Athanasius;* Tracts *Theological and Ecclesiastical**; *Grammar of Assent**; *Development of Doctrine* (by which he wrote himself into the Roman Church); Wm. Palmer, *Of the Church**; R. I. Wilberforce (1800–1857), *The Incarnation**; *The Holy Eucharist**; A P. Forbes, *Thirty-Nine Articles**; *Theological Defence**; *Nicene Creed**; Jas. B. Mozley (1818–1878), *Miracles**; *Predestination**; *Development**; Geo. Moberly, *The Holy Spirit;* R. C. Trench (1807–1886), *Notes on the Miracles of our Lord**; M. F. Sadler, *Emmanuel; Church Doctrine**; *Second Adam**; *One Offering*; The Justification of Life**; Christopher Wordsworth (1807–1888), *Inspiration;* H. P. Liddon (1829–1890), *Divinity of our Lord**; *Some Elements of Religion**; and many of his sermons; R. C. Moberly, *Reason and Religion; Ministerial Priesthood**; *Atonement and Personality;* B. F. Westcott, *The Historic Faith, Revelation of the Father; Gospel of the Resurrection;* and *Gospel of Creation* in his *Epistles of St. John;* T. T. Carter, *Doctrine of Confession**; *Doctrine of the Priesthood**; H. C. Powell, *Principle of the Incarnation.**

In America, Bishop Hobart (1775–1830), *Baptismal Regeneration;* Bishop Hopkins (1792–1868), *The End of Controversy Controverted;* James De Koven (1831–1879), *Theological Defence**; F. W. Ewer (1826–1883), *Grammar of Theology; The Holy Spirit**; W. E. McLaren (1831–1905), *Catholic Dogma**; W. J. Gold, *Sacrificial Worship**; Thos. Richey, *Truth and Counter Truth.**

The above list of Anglican contributions to Dogmatic Theology is not by any means exhaustive, and contains works of very uneven value. It ought to vindicate the contention, however, that the unsystematic and frequently controversial nature of our literature has not prevented the production of numerous treatises that ought to be studied carefully by theological students. The works of living writers are not included in our list.

THE KENOTIC THEORY

CONSIDERED WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO ITS ANGLICAN FORMS AND ARGUMENTS

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